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THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF MIDDLE MANAGERS

by



JAN LAWSON

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF MIDDLE MANAGERS submitted by JAN LAWSON in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration.

ABSTRACT

In view of the growing numbers and importance of white collar staff and professional management which have accompanied the large scale bureaucratization of Canadian political and economic organizations, comparatively little empirical evidence is available on the political attitudes and participation of this group. This study was intended, in part, to remedy this deficiency in empirical knowledge using a sample of Western Canadian Middle Management. The study also investigated the possible relationships of political attitudes and participation to demographic and social variables, organizational and job variables, and to party affiliation and other political attitudes.

The sample consisted of 621 business and government employees (middle management and staff) enrolled in the management development program at the University of Alberta, Edmonton.

Political variables measured were party affiliation, levels of voting and active participation, alienation, intolerance, anti-French attitudes, attitudes to welfare and free enterprise, and nineteenth century liberalism. Demographic variables included age, education, sex, income, ethnic origin, religion and church attendance, social and geographic mobility. Organizational variables tested are type of organization, level in organization, number of promotions and number of years worked for the company. Job variables included satisfaction, routinization, uncertainty, changes, role definition and group cohesion.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Introduction

In the twentieth century the Canadian economy has become increasingly bureaucratized. In the nineteenth century Canada was mainly a nation of independent farmers and small merchants and manufacturers. Now it is, by and large, a nation of large organizations, giant national and multi-national corporations, federal and provincial civil services administering government programs, and quasi-public industries such as nationalized transportation and communications networks. At the same time Canada has changed from a rural to an urban dwelling population.

Equivalent changes have occurred in the composition of the labour force in order to meet the demands of these new bureaucratic organizations. While numbers engaged in entrepreneurial activities (the old middle class) and in unskilled labour (working class) have both declined, white collar salaried workers (the new middle class) have increased in number to fill the widening gap. By 1960, 40% of the Canadian labour force were white collar workers.¹ This new middle class is not a class of property owners. Canada, according to Porter, does not have a large, middle level, investing class.² Their prestige and security rests entirely with their jobs, which in turn depend upon the labour market. The way of progress for the white collar worker is promotion through the hierarchy of the bureaucracies which use his specialized skills, education and experience. That some are very successful is confirmed by Porter who notes "the virtual disappearance of the independent entrepreneur" among the

economic elite of Canada.³ The economic elite of Canada is now dominated by career bureaucrats.⁴

Observers of the phenomenal rise of this "new middle class" have speculated on the influence of the bureaucratization of work on political behaviour since this new class does not fit in the traditional, bourgeoisie-proletariat class structure. It is fairly obvious that this group is not a cohesive unit. It does not have the unifying property interest of the old middle class. Aspirations of upward mobility and acceptance of middle class, free enterprise norms precludes the worker solidarity of the unionized working class.⁵ C. Wright Mills said of the new middle class in the United States, that finding no political party to represent their interests and aspirations they would become increasingly alienated, apathetic and apolitical.⁶ In view of the growth and importance of this group, the prospect that 40% of the work force may be potentially or actually apathetic is a serious challenge to the democratic process. Yet empirical data on the political attitudes and rate of political participation of this "new middle class" is almost entirely lacking.

The Purpose of this Study

The purpose of this study is threefold:

1. To collect and analyze empirical data on the political attitudes and participation of Western Canadian salaried, white collar, bureaucratic, "new middle class." The political variables to be measured include voting frequency, active political participation (other than voting), party identification, political alienation, intolerance of non-conformity, anti-French attitudes, "laissez-faire" (attitudes to govern-

ment interference in the economy), and attitudes to government welfare measures.

2. To relate political attitudes to demographic variables in order to establish some predictors of Western Canadian attitudes. Such factors as education, income, sex, age, social and geographical mobility, ethnic origin and religion and church attendance will be treated as possible predictive factors.

3. To relate job and organizational variables to political attitudes with the intention of isolating those aspects of white collar jobs or bureaucratic organizations that influenced political attitudes or participation. Organizational variables tested were type of organization (private--type of ownership and size, public--federal, provincial, municipal), level in organization (executive - clerical supervisor), number of promotions, number of years worked for the company. Job variables included, satisfaction, routinization, uncertainty, changes and role definition, and group cohesion.

The New Middle Class in Western Industrial Democracies

Dahrendorf defines the 'new middle class' as being white collar salaried workers occupying a place in a bureaucratic hierarchy.⁷ Certain workers are salaried but not "white collar." These are excluded by Dahrendorf, others are white collar but do not work in a bureaucratic organization.⁸ These too are also excluded by Dahrendorf, however this group is represented in this sample. "White collar" includes a large range of occupations from clerical and sales to professionals such as accountants and company lawyers, right up to the top management.

The new middle class differs from the old middle class or bourgeoisie because they are not property owning capitalists. C. Wright Mills sees the bourgeoisie who can live on their property as being a small minority, "2 or 3% of the population who now own 40 or 50% of the private property in the United States of America."⁹ Porter found a similar concentration of wealth in Canada.¹⁰ For most white collar employees ownership of the means of production is out of range.

The source of prestige of the white collar workers, according to C. Wright Mills, comes in part because of the similarity of place and type of work to those of the old middle classes which has allowed them to borrow prestige.¹¹ Claims to higher status have mainly been economic, because of the higher incomes of the white collar group. However, these claims to higher status are challenged by organized labour and the differences in income between manual workers and white collar workers has consistently diminished during the course of the twentieth century.¹²

Threatened by the rising economic importance of the manual worker, the bureaucrat has taken refuge behind middle class norms and the possibility of upward mobility. Presthus observed that the upward mobile often have skills in human and public relations which allowed them to rise in the organization and that they are typically distinguished by high morale and a high level of job satisfaction.¹³ The authoritarian, or power-oriented, individual is likely to prefer a bureaucratic career because it offers both security and power.¹⁴

Bureaucracies provide a hierarchy up which an aspiring individual may progress despite barriers. There is also a large amount of social mobility between generations, mostly accomplished through the educational

system.¹⁵ To a large extent a person's social position is dependent on his educational achievement. Thus the new middle class bureaucrats are characterized by high social mobility, both between generations as well as within them and by emphasis on higher education. Mills sees the psychology of the white collar worker as the psychology of prestige striving.¹⁶ This striving may be expressed either in the form of symbolic prestige from the kind of firm worked for, the sort of office, the chair or even the pen set one has, or in terms of material success (house, car, cruise, etc.) or both.

Mills goes on to state that these groups in the United States have no middle party to represent their interests, propertyless and under pressure from highly paid manual workers, this social strata becomes indifferent and politically ignorant.¹⁷ He traces the causes of this apathy to:

- a. The mass media with its euphoric "soap operas" which do not stimulate political thought but rather deaden it;
- b. The possibility of upward mobility, emphasis is put on economic rather than political institutions;
- c. The corruption of politics in the United States and the belief that political action is not effective.

Weber also observed that separation of the white collar worker from the tools of production would lead to powerlessness or alienation.¹⁸ If Mills and Weber are correct in their conclusions, this group becomes, according to Kornhauser and others,¹⁹ targets for the totalitarian or intolerant movements of "mass society."

Yet even accepting Mills' observations we do not have to come to the same conclusions. For example, because of upward striving this group may identify with middle class norms which make it almost mandatory to

participate, at least by voting and by paying lip service to democratic ideals. Dahrendorf sees the two-thirds of these white collar employees who are bureaucrats identifying with the bourgeois class; white non-bureaucratic white collar employees, such as the salesgirl and the office boy, will identify with the working class.²⁰ Dahrendorf quotes studies in Germany and Britain to show that two-thirds of white collar workers vote Conservative and one-third vote Socialist.²¹

This latter view seems to fit the empirical findings on political attitudes. Tingsten, in a collection of studies from a large number of European nations before World War II, showed in every case that political participation, both voting and active campaigning, were related to social status.²² Occupation, income and education were all used as measures of social status. Thus, before the war and in Europe at least, we cannot say that the white collar worker was apathetic, although there is evidence that the marginal middle class, including white collar workers, were disproportionate and early supporters of fascist movements.²³ These findings have also held good in more recent years and for other countries. For example, in a study of the United States, Germany, Italy, Mexico and Britain, Almond and Verba found increasing participation with social status.²⁴ However, Trow found the marginal middle class (mainly small businessmen) giving disproportionate support to McCarthyism²⁵ and Wolfinger et.al. made similar findings among members of the "Christian Crusade against Communism."²⁶

Since the majority of this group identify with the conservative parties, the parties of private enterprise and the status quo, this group is likely, compared with the blue collar worker group, to hold conservative attitudes towards government control of the economy and

social welfare measures. Exceptions are found within this group, however, for example, women hold more favourable attitudes to welfare schemes while being economically more conservative than men, no matter what their status.²⁷ Lenski shows that where ethnic origin confers inferior status compared with occupation, income or education, an individual tends to be more liberal in terms of social welfare.²⁸ In another study, Lenski found white middle class Catholics to be more likely than white middle class Protestants to hold liberal attitudes.²⁹

Other aspects of liberalism such as civil liberties, tolerance of non-conformity or foreign aid find increasing acceptance with socio-economic status.³⁰ Liberal attitudes were directly related to education in Stouffer's study of tolerance towards non-conformity.³¹ Subsequent studies have confirmed this finding.³² Stouffer found that even within social classes intolerance was higher among females and the older age groups.³³ Lenski found intolerance higher in Catholics³⁴ and Wolfinger *et.al.*³⁵ and Quinney³⁶ found intolerance higher among fundamentalists. Stouffer³⁷ found those who attended church regularly to be more intolerant in the United States, as also did Bochel and Denver in Scotland.³⁸ Church attendance has traditionally been a middle class norm.

Intolerance has also been related to status inconsistencies caused by geographic or social mobility,³⁹ but the results were not confirmed by further studies.⁴⁰ Stouffer showed that those with rural backgrounds were more intolerant.⁴¹

Others have claimed that the middle class, especially small businessmen, displayed more intolerant attitudes.⁴² This suggests that occupational variables or status inconsistencies could be as important

as "class" especially as Lipsetz suggests that these economic and status insecurities have more effect on individuals of the middle classes rather than the working class.⁴³

In summary it would appear that although there are generalizations which can be made about the characteristics of the new middle class which affect their political attitudes and participation, there are a broad range of exceptions. Little has been done to empirically test the predictions of Weber and Mills that the white collar workers will become alienated as they lose the control over the means of production (capital) like the workers before them. As the work becomes more standardized, they become what Mills calls "the cheerful robots."⁴⁴ Voting frequency and even more active forms of participation, for example, do not preclude political alienation or cynicism for which more subtle measures must be used.

The New Middle Class in Canada

What is the new middle class in other Western industrial democracies is not really new in Canada but an enlargement of the old middle class. Canada's middle class compared with the United States of America has tended to be more bureaucratic and less entrepreneurial. According to S.D. Clark the middle class in Canada though growing, was, and still is, small, narrowly based, conservative, and contained "largely within a bureaucratic structure of power--economic, political, ecclesiastical. Typically, the Canadian middle class person has been an office holder."⁴⁵ The first part of this section will consider how the historical and social forces brought about such a great difference in emphasis in the structure of society between Canada and the United States when in many respects

they appear so closely alike.

In his book The First New Nation, Lipset compared the United States with the English speaking democracies of Great Britain, Canada and Australia.⁴⁶ His insight into Canadian social and value structures is especially relevant to this thesis. Lipset compares the United States and Canada on the pattern variable dimensions of Parsons which classify the central values of social systems.⁴⁷ These pattern variables are paired categories of orientation of the members of the society to each other

1. Achievement - Ascription, orientation to a person's abilities and performance or to his inherited qualities.
2. Universalism - Particularism, one general standard for all or special treatment for some.
3. Diffuseness - Specificity, collective and community minded or self-oriented.
4. Elitist - Equalitarianism, stress on general superiority of those who hold power and privilege or no stress on social differences.

He found Canada less achievement oriented, universalistic, equalitarian and specific than the United States. In seeking explanations for these differences of degree he looks to Canada's lack of a revolutionary past, the influence of monarchical institutions, the dominance of the Anglican and Catholic churches and a less individualistic and more governmentally controlled frontier expansion than that on the American frontier. In order to maintain its independence from the United States, Canada has emphasized its counter-revolutionary traditions. Underhill states that:

In Canada we have no revolutionary tradition; and our historians, political scientists and philosophers have assiduously tried to educate us to be proud of the fact.⁴⁸

Elitist values are maintained in part by the educational system,

an appointed judiciary not swayed by popular feelings, and the conservative Catholic and Anglican churches both of whom have supported the "establishment." According to Clark the establishment in Canada, unlike any other Western nation, has been the middle class.⁴⁹ The establishment of Canada required protection of the interests of this small group of middle class. As the Canadian frontier moved West it was, by an large an orderly movement, bureaucratically controlled by the interests of the small middle class group, not through venture capital and rugged individualism as in the United States, but by "large scale bureaucratic forms of organization and widespread intervention by the state."⁵⁰ The middle class found themselves positions within the bureaucratic structure, removed from competition by a tariff barrier and those who sought to advance themselves outside the bureaucratic order moved across the border.⁵¹

This middle class had much to lose by emphasizing either the equalitarianism of American Revolution or the desirability of achievement or success at any price, but rather they have emphasized the needs of the community as a whole.

S.D. Clark states that:

In very broad general terms, the temper of Canadian society can be described as more conservative, less dedicated to such cherished American values as democracy, equality and liberty. Ours is a society more ready to compromise with the past, to accept without protest the limitations upon individual endeavour, freedom of expression and achievement which our institutional heritage proscribes. We are less concerned about getting on, being successful. We are not to the same extent as Americans a status seeking people. The protestant ethic here early became sharply modified by a strong Catholic spirit.⁵²

Because the established middle class in Canada has been bureaucratic rather than entrepreneurial and regarded the state as an ally,

there is fairly wide agreement that 'free enterprise' ideology, though accepted in Canada, has never been the source of violent conflicts as in the United States.⁵³ Today Canada has a long list of "nationalized" industries, in fact even

. . .at a time when the laissez-faire philosophy was prevailing in the rest of the Western world there was no protest against government intervention and interference, not even from business circles.⁵⁴

Nor, on the whole, are social welfare measures opposed to the same extent in Canada as is attested to by government measures in medical care, grants for large families, subsidies for low cost housing which have become effective in Canada but not in the United States.⁵⁵ We might expect, therefore, that members of the Canadian middle class would be less opposed to welfare and government interference in the economy than their American counterparts.

Horowitz points out that these elements of conservatism in Canadian society, in fostering the spirit of community rather than rugged individualism, have enabled the toleration of a wide spectrum of political opinions, including important socialist elements.⁵⁶ In the United States the aggressive egalitarian, individualistic, liberalism, has become fused with the capitalist economic system into an American ideology.⁵⁷ Liberalism became "Americanism" and socialism "un-Americanism." Such a fixed ideology allows no room for dissent.

If the values above are indeed Canadian middle class values, we would expect middle class Canadians to hold attitudes more tolerant of non-conformity, have less ideological commitment to laissez-faire notions of government and the capitalist free enterprise economy, and be more favourable to social welfare measures.

A thousand miles of Canadian shield physically divides Western Canada from the East. The more recent frontier experience, the pattern of settlement by a population of whom less than half are of British or French extraction, and the comparatively greater influence of fundamentalist sects compared with the Anglican or Catholic churches, may all tend to bring Western Canadian conventional attitudes nearer to those of America.

The history of Prairie radicalism has aimed to give the individual more control over his affairs and was a manifestation of Western suspicion and hostility to Eastern financial interests and political power. It is the expression of alienation, a populist movement.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, S.D. Clark says that Albertans were not progressive but

. . . had only a limited appreciation of the complexities of modern government and no great understanding of the conditions necessary for the preservation of individual rights and sense of community responsibility. . . in the emphasis of Social Credit upon results rather than means, poor citizenship in the form of lack of concern for the actual management of political affairs became almost a condition of membership in the party.⁵⁹

Thus, while not subscribing to Eastern Canadian elitist values and in emphasizing individual participation, Western Canadian attitudes are in some ways probably more reactionary.

Clark identifies the activities of fundamentalist religion in connection with prairie radicalism.⁶⁰ In Alberta the established churches were located in the better residential districts of the city. In the country and working class sections of cities, sectarian activity flourished. In Alberta the dominance of the established churches became associated with the dominance of the East and the religious separatism of the sect was easily translated by the charismatic leadership of

William Aberhart into a political exclusiveness and separatism which sought to find solutions to economic dissatisfaction in monetary reform.⁶¹

In time, Clark contends, both sects and their accompanying political movements, moved into the cities, attracted the support of businessmen and the teachings of the sect encouraged members themselves to success in commercial enterprises.⁶² The sects ceased to be churches of the poor and became respectable institutions similar to the established churches. The illiberal religious attitudes were carried over into political opportunism, conservatism and intolerance.⁶³

In one area we have empirical evidence of Western Canadian attitudes. J.E. Boyd carried out a study of high school students and their parents of attitudes towards French Canadians, in which he found positive attitudes related to socio-economic class and level of education.⁶⁴

Summary

This study is dealing essentially with a group of salaried, bureaucratic, white collar and managerial "new middle class." To this new class, which does not normally own any substantial portion of the means of production, the job is central in providing income, status and ego satisfaction. Success is obtained by promotion through the bureaucratic hierarchy. Thus the group depends substantially on the opportunities for upward mobility within large organizations. In part, upward mobility is obtained by increased education, also in part by status seeking. The status seeking upward mobile individual is also likely to be authoritarian and power-oriented. The more successful he is in his

own progress towards the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy, the less tolerant of those less successful he is likely to become.

Though not owning the means of production themselves, white collar and managerial bureaucrats have taken over some of the functions of the old bourgeoisie, and with these functions some of the status and values of the old entrepreneurial middle class. Thus they will subscribe to middle class conventions such as church attendance and political participation. Unlike the old middle class however, they have no unifying interest (in property) and no party to represent their interests. Consequently this group may become alienated and subject to the extremism of mass society.

A number of peculiarly Canadian values may limit these generalizations somewhat. The Canadian middle class seems historically to have been more bureaucratic than entrepreneurial. Dominated by monarchical and ecclesiastical institutions and without a revolution, Canada's development has been comparatively orderly and government controlled. There has never been a traditional emphasis on individual success, and thus the middle class has tended to remain small and within the bureaucratic structure. As a result of this Canadians in general could probably be expected to be comparatively more tolerant of non-conformity, more favourable towards the welfare state and to hold less commitment to free enterprise as a philosophy.

In the West further historical factors may modify the general Canadian political outlook. The more recent frontier experience, the greater influence of fundamentalist sects, and general alienation from the East have given rise to populist, agrarian movements. This tradition

may make political attitudes in Western Canada more radical.

It would seem reasonable to conclude that the attitudes of the 'new middle class' Western Canadians, though influenced by the status and demographic variables that influence political attitudes in other Western democracies and by the peculiar historical developments of Canadian society as a whole, are likely to be modified by distinctively Western Canadian influences.

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CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In Chapter I the first purpose of this thesis was stated as the collection and analysis of a data base on the political attitudes and political participation of the "New Middle Class" in Western Canada. The second purpose was the relating of these data to demographic variables and the third purpose the relationships of political variables to job and organizational variables. In this chapter the methodological problems and rationale will be discussed relating to the measurement of the variables and the collection of the data.

In the first section measurement of the political, demographic and organizational variables will be considered. Since many of the political and organizational factors are measured on scales, a section on factor analysis will be included. The second section deals with research design and is divided into two parts, the questionnaire and the sample.

The Problem of Measurement

When a survey is made to assess what attitudes are held by a group of people with the intention of analyzing the relationships between these attitudes and demographic or social variables, the way in which these attitudes are measured assumes a critical importance. It is necessary to be certain that what is measured is the attitude intended and not some other attitude, related or not, to the one intended. Some things are

easier to measure than others. To measure the length of this page requires only a ruler, to measure the thickness requires a more sophisticated instrument. Demographic variables may be ascertained with a single question such as 'where were you born'? Political attitudes, however, cannot usually be measured by single questions, although single attitude items do exist. Measuring political intolerance, for example, requires a more subtle technique. Consequently scales have been constructed to measure complex attitudes and reactions such as political alienation and intolerance.

A scale is a series of items (questions) that are homogeneous in content. For it to be useful the scale has to meet certain criteria:¹

1. The items must be constructed so that they are referent to what is being measured, that the wording is not ambiguous or unintelligible to the respondents.
2. Response set should be minimized to mitigate the tendency of respondents to be agreeable or to choose socially desirable responses.
3. Validation by some form of psychometric and/or statistical method.

The number of questions required to adequately cover an attitude varies with the number of dimensions possessed by the attitude being measured. The smallest recommended number is two.² It is important to ensure that most aspects of the attitude are covered without having items which are spurious or unconnected with the attitude. Items which seem to go together in fact may not do so and 'mavericks' may have to be discarded. Even slight changes in the wording of an item may mean a distinct change in the dimension that it taps. One method of coping with this problem is to use factor or cluster analysis to locate the groups of items that go together. This may show that a group of items

previously considered uni-dimensional may be measuring four or five different attitudes even though items may be individually related to others on inter-item analysis. However, if the items are tightly clustered and load heavily on the factor being measured, a highly cohesive scale has been attained.³

This also allows for the information from several items to be reduced to one score for the scale as a whole, thus facilitating easier handling of the data.

Factor Analysis

(i) Introduction

Factor analysis of the items of the scales used in this study fulfilled two functions:

1.. It takes the observations of each item and links them together into distinct patterns of occurrence. Factor analysis applied to delineate patterns of variation in characteristics is called R-factor analysis.⁴ This functions is to validate the scale.

2. Summarization of large numbers of items in terms of a smaller set of linear combinations that preserve most of the data in the original set allows for easier handling of the data.⁵ Once the scale is validated one score can summarize all aspects of the attitude measured.

The major substantive purpose of R-factor analysis is the search for underlying constructs to the variables measured in the survey.⁶ For example, in a survey data may be collected on an individual's view of his position in society, how he regards political parties and public officials, whether he votes, how he regards unions, atheists and communists, etc. which are fairly easily articulated items. However,

the study is really concerned with theoretical constructs, for example, how alienated the individual is from the political system. This is not easily observable but it may be inferred from some of the variables collected.

Three or four of the variables (out of hundreds) may account for 80% of the variation in alienated attitudes. If these variables are highly interrelated the use of these variables may be justifiably treated as a scale to measure the construct "alienation." In factor analysis such a group of interrelated variables would appear as a pattern or cluster, they are then called a "factor." Each variable is weighted according to the contribution it makes in accounting for the total score on that factor, this weighting is known as 'loading.' These loadings are similar to regression coefficients, not tests of significance.⁷ Tests of significance are unnecessary.

(ii) A geometric model

Suppose three scales are used, each represented by an axis at right angles to the other axes in three dimensional space. Within this space each variable may be considered a point located according to its value for each scale (see Figure 1). A large number of variables may be plotted this way. Although constrained to three dimensional space here, analytically the space can be extended until there is a dimension for each scale. For each variable in this space a vector can be plotted from the origin to the point. The angle between two vectors measures the relationship between the two variables. The closer to 90° the angle is the less the relationship is. If two vectors are at a right angle the two variables are uncorrelated, the closer the angle to zero the




Figure 1--Three dimensional representation of the patterns defined by factor analysis for three scales and two variables.

stronger the relationship. An angle of 180° between the two vectors means that the two variables are inversely related.⁸ Thus the configuration of vectors will reflect the interrelationships of the variables, high related variables cluster together, patterns of clusters of variables which are unrelated to each other emerge. The distance of each variable from the axes which represents the factor being measured is the loading of that variable on that factor.⁹

The factors are ordered sequentially so that the first principal component may be viewed as the single best summary of linear relationships exhibited in the data.¹⁰ The second component is defined as the second best linear combination of variables under the condition that the second component is orthogonal (at right angles) to the first. (It will be remembered that the axes are all at right angles to one another). To be at right angles the second component must account for the proportion of the variance not accounted for by the first one, or the combination of variables which best account for the residual variance. Subsequent

components are defined similarly until all the variance in the data is exhausted.¹¹ The first principal component tends to be that factor on which all variables have some loading, subsequent factors differentiate much more between the variables having a high positive loading while others are negatively related.¹² This list of principal components gives a factor matrix.¹³

If the variables relate to the scales exactly as predicted, the clusters will be around the original axes. Most often, however, by tilting the axes while still maintaining the axes at right angles to one another, a better "fit" of variables to the factor will be obtained and the relationships with other unrelated clusters is made clearer. This technique is called orthogonal (at right angles) rotation.¹⁴ It should be noted that in an orthogonally rotated matrix, the relationship between the order of the factors and the amount of data variation they stand for is destroyed. Most other features of the unrotated matrix are preserved.

(iii) Rotated Factor Matrix--Varimax

In an unrotated factor matrix each variable may have moderate or high loadings for several factor patterns because the unrotated factor may be located between independent clusters of interrelated variables. Varimax tries to maximize the sum of variances of squared factor loadings in the columns of the variables, by a factor loading matrix which produces some high loadings and some near zero loadings on each factor.¹⁶ For example, here is an example relating two clusters of variables to two factors (see Figure 2)

In this example all the variables 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 load highly




Figure 2--Orthogonal Factor rotation in two dimensional space

Note:- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 represent variables.

on factor B relating them to factor B rather than to their interrelated clusters (which are not otherwise correlated) with 1 and 6 respectively. By rotating the axes to the new position, completely different factor loadings are obtained so that variables 1, 2 and 3 now load together highly on factor A but almost zero on B and variables 4, 5, 6 and 7 now load together highly on B but almost zero on A. This gives a rotated factor matrix¹⁷ (see Tables 2.1 and 3.1 in the Appendix for the results of this study).

Testing items (variables) to see if they relate (cluster) on a particular scale (factor) uses this technique of orthogonal rotation. Two factors (scales) are rotated at each time to assess how the variables are interrelated and to make sure that all variables in a scale are not related to another scale. In this fashion, any variables which do not relate to any cluster or factor and any variables that load highly on two factors are located. These variables must be taken out of a scale

if that scale is to be a valid measure.¹⁸

The Political Variables

(i) Introduction

All of the political attitude variables were measured by means of scales, except party preference was asked by a direct, one item question. The scales consisted of items which have been selected and validated by factor analysis. The items which did not load highly on any scale have been omitted.

The results of the factor analysis are gathered together in Appendix B.

(ii) Passive Political Participation Voting

Variable. This scale attempts to measure the amount of passive (voting) participation of individuals. Since so many more people exercise their franchise than take any active part in political campaigning, it is an important variable in its own right.

Description. A two item Likert scale with responses from always (voting) to never (see Table 2-1). Possible range of scores from two to ten according to frequency of voting in federal and municipal elections. It is adapted from an open ended question (7) in the Political Activity Index and found in:

Woodward, Julian L. and Roper, Elmo. "Political Activity of American Citizens," American Political Science Review, 1950, 44, pp.872-885.

Factor Analysis. From the seven scales of political attitudes this scale is number six in explaining variation in the total data. However, variables 50 and 51 loaded very heavily on this scale, .8966 and .8849 respectively, showing that they explained the greatest part of the variation in voting

TABLE 2-1

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

PASSIVE (VOTING) PARTICIPATION SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
050	How frequently do you vote in local municipal elections?) Always 1) Usually 2) Sometimes 3	.90
051	How frequently do you vote in federal elections?) Rarely 4) Never 5	.88
<hr/>			
Ranges.		Total Score	
High in Passive Participation		2-4	
Medium in Passive Participation		5-7	
Low in Passive Participation		8-10	

behaviour. The two variables showed high factor loadings on Factor 6 and were orthogonal to Factor 1 (see Figure 2.7, Appendix B) - Factor 2 (Figure 2.12, Appendix B), Factor 3 (Figure 2.16, Appendix B), Factor 4 (Figure 2.19), Factor 5 (Figure 2.21) and Factor 7 (Figure 2.24). The orthogonal relationship of these variables to other factors indicates that these items were almost totally independent of other attitudes being measured.

(iii) Active Political Participation

Variable. This scale attempts to classify individuals in terms of political participation, specifically referring to political activity in channels of possible influence on legislators and government officials.

Description. The scale consists of three items concerned with actions of participation in politics (52, 53, 54) and one item concerned with the individual's perception of himself in the community (see Table 2-2). The first three have three possible responses; frequently, occasionally

TABLE 2-2

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

ACTIVE PARTICIPATION SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
052	When you get together with your friends would you say that you discuss public issues like government regulation of business, labor unions, taxes, and farm programs?))) 1) Frequently))	.63
053	Have you ever written, phoned or talked to your member on city council, in the provincial legislature, or the House of Commons, or any other public official about some issue or problem?))) 2) Occasionally)))	.77
054	Have you ever gone to any political meetings, speeches, rallies, dinners, or things like that in connection with an election?))) 3) Never	.70
055	Would you say that you are: a person who contributes to community decisions a person who is active, but not one of the decision-makers just an ordinary person in the community not really a part of the community at all	1 2 3 4	.61

Ranges	Total Score
High Active Participation	4-6
Medium Active Participation	7-11
Low Active Participation	11-13

and never. The fourth has four possible responses covering a spectrum from participating in decision making to inert passivity. The original wording of Woodward's instrument are as follows:

- 52 When you get together with your friends, would you say that you discuss public issues like government regulation of business, labor unions, taxes, and farm programs?

53 Have you ever written or talked to your Congressman or Senator or other public officials to let them know what you would like them to do on a public issue you were interested in?

54 Have you attended any meetings in the last four years at which political speeches were made?

Variables 52, 53 and 54 were taken from:

Woodward Julian L. and Roper, Elmo. "Political Activity of American Citizens," American Political Science Review, 1950, 44, pp. 872-885. Reprinted in Robinson et.al. Measures of Political Attitudes.

Variable 55 was taken verbatim from:

Thompson, Wayne E. and Horton, John E. "Political Alienation as a force in Political Action," American Journal of Sociology, (March 1962), p. 489.

Factor Analysis. This scale was fifth out of the seven scales in explaining the variation in the total data. Variables 52-55 loaded heavily on this scale -factor loadings from .7730 to .6068. In comparing this factor with the other scales, variables 52-55 are clustered about the axis and orthogonal to Factor 1 (Figure 2.6), Factor 2 (Figure 2.11), Factor 3 (Figure 2.15), Factor 4 (Figure 2.18), Factor 6 (Figure 2.21) (where the relationship is slightly less than orthogonal) and Factor 7 (Figure 2.23). These orthogonal or close to orthogonal relationships indicate that there is little relationship between the items in the different scales.

(iv) Political Alienation

Variable. This scale attempts to measure political alienation, defined as a combination of perceived lack of power in community affairs and distrust of those who hold power positions. Thompson and Horton hypothesize this variable to be closely related to lower socio-economic status. In the results of the present study it seemed to be more

related to cynicism, as those who participate in the political process show a high degree of alienation as measured by this scale.

Description. A five item Likert scale with possible responses to each item ranging from agree strongly to disagree strongly (see Table 2-3).

TABLE 2-3

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

POLITICAL ALIENATION SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
044	It doesn't matter which party wins the elections, the interests of the little man don't count.) Agree Strongly 1	.56
046	Elected officials become tools of special interests, no matter what.) Agree Slightly 2	.75
047	Local officials lose touch with the people who elected them) Don't Know 3	.70
048	If people knew what was really going on in high places, it would blow the lid off things.) Disagree Slightly 4	.71
049	People who go into public office are usually out for all they can get.) Disagree Strongly 5	.70

Ranges	Total Score
High Political Alienation	5-11
Medium Political Alienation	12-18
Low Political Alienation	19-25

Variables 44, 46, 47, 48 were taken from:

Thompson and Horton, op.cit., "Mistrust of Public Officials Scale."

Factor Analysis. The political alienation scale is the second strongest factor in explaining the variations in the data from this study. This is important in view of the fact that voting behaviour is Factor 6 and

voting behaviour has been used in many studies as a measure of alienation. The factor loadings of the individual variables range from .7521 to .5579. The factor is orthogonally related to Factor 1 (Figure 2.3), Factor 3 (Figure 2.9), Factor 5 (Figure 2.11) and Factor 6 (Figure 2.12) showing these items are independent. The relationships between Factor 2 and Factors 4 (anti-French Canadian) and 7 (laissez-faire) are somewhat less than orthogonal showing some relationship of the variables to the other scales.

(v) Tolerance of non-conformity

Variable. These six items attempt to measure the degree of willingness to tolerate non-conformists such as socialists, atheists or communists. It does not attempt to measure intolerance in general.

Description. A Likert scale of six items, with five possible responses from strong agreement to strong disagreement (see Table 2-4). Variables 36, 38 and 40 were adapted from a Gutman scale in which respondents were asked to dichotomize (yes/no) their reactions to the propositions. All respondents gave sample yes/no answers when the variables 36-41 were used in the Michigan University, Political Attitudes survey. The sources for the scales will be found in:

Stouffer, Samuel A. Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955, pp. 262-266; and Political Attitudes Study, University of Michigan, pp. 9-10.

Factor Analysis. This scale was the strongest factor in explaining the variation in data. The variable loadings on the scale ranged from .8294 to .7235, all high loadings giving a very tight cluster about the axis. The cluster of Factor 1 was orthogonally related to Factor 2 (Figure 2.3), Factor 3 (Figure 2.4), Factor 4 (Figure 2.5), Factor 5 (Figure 2.6),

Factor 6 (Figure 2.7) and Factor 7 (Figure 2.8) showing very little relationship between these items.

TABLE 2-4

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

POLITICAL INTOLERANCE SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
036	If a person wanted to make a speech in your community against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak?) Agree Strongly) 5))	.72
037	Should such a person be allowed to teach in a Canadian university?) Agree Slightly) 4	.83
038	If a person wanted to make a speech in your community favoring government ownership of all the railroads and big industries, should he be allowed to speak?))) Don't Know) 3)	.77
039	Should such a person be allowed to teach in a Canadian university?)) Disagree) Slightly	.81
040	If a Communist wanted to make a speech in your community, should he be allowed to speak?) 2)) Disagree	.76
041	Should such a person be allowed to teach in a Canadian university?) Strongly) 1	.75
Ranges		Total Score	
Highly Intolerant		6-13	
Medium Intolerant		14-22	
Low Intolerant		23-30	

(vi) Anti-French Canadian Attitudes

Variable. This scale attempts to measure anti-French Canadian attitudes.

Description. A three item Likert scale with responses varying from agree strongly to disagree strongly (see Table 2-5).

TABLE 2-5

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

ANTI-FRENCH CANADIAN SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
042	Do you feel that the federal government is doing too much for Quebec in relation to other provinces?)Agree Strongly 1)Agree Slightly 2)Don't Know 3)Disagree Slightly 4	.80
043	Do you think French Canadians are making unreasonable demands?)Disagree Strongly 5)	.78
045	Do you agree with the policy of the federal government to make both French and English the official languages of Canada?)Agree Strongly 5)Agree Slightly 4)Don't Know 3)Disagree Slightly 2 Disagree Strongly 1	.66
Ranges		Total Score	
High anti-French Canadian		3-6	
Medium anti-French Canadian		7-11	
Low anti-French Canadian		12-15	

Factor Analysis. This scale was the fourth most important factor in explaining the variation in the data, it is more important than either voting behaviour or active participation, showing that many items have a positive relationship with this factor. Variables 42, 43 and 45 loaded heavily on this factor having loadings from .7990 to .6606. This factor is orthogonal to Factor 1 (Figure 2.5), Factor 3 (Figure 2.14) and Factor 6 (Figure 2.19), but less than orthogonal to Factor 2 (Political Alienation - Figure 2.10) and Factor 7 (laissez-faire, Figure 2.20). The items measuring Factors 2 and 7 are not completely independent of the factors measuring Factor 4.

(vii) Government and Social Welfare

Variable. This scale attempts to measure attitudes to the desirability

of welfare and government aid rather than government interference with the market economy directly. Liberal attitudes to social welfare appear to be a different aspect of liberalism and not necessarily congruent with liberal laissez-faire attitudes towards government interference in the non capitalist method of resource allocation in the free market. The items here probably measure degree of community mindedness as opposed to attitudes of competitive individualism.

Description. Four items constituting a Likert scale, responses varying from agree strongly to disagree strongly for all four items (see Table 2-6). Variables 34 and 35 have been adapted and Variables 32 and 33

TABLE 2-6

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

SOCIAL WELFARE AND GOVERNMENT AID SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
032	The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost.) Agree Strongly) 5)	.59
033	The government in Ottawa ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job.) Agree Slightly) 4)	.68
034	The government ought to have special programs so that children from poor families receive help to get as much education as possible.) Don't Know) 3) Disagree Slightly) 2	.73
035	The government ought to see that the poor get good housing at low cost.) Disagree Strongly) 1	.70
Ranges		Total Score	
High support of Social Welfare		16-20	
Medium support of Social Welfare		9-15	
Low support of Social Welfare		4-8	

taken verbatim from:

Cambell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E., and Stokes, Donald E. The American Voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960, pp. 194-208. Reprinted in Robinson, John P., Rusk, Jerrold G., Head, Kendra B. Measures of Political Attitudes. Ann Arbor: Survey Research Centre, University of Michigan, 1968.

Factor Analysis. Variables 32-35 loaded heavily on this scale (loadings from .7285 to .5902) which was the third most important factor in accounting for variation in the total data. Variables clustered tightly and were orthogonal to Factor 1 (Figure 2.4), Factor 2 (Figure 2.9), Factor 4 (Figure 2.14), Factor 5 (Figure 2.15 and Factor 6 (Figure 2.16), but were not tightly clustered or orthogonal when compared with the items making up Factor 7, laissez-faire attitudes, showing that the variables used to measure these two factors, especially variables 29 and 32, are somewhat related to each other.

(viii) Laissez-faire Attitudes

Variable. This scale attempts to measure attitudes to the free enterprise market economy and government and trade union interference with or restriction of the entrepreneur from pursuing "private profit." This scale is more likely to tap an attitude of self-interest rather than ideology.

Description. Of the four items, two concern government, one on direct government interference in the economy by nationalization, one on government regulation of the economy putting restrictions on business. The other two concern trade unions, one doctrinaire (should they exist at all?) and the other pragmatic (how are they run?) Responses are measured on a five point Likert scale (see Table 2-8). The items in this scale were adapted from various United States scales.

TABLE 2-8

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

ECONOMIC LAISSEZ-FAIRE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
027	Do you agree or disagree that the way they are run now, labor unions do this country more harm than good?) Agree Strongly 1) Agree Slightly 2) Don't Know 3	.55
028	The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle.) Disagree Slightly 4) Disagree Strongly 5)	.69
029	We need more government controls over business practices and profits) Agree Strongly 5) Agree Slightly 4) Don't Know 3) Disagree Slightly 2) Disagree Strongly 1	.59
030	Canada would be better off without any labor unions at all.)) As 027 and 028	.43

Ranges	Total Score
High economic laissez-faire	4-8
Medium economic laissez-faire	9-15
Low economic laissez-faire	16-20

Factor Analysis. Of all the scales factor analyzed this factor accounted least for the variation in data. This indicates that there is a great deal of agreement within the sample on this attitude. The factor loadings of the four variables 27-30 which make up the scale are the lowest of all the scales varying from .6856 to .4306. The items in this scale do not cluster tightly but are orthogonal to Factor 1 (Figure 2.8), Factor 2 (Figure 2.13), Factor 4 (Figure 2.20) and Factor 6 (Figure 2.24 - shows the tightest clustering). In relation to Factor 3 (government welfare) Factor 7 is neither tightly clustered nor orthogonal.

(ix) Nineteenth Century Liberal Attitudes

Variable. This scale attempts to measure the degree of what Trow calls

"nineteenth century liberalism" which is expressed in hostility to both big business and trade unions and is emotional rather than intellectual in content.¹⁹ It contains elements of nostalgia for the age of small farmers and businessmen as well as being an expression of resentment or hatred of an increasingly bureaucratized and de-personalized world.

Description. These two items are identical to those used by Trow to measure nineteenth century liberalism in his study. However, where Trow merely asked for agreement or disagreement with these items in the present study the respondent had a five point Likert scale against which he could record his response. Possible responses ranged from strongly agree to strongly disagree (see Table 2-9). The original scale is found

TABLE 2-9

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERALISM SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
030	Canada would be better off without any labor unions at all.)Agree Strongly 1)Agree Slightly 2)Don't Know 3	-
031	Big companies control too much of Canadian business.)Disagree Slightly 4)Disagree Strongly 5	-
Ranges		Total Score	
High in nineteenth century liberalism		2-4	
Medium in nineteenth century liberalism		5-7	
High in nineteenth century liberalism		8-10	

in:

Martin Trow. "Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance and Support for McCarthy," American Journal of Sociology, Vo.64, 1958, pp. 270-281.

Factor Analysis. No factor analysis was done on this scale since it did not appear as a separate factor. Variables 30 and 31 loaded together moderately on Factor 2, Political Alienation, but they are not obviously important variables in explaining overall variation in the data. They are included here because together they have been found to be an important explanatory variable in right wing extremism by Trow²⁰ and Wolfinger et.al.²¹ and Alberta has been called "the last bastion of right wing politics."

Organizational Variables

(i) Introduction

The scores of six of the organizational variables, measuring the satisfaction with the job, routinization of the job, role definition of the job within the organization, uncertainty involved in the job, the threat of technological or other changes to the job and the cohesion of the work group, have been found not through single item questions but by scales. It should be noted that these scales do not measure objective characteristics but the characteristics as perceived by the respondent.

Other aspects of the organization and the job can be ascertained by simple direct questions. These include: union membership; length of employment with the company; shift work; level of position in the organization; to what level are reports made, functional area of work (production, accounting, etc.); the type of technology of the company, number of promotions with the company; level of first job with the company; type and ownership of organization; number of employees in the company and percentage of these workers who are unionized. Some of these questions were open ended (for example, what percentage of company

employees are unionized?) but most were answerable by a choice of yes/no or a choice of a short list of general categories (see Questionnaire, Appendix A).

(ii) Job Satisfaction

Variable. This scale attempts to measure the degree of general job satisfaction, that is both the task itself and the conditions of work, supervision, salary and company policies.

Description. The six items are constructed as a Likert Scale (see Table 2-10). The range of responses for variables 15-19 are from completely

TABLE 2-10

ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES

JOB SATISFACTION SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
015	On the whole, how satisfied are you with the company where you work?) Completely Satisfied) 1)	.80
016	How satisfied are you with your present salary?) Well Satisfied) 2)	.63
017	How satisfied are you with the kind of work (or task) you do?) Neither Satisfied) nor Dissatisfied) 3	.71
018	How satisfied are you with the progress you have made in this company?) A little Dissatisfied) 4)	.73
019	How satisfied are you with your present supervisors?) Very Dissatisfied) 5	.63
021	How much does your job give you a chance to do the things you are best at?) No chance at all 5) Very little chance 4) Some chance 3 Fairly good chance 2 Very good chance 1	.64
Ranges		Total Score	
High Satisfaction		6-13	
Medium Satisfaction		14-22	
Low Satisfaction		23-30	

satisfied to very dissatisfied; variable 19 has possible responses from no chance at all to a very good chance. Variable 21 is taken from Kahn, et.al. verbatim. Variables 15 and 17 have been slightly reworded.

The original questions read:

015 How do you like working for this company?

1. It's not a very good place to work
2. It's all right, but there are many things that should be changed
3. It's a fairly good place, but quite a few things should be changed
4. It's a good place, but there are a few things that should be changed
5. It's a very good place - wouldn't change anything.

017 Not counting all the other things that make your particular job good or bad, how do you like the kind of work that you do?

1. I dislike it very much; would prefer almost any other kind of work
2. I don't like it very much; would much prefer some other kind of work
3. It's all right, but there are other kinds of work I like better
4. I like it very much, but there are other kinds of work I like just as much
5. It's exactly the kind of work I like best.

Variable 18 has been converted from a four point to a Likert scale by the addition of a neutral response. Kahn's original question read:

How do you feel about the progress you have made in this company?

1. I have made little or no progress
2. I have made some progress, but it should have been much better
3. I have made quite a lot of progress, but it should have been better
4. I have made a great deal of progress.

The original scale will be found in:

Kahn, R.L., Wolfe, D.M., Quinn, R.P. and Snoek, J.D. Organization Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964, pp. 428-429

Factor Analysis. This scale was the most important factor in accounting for the variations in the data. Variables 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 21 loaded highly on this factor with loadings ranging from .8036 to .6269.

However, this factor accounted for only 4.8% of the total variation in the data. In general, Factor 1 was orthogonal to Factor 2 (Appendix C, Figure 3.3), Factor 3 (Figure 3.4), Factor 4 (Figure 3.5), Factor 5 (Figure 3.6), Factor 6 (Figure 3.7). The variables, however, do not cluster tightly around the factor axis.

(iii) Group Cohesion

Variable. The scale attempts to measure group cohesiveness, defined as attraction to the group.

Description. The scale consists of three items comparing the work group with others in the same company for cooperation and cohesiveness (see Table 2-11). Three possible responses are: better than most, about the

TABLE 2-11

ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES

GROUP COHESION SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
	How does your work group compared with other work groups in the company on each of the following points?		
024	The way the men get along together:) Better than most 1	.80
) About the same as	
025	The way the men stick together:) most 2	.83
) Not as good as	
026	The way the men help each other on the job.) most 3	
) Don't Know 9	.77
Range		Total Score	
High Cohesion		3-4	
Medium Cohesion		5-7	
Low Cohesion		8-9	

same as most, not as good as most. The three items are taken verbatim from Seashore's group cohesiveness scale which will be found in:

Seashore, Stanley E. Group Cohesiveness in the Industrial Work Group, Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1954. Reprinted in Miller, D.C. Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement, New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1964.

Factor Analysis. This scale was the second most important factor in explaining variation in the data, even so it accounted for only 2.8% of the total variation. Three variables, 24-26, load really highly, loading scores from .8316 to .7678. Consequently, variables cluster tightly and are orthogonal to Factor 1 (Figure 3.3), Factor 3 (Figure 3.8), Factor 4 (Figure 3.9), Factor 5 (Figure 3.10) and Factor 6 (Figure 3.11) showing these variables to be independent of the other variables.

(iv) Job Routinization

Variable. The purpose of this scale is to measure how routine the job is, not totally objectively but, to a certain extent, subjectively, as the respondent perceives it.

Description. This scale consists of five items constituting a Likert scale (see Table 2-12). The first measures the aspect of the employee's knowledge of what he can expect during the week. The third question attempts to measure differentiation by days; perhaps the respondent knows what will happen during the work week but this does not mean everyday will be the same. If each day is different routine will be reduced. The fourth item covers the aspect of laid down procedures (compulsory) whereas the fifth seeks out situations where the decisions are routine even though not set down. The second item measures the nature of the job; are highly specialized skills and insights required or is the work standardized. This scale is taken from:

TABLE 2-12

ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES

JOB ROUTINIZATION SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
002	When you begin a working week, how much of what you will actually do during the week can you foresee?	Most 1	.64
003	If someone completely new to your job had to take it on at short notice, how much of it would he be able to find out from a job description and/or a record of previous work?	Quite a lot 2	.59
004	How many of your working days follow a similar pattern to one another?	Some 3	.53
007	How often does your work involve following regular set procedures?	A little 4	.45
011	Considering the various problems that arise in your work, how often is the solution clear?	Almost none 5	.51
Ranges		Total Score	
High Routinization		5-11	
Medium Routinization		12-18	
Low Routinization		19-25	

Hickson, D.J. "The Executive in the Organization," Unpublished monograph, University of Aston, Birmingham, England.

Factor Analysis. Of the six job scales this is least important (Factor 6) in accounting for the variation in the data; it accounts for only 1.1% of the variation in total data. The five variables, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 11, have factor loading scores of .6415 to .4532. They do not cluster tightly but are orthogonal to Factor 1 (Figure 3.7) and Factor 3 (Figure 3.16). The variables are tightly clustered and orthogonal to Factor 2 (Figure 3.11), but neither tightly clustered nor strictly orthogonal to

Factor 4 (Figure 3.18) or Factor 5 (Figure 3.20).

(v) Role Definition

Variable. This scale attempts to measure the preciseness with which the respondent's job is laid down.

Description. This scale may seem the same as job routinization scale.

However, routine jobs are not always clearly defined and in some organizations the responsibilities and level of decisions to be made may be precisely laid down from president to janitor. Thus, this variable measures an aspect of the organizational climate, rather than the type of job. The scale consists of two items. One item seeks to measure the aspect of responsibility, the other of decision making (see Table 2-13). The items are scored on a Likert scale giving a total score of between two and ten. The items are taken from:

Hickson, D.J., op.cit.

TABLE 2-13

ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES

ROLE DEFINITION SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
013	How precisely are your responsibilities laid down?	Very Precisely) 1) Fairly Precisely	.76
014	How precisely is it laid down which decisions you take yourself?) 2) Not Very Precisely 3 Very Imprecisely 4 Not laid down at all 5	.80
Ranges		Total Score	
High Role Definition		2-4	
Medium Role Definition		5-7	
Low Role Definition		8-10	

Factor Analysis. The role definition scale is Factor 5 of the job scales. This scale accounts for 1.5% of the variation in the data and the two variables 13 and 14 which load highly on this factor have factor loadings of .7615 and .8011 respectively. The variables of Factor 5 are orthogonal to Factor 1 (Figure 3.6), Factor 2 (Figure 3.10), Factor 3 (Figure 3.13) and Factor 4 (Figure 3.17) but though tightly clustered are not orthogonal to Factor 6 (Figure 3.20 - Job Routine) showing that variables 13 and 14 have some relationship with the routine nature of work.

(vi) Job Uncertainty

Variable. This scale attempts to measure the variety of task which the job offers to the respondent.

Description. Somewhat the reverse of routine, this scale tries to tap the aspects of the job which allow for creative problem solving. The occurrence of unforeseen happenings is related to the acquiring of new skills. The scale consists of three items measured on a Likert scale giving total scores from 3 to 15 (see Table 2-14). This scale is also taken from:

Hickson, op.cit.

Factor Analysis. This scale shows up in the factor analysis of job scales as Factor 4, accounting for 1.8% of the total variation in data. The three variables, 8, 9 and 10, have factor loading scores of from .7802 to .7091. The variables loading on Factor 4 are tightly clustered and orthogonal to Factor 1 (Figure 3.5), Factor 2 (Figure 3.9) and Factor 5 (Figure 3.17). Factor 4 cluster is less than orthogonal to the variables clustered on Factor 3 (Figure 3.12 - Job Change) and are not

TABLE 2-14

ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES

JOB UNCERTAINTY SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
008	How often do major problems occur in your job which have never occurred before?) Most 1)) Quite a lot 2	.71
009	How often does something come up in your work which necessitates acquiring fresh knowledge or new skills?)) Some 3)) A little 4	.78
010	How often do completely unforeseen things happen in your job?) Almost none 5)	.71
<hr/>			
Ranges.		Total Score	
	High Job Challenge	3-6	
	Medium Job Challenge	7-11	
	Low Job Challenge	12-15	

tightly clustered or orthogonally related to the variables loading on Factor 6 (Figure 3.18 - Job Routine).

(vii) Job Change

Variable. This scale attempts to measure the perceived amount of change in job content.

Description. Two items form a Likert Scale, one taps the aspect of past change, the other of future changes (see Table 2-15). Both result in uncertainty and a reduction of uncertainty for the employee. This scale measures unwelcome change rather than an accepted challenge. From:

Hickson, D.J., op.cit.

Factor Analysis. The job change (due to technical or other reasons that threaten the existence of the job) scale is Factor 3 in the factor analysis of job variables, explaining 1.9% of the total variation in the

TABLE 2-15

ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES

JOB CHANGE SCALE

Variable No.	Item	Response & Score	Factor Loading
005	How much of the content of the job you are now in has changed in the past year?)Most 1)Quite a lot 2)Some 3	.83
006	How much of the content of the job you are in now do you anticipate will have changed in a year's time?)A little 4)Almost none 5)	.82
Ranges		Total Score	
High in Job Change		2-4	
Medium in Job Change		5-7	
Low in Job Change		8-10	

data. The two variables, 5 and 6, have factor loadings of .8289 and .8233 respectively. These variables cluster together and are orthogonal to Factor 1 (Figure 3.4), Factor 2 (Figure 3.8) and Factor 5 (Figure 3.13). Though tightly clustered still Factor 3 is not orthogonal to Factor 4 (Figure 3.12 - Role Definition) or to Factor 6 (Figure 3.16 - Job Routine) showing that variables 5 and 6 also tap some of the perceptions measured by the variables loading on Factors 4 and 6.

Demographic and Social Variables

Most of the demographic variables were measured by single item direct questions, although some were measured by comparing the results of one item with another. For example, upward mobility is measured by comparing the level of education of the respondent with that of the respondent's father. In answering the demographic questions the respondents were mainly given the choice of a limited number of general

categories (see questionnaire - Appendix A).

Demographic variables collected were: sex, age, marital status, highest level of education completed, present annual income, area of socialization during childhood (for example, farm, large city), religion, frequency of church attendance, province or country of birth, length of residence in Canada if not native born, province of childhood socialization, father's occupation during childhood, ethnic origin of family and number of voluntary social groups belonged to.

Research Design

The Questionnaire

Since empirical data were essential for this study a survey research design was used. The survey was not a random sample but was limited to a group of upward mobile, white collar and managerial middle class involved in management development courses in the Management Development Program offered by the Department of Extension at the University of Alberta, Edmonton.²² The written questionnaire was administered during classes so that virtually all those who were in the program in the Fall of 1969 or the Spring of 1970 are included in the 621 responses made. The individuals administering the questionnaire explained the questionnaire. The respondents were allowed to ask any questions they wanted and the administrators stayed until everyone had finished so that questions could be dealt with adequately. Complete anonymity was guaranteed.

The items on the questionnaire, described in the last section, were divided into the three types of variables, political, demographic and organizational. The questionnaire is reproduced in its entirety

in Appendix A and will not be reiterated here.

The Sample

(i) Introduction

By choosing a restricted sample, certain advantages are gained at the expense of certain disadvantages. The advantages are twofold:

- a. it is easier to collect the data;
- b. social class is held approximately constant.

Even young workers, low in income and occupation status, probably have the middle class as a reference group. Most of the sample are white collar workers, many of whom work for large bureaucracies. With a somewhat homogeneous group variables such as income, ethnic origin and job satisfaction can be examined for their relationships with political attitudes independently of social class. The disadvantage of a homogeneous group is that significant relationships are less likely to be found. The following two sections will examine the social and job characteristics of this group of new middle class, white collar, bureaucrats, and the third section the problem of measurement and tests of significance.

(ii) Social Characteristics of the Sample

The overwhelming majority of those sampled (91.6%) were male and 87% of the sample were married and living with their spouses (not divorced, separated, widowed or never married).

Education. The level of educational attainment was high, 88% had completed high school. Almost half had had some post secondary training compared with less than 10% of the population of Edmonton in the 1961 census (nearest comparable figures) and less than eight per cent of the

province as a whole (see Table 2-16). Since education is one measure

TABLE 2-16

EDUCATION OF SAMPLE COMPARED WITH AVERAGE
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Highest level of education attained	N	1969 Sample	1961 Edmonton	1961 Alberta
No schooling	3	0.5%	-	2.0%
Grades 1-6	-	-	30.7	37.5
Jr.High or some High Sch	73	11.9) 58.9*	53.3*
High School (completed)	238	38.7)	
Technical	44	7.2	n.a.	n.a.
Some College	128	20.8	4.5	4.1
College Graduates	96	15.6	4.6	3.1
Post Graduates	33	5.4	n.a.	n.a.
Total	615	100.0	100.0	100.0

* The 1961 census figures are not divided between Junior High School and High School but put together under the heading "Secondary".

n.a. No breakdown available for technical and post graduate level.

Source: 1961 Census - Table 19 (Province) and Table 7 (Edmonton).

of social class it is apparent that this sample is at least upper middle class by educational standards. The sample was dichotomized to make sure that the educational attainment of the women was not substantially different from the men. The most apparent differences is that none of the females in the sample attended technical institutes (such as N.A.I.T.). In consequence more females finished high school and then took no more training (see Table 2-17), however, just as many women as men have some college, college degrees or post graduate work taken as a whole (although far more women start college, far fewer finish their degree).

Income. The sample is also upper middle class by income, 44% earn over \$10,000 compared with seven per cent of the total Edmonton population (1967 figures) and only four per cent earned under \$5,000 compared with

TABLE 2-17

COMPARATIVE EDUCATION OF MALES AND FEMALES

Highest level of education attained	Males		Females	
	1969 Sample	1961 Alberta	1969 Sample	1961 Alberta
No schooling	0.5%	1.8%	-	2.2%
Grades 1-6	-	42.0	-	32.8
Jr.High or some High Sch.	11.9) 48.6*	11.5) 58.4 ⁸
High School	38.0)	46.2)
Technical	7.8	n.a.	-	n.a.
Some College	19.9	3.4	30.8	4.8
College Graduates	16.5	4.2	5.8	1.8
Post graduates	5.3	n.a.	5.8	n.a.
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	563		52	

* Census figures for 1961 do not differentiate between Junior and Senior High School.

n.a. No breakdown available for technical institutes and post graduate levels.

61% of all Edmontonians (see Table 2-18). The high income levels are

TABLE 2-18

INCOME OF RESPONDENTS AND AVERAGE INCOME
OF EDMONTON AND ALBERTA

Income	N	1969 Sample	1967 Edmonton	1967 Alberta
Under \$5,000	27	4.4%	61.2%	64.5%
5,001-7,500	118	19.3	19.3*	17.7*
7,501-10,000	200	32.7	12.6*	11.5*
10,001-12,500	132	21.6)	
12,501-15,000	78	12.8) 5.9	5.5
15,001-20,000	36	5.9)	
Over 20,001	20	3.3	1.0	.9
Total	611	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Taxation returns figures are divided into income categories of \$5,000 to \$7,000 and \$7,000 to \$10,000 rather than \$5,001 to \$7,500 and \$7,501 to \$10,000.

Source: Taxation returns for the taxation year 1967, Department of Taxation Table 6.

all the more notable when the young age of the sample is taken into consideration, nearly 70% of this sample was under the age of 35 (compared with 43% of total population) and would not likely have reached their maximum earnings. Those earning under \$5,000 are mostly among the younger members of this sample (see Table 2-19, 12.5% of those under 25 are earning less than \$5,000) or female (see Table 2-20, 25%

TABLE 2-19

INCOME AND AGE OF SAMPLE

Income	Age					
	21-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50
Under \$5,000	12.5%	2.8%	2.2%	2.2%	6.7%	0.0%
5,001-7,500	46.2	21.3	14.8	11.8	16.0	10.2
7,501-10,000	25.0	43.3	37.8	23.7	24.0	30.5
10,001-12,500	8.7	22.7	20.7	30.1	21.3	23.7
12,501-15,000	6.2	7.1	14.8	19.4	17.3	15.3
15,001-20,000	1.2	1.4	5.2	10.8	10.7	10.2
Over 20,000	0.0	1.4	4.4	2.2	4.0	10.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	80	141	135	93	75	59
Mean	2.537	3.199	3.644	3.935	3.747	4.153

TABLE 2-20

INCOME AND SEX OF SAMPLE

Income	Males		Females	
	N	%	N	%
Under \$5,000	14	2.5	13	25.0
5,001-7,500	98	17.5	20	38.5
7,501-10,000	188	33.6	12	23.1
10,001-12,500	127	22.7	5	9.6
12,501-15,000	78	14.0	0	0.0
15,001-20,000	34	6.1	2	3.8
Over 20,000	20	3.6	0	0.0
Total	569	100.0	52	100.0

of the females in this sample earn under \$5,000). Since these two groups are on the bottom rungs of the bureaucratic ladder they are probably middle class by aspiration and self-identification. This sample is a fairly homogeneous young upper middle class sample.

Age. The young age of the sample generally and the rapid drop in participation after the age of 50 probably indicates that the sample is still upward mobile in the sense of expecting further promotions for which management development courses would be useful (Table 2-21).

TABLE 2-21

AGE OF RESPONDENTS

Age	1969 Total Sample	1969 Male	1969 Female	1961 Edmonton*	1961 Alberta*
21-25	13.0%	13.1%	11.5%	14.9%	13.7%
26-30	22.9	24.3	7.7	14.0	12.5
31-35	22.7	23.4	15.4	14.2	13.3
36-40	15.6	15.6	15.4	14.2	13.5
41-45	12.2	10.6	28.8	12.5	12.2
46-50	9.7	9.4	13.5	10.0	10.8
51-55	2.4	2.1	5.8	8.4	9.4
56-60	1.1	1.2	0.0	6.6	7.9
Over 60	0.3	0.2	1.9	5.2	6.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	616	564	52		

* Source: 1961 Census Table 5, Alberta, Table 7, Edmonton.

The age distribution of females does not follow the same pattern as males. In the 21-25 proportions are about equal. Between 25 and 30 males are at the peak of their participation while women are almost entirely absent. The percentage of females increases after 30. After 35 there are proportionately more women than men participating, their peak participation is in the 41-45 age group. This heavier participation

of women in this group probably serves to depress the average income of the age group (see Table 2-19).

Ethnic Background. Over half (51.2%) of the sample were of British ethnic origin (English and Irish), 11% were German and 10% Ukrainian (see Table 2-22). This compared with a total British contingent of

TABLE 2-22

ETHNIC ORIGIN OF RESPONDENTS

Ethnic Origin	N	% of sample	% of Edmonton	% of Alberta
Irish	29	4.7) 45.7*	45.2*
English	289	46.5)	
Hungarian	4	0.6	n.a.	n.a.
American	18	2.9	n.a.	n.a.
French	22	3.5	6.6	6.3
Italian	7	1.1	1.4	1.1
German	69	11.1	12.3	13.8
Ukrainian	61	9.8	11.3	8.0
Other	122	19.6	29.3	23.6
Total	621	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Census figures use the designation "British" for English, Irish, Scots and Welsh.

Source: D.B.S. Edmonton, 1961 Census report

Population: Ethnic Groups 1961 Census Report

45% of total Edmonton population, 12% German and 11% Ukrainian. Thus the English ethnic group is over-represented and the others are slightly under-represented.

Socialization. Eighty five per cent of the sample spent their childhood in Canada, 86% of these in the three Prairie provinces, 5.5% in British Columbia and six per cent in Ontario (see Table 2-23).

Of the 95 respondents brought up outside Canada, 37% came from Britain, 15% from Germany and five per cent from the United States.

TABLE 2-23

PROVINCE OF RESIDENCE DURING CHILDHOOD

Province	N	% of Sample
British Columbia	29	5.5
Alberta	327	62.2
Saskatchewan	77	14.6
Manitoba	49	9.3
Ontario	33	6.3
Province of Quebec	7	1.3
New Brunswick	1	0.2
Nova Scotia	3	0.6
Total	526	100.0

There was no other sizeable proportion from any one country. Most of those brought up outside Canada have lived in Canada about 15 years, 19% under five years, seven per cent between five and nine years and 74% for ten years or more.

Although three quarters of the sample is from the three Prairie provinces, there is a difference in geographic socialization since, although more respondents had spent their childhood in large cities (38% of the sample) than any other single category, many had rural backgrounds, almost half from a farm or small town (see Table 2-24).

TABLE 2-24

GEOGRAPHIC SOCIALIZATION - PLACE OF RESIDENCE
DURING CHILDHOOD

Place	N	% of total sample	Males	Females
Farm	164	26.6	25.0%	44.2%
Small Town	133	21.6	21.6	21.2
Small City	287	14.1	14.0	15.4
Big City	233	37.8	39.5	19.2
Total	617	100.0	100.0	100.0
N			565	52

Proportionately more women and more of the over 40 age groups were from rural areas.

Religion. Sixty seven per cent of the sample is Protestant by religion (see Table 2-25) and of these 54% are United Church. Anglicans (21%)

TABLE 2-25

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

Religion	N	Sample %	Edmonton %	Alberta %
Protestant	410	66.5	59.3	62.2
Catholic	114	18.5	26.4	25.0
Jewish	3	0.5	0.7	0.5
Greek Orthodox	24	3.9	5.1	3.6
Other	13	2.1) 8.8*	8.8*
None	53	8.6)	
Total	617	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Included together in census reports

Source: D.B.S. 1961 Census Reports, Bulletin CT-21 Edmonton

Population - Religious Denomination

and Lutherans (11.5%) account for most of the rest, leaving the smaller independent sects with only 13% of Protestant affiliates. However, only 40% of the respondents attended church regularly or often, more than half (60%) attending only seldom or never (see Table 2-26). There is little difference between males and females on church attendance, though we may have expected a greater proportion of women than men to attend church.

Social Mobility. The respondents in the sample were noticeably upward mobile as measured by father's education (see Table 2-27). Whereas 12% of the sample had only completed junior high school or less, 65.5% of of fathers had not got beyond junior high. Only 20% of fathers had

TABLE 2-26
CHURCH ATTENDANCE

Frequency	N	Sample %	Males %	Females %
Regularly	131	21.2	21.5	17.3
Often	117	18.9	18.3	25.0
Seldom	290	46.8	46.7	48.1
Never	81	13.1	13.4	9.6
Total	619	100.0	100.0	100.0
N			567	52

TABLE 2-27
HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF RESPONDENT
COMPARED WITH FATHER

Highest level of Education Attained	Fathers		Respondents	
	N	%	N	%
No schooling	15	2.9	3	0.5
Grades 1-6	110	21.1	-	-
Junior High	216	41.5	73	11.9
High School	75	14.4	238	38.7
Technical	16	3.1	44	7.2
Some College	32	6.1	128	20.8
College Graduate	44	8.4	96	15.6
Post Graduate	13	2.5	33	5.4
Total	521	100.0	615	100.0

post secondary training compared with 49% of the sample.

The range of occupations of respondents' fathers shown in Table 2-28 reveals that the sample is not homogeneous in its background and that less than one quarter have fathers whose occupations would have been similar to those of the homogeneous sample group (professionals seven per cent, managers 15.5%). This wide spread of parental occupation indicates there is a great deal of upward or geographic (farm to city) mobility.

TABLE 2-28

FATHER'S OCCUPATION DURING RESPONDENT'S CHILDHOOD

Occupation	N	% of Sample
Professional	43	7.0
Managers	95	15.5
Clerks	23	3.7
Salesmen	30	4.9
Craftsmen	59	9.6
Operatives	14	2.3
Service	61	9.9
Farmers	176	28.7
Farm Labourers	5	0.8
Other Labourers	86	14.0
Unemployed	13	2.1
Total	614	100.0

(iii) Organizational and Job Characteristics

Level. High educational and income levels are also reflected in the white collar occupations of this sample. Over three quarters of the respondents have staff or department head positions (see Table 2-29),

TABLE 2-29

LEVEL OF POSITION IN ORGANIZATION

Level	N	% of sample	% males	% females
Foreman/Clerical Sup.	93	15.0	15.5	9.6
Staff	261	42.1	39.5	69.2
Department Head	211	34.0	35.3	19.2
Chief Executive	55	8.9	9.5	1.9
Total	620	100.0	100.0	100.0
N			568	52

70% of the females hold staff positions. Because of the broad range of size in the companies the "executive" category includes some who are owner managers or managers of locally owned companies.

Function. Only 12% of the sample were concerned with the actual

production function compared with 32% in accounting and finance, and 26% in marketing (see Table 2-30). Since most of the sample are

TABLE 2-30

FUNCTION IN THE ORGANIZATION

Function	N	% of Sample
Production	74	12.0
Marketing	161	26.0
Accounting & Finance	196	31.7
Research & Development	69	11.1
Purchasing	27	4.4
Personnel	54	8.7
Other	38	6.1
Total	619	100.0

employed in staff or management positions in the organization and few are concerned with the production function, only a minority (four per cent) work on shifts or belong to a union (nine per cent).

Length of Employment. A further corroboration of the white collar and bureaucratic nature of the sample is the steady pattern of the employment. Although almost half the sample are under thirty and in spite of the high level of educational attainment which would mean a later age at which employment began, and the number of women over thirty who have probably returned to work after childrening, 22% of the sample have been with their present company for five to nine years and 34% have been with the same company for over ten years (see Table 2-31).

Technology of the Organization. Two-thirds of the sample are engaged in service industries and the next largest number in continuous production technology, probably reflecting the economic base of Edmonton industry. Only six per cent work in companies with a unit technology (see Table 2-32).

TABLE 2-31

LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT WITH PRESENT COMPANY

Number of Years	N	%
Under 5	275	44.3
5-9	136	21.9
10-14	104	16.7
15-19	61	9.8
20-24	34	5.5
25-29	8	1.3
30-34	2	0.3
35-39	1	0.2
Total	621	100.0

TABLE 2-32

TECHNOLOGY OF THE ORGANIZATION

	N	% of Sample
Unit	40	6.4
Mass	44	7.1
Continuous	84	13.5
Service	416	67.0
Multi-technology	12	1.9
Total	621	100.0

Note to Table 2-32

Unit technology means producing individual units.

Mass technology means producing a number of identical items usually with the aid of a production line.

Continuous technology means producing a continuous flow of a product (rather than units or items) such as the production of gasoline from a refining process.

Multi-technology implies the combined use of at least two of the above technologies.

Type of Organization. Type of organization is classified according to both size and type of ownership (private or public). Forty per cent of the sample work for a branch plant of a large company (see Table 2-33), 25% work for some form of government operation and 5.5% work for a local

TABLE 2-33

ORGANIZATION OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

Type of Organization	N	%
Branch plant of large company	248	40.3
Owner-managed local company	109	17.7
Local company with hired management	34	5.5
Government:		
Municipal	29	4.7
Provincial	79	12.8
Federal	49	8.0
Other	68	11.1
Total	616	100.0

company with hired management. This group may be assumed to be management and staff with little or no ownership interest in the organizations they work for. The organizations themselves, therefore, are probably bureaucratic and those who work in them striving for success up the bureaucratic hierarchy. Only 18% of the sample work in companies which are both locally owned and owner-managed. This group may include some owner-managers and may be less bureaucratic and less upward mobile.

Occupational Mobility. General upward mobility of the sample is attested by the fact that 80% of the sample were not appointed to management when they entered their present companies. They originally held non-management staff positions in personnel, research and development, production, marketing and accounting (in increasing order of importance). More than half the sample (54%) have had one or more promotions since joining the company for which they presently work (see Table 2-34).

Summary

We may conclude that the sample is upper middle class in terms of income, occupation and education, and in terms of these variables is

TABLE 2-34

NUMBER OF PROMOTIONS OF RESPONDENT IN THE PRESENT COMPANY

Number of Promotions	N	%
Under 2	286	46.1
2-4	220	35.4
5-7	89	14.3
Over 7	26	4.2
Total	621	100.0

a fairly homogeneous group. It is also a young group almost totally Canadian, predominantly from the West, largely of British ancestry and noticeably upward mobile. A large group spent their childhood on a farm, the sample is about equally divided between country and city backgrounds. Two-thirds of the sample are Protestants but less than half of the total sample attend church frequently. The females in the sample are almost as well educated as the males and are certainly above the average population in educational attainment, however they are more likely to be from rural backgrounds and to earn less than the males. Nevertheless, because of their small number and because their attitudes did not appear markedly different from the males, they were kept in the following analysis.

In organizational characteristics the sample is mainly in staff or management positions, a variety of staff fields are covered. They are white collar workers, 80% at least work in bureaucracies, largely within service industries. They seem to be working up the bureaucratic ladder within the same company, they have fairly long employment records with their present company and over half have at least one promotion from that company. We can conclude, therefore, that they are upward mobile

in terms of the bureaucratic hierarchy as well as intergenerationally.

A Note on the Tables and Statistics

It was noted in the previous section that when a restricted sample of this type is used advantages are obtained at the expense of certain disadvantages. The chief disadvantage is that a homogeneous sample will show very little variation in relationships with attitude variables, either towards the job or towards political attitudes. Therefore we would expect trends to appear but that these trends would not be statistically significant. Careful consideration was thus given to the problem of statistical tests of significance. It was decided that since the measures used for single item variables would not be sensitive enough for relationships to be meaningful, even if they were statistically significant statistical tests would not be reported. To avoid giving the impression of certainty where none existed, such relationships are reported as percentages and means only.

With the more sophisticated measurement used in the scales, it seemed more worthwhile to report tests of significance when comparing one scale (divided into high, medium, low) against another scale (similarly divided). A chi square test was used. Pearson Correlation Coefficients were also calculated where one scale was related to another. These coefficients are generally low indicating that linear relationship of one scale to another was low. They are included because they show the directionality of the relationship. Even slight linear relationships in the data tended to be very significant because of the large number in the sample.

The scores on all scales were divided as equally as possible into the three classifications. It should be noted, however, that when for example it is stated that a score of nine is classified high in intolerance, this is not meant in any absolute sense, because there is no universal scale against which to measure intolerance. The only meaning this classification can have in this context is relatively high or low compared with the rest of the sample. Thus all high, medium and low scores are relative.

All the tables in the results of this analysis add up to 100% across the table (except where otherwise stated) with the intention of seeing the distribution of various demographic variables to the high, medium and low classifications of scores on the scales. The abbreviation N, meaning number of cases, is used throughout the tables.

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11. Ibid.
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13. Rummel, op.cit., pp. 460-466.
14. Ibid., pp. 466-468; Nie, et.al., op.cit., pp. 221-223.
15. Rummel, op.cit., pp. 466-7.
16. Nie, et.al., op.cit., p. 224.
17. Ibid., p. 222.
18. Rummel, op.cit., p. 450.
19. Trow, op.cit., p.275.
20. Ibid.
21. Wolfinger, et.al., op.cit.

22. The Management Development Certificate Programme is organized by the Department of Extension in cooperation with the Faculty of Business Administration and Commerce at the University of Alberta. This evening credit program was initiated in the fall of 1961 and is now well known and well established in the community. It aims to provide an opportunity to examine key business areas and develop the skills and perception necessary for the development of a manager or executive. The program is open to applicants with a senior high school diploma, over 25 years of age with management experience in business or public organization. The candidate has to complete three compulsory and three optional subjects for the certificate. Each subject offers 50 hours of instruction and usually students take only one subject each session.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Introduction

In Western Democracies, the electoral process is often considered to be one of the few ways in which the citizen can influence political decisions. It is assumed that a high level of participation in the electoral process indicates that the citizenry accept the political system as a means through which they can meaningfully influence the political decision making process. High participation is taken as evidence that democracy works. Low participation is taken as evidence that a large number of citizens are indifferent, cynical or alienated insofar as the political system is concerned. A large group of alienated may be apathetic and simply withdraw from political participation, or they may become extremists embracing the anti-democratic views of either right or left. A large group of politically apathetic, susceptible to extremism, are a potentially disruptive force in a democracy. It has been suggested that mass support for strong personalities such as Hitler and McCarthy comes from the politically alienated.¹

Several researchers, both in the United States and Canada, however, have doubted whether high electoral participation is indicative of fundamental contentment with the system or satisfaction with the outputs from it.² If this is so it becomes doubly important to measure it so that the question of why citizens do or do not vote can be subjected to more scrutiny.

Milbrath has classified voting as a very passive form of participation in the electoral system, requiring very little effort, it is a private act (covert) involving no public commitment (overt), non-verbal rather than verbal and episodic rather than continuous.³ Real involvement in the political process requires a commitment which is known to one's peer group or larger group and is a verbal and more continuous effort. Without sufficient people willing to contribute their skills to work in these activities the democratic political system would collapse. Thus we have a second and in some respects even more important variable, that of active participation.

The Participation Scales

Electoral participation is a variable which attempts to measure the degree of involvement in and acceptance of the present political system. It may not do so. Actually, voting may not imply acceptance of the system. A political alienation scale is probably a better measure of acceptance of the system. Thus the voting behaviour scale claims only to measure the actual voting behaviour of the respondents and makes no assumptions as to the motivation or meaning behind the actual behaviour. It was desirable to have one scale to measure voting behaviour and another to measure active participation not only on theoretical grounds⁴ but because the overwhelming participation of this group in the voting act made a meaningful scale of overall participation impossible.

Federal elections typically have the highest turnout, followed by provincial and then municipal elections. This scale is intended to tap the greatest and the least frequency of respondents voting. There

is probably a tendency to exaggerate participation because it is self estimated and almost certainly regarded as the 'right' thing to do. However, there is no other way of measuring actual voting participation. Measuring participation in municipal elections also gives a means of testing for alienation since Templeton found in the United States that alienation influenced voting in municipal rather than presidential elections.⁵

Review of Past Research

Electoral participation, both voting and more active participation, varies a great deal from country to country and from one time period to another. Milbrath finds that about one-third of the American adult population can be categorized as politically apathetic, another 60% vote but are otherwise passive.⁶ Only 5-7% are active and assume "gladiator" roles of standing for election, taking a major part in organizing a campaign, etc.

In Canada, even when the election issues and personalities are not particularly exciting or colourful, 70-75% of those eligible to vote do so. This is a comparatively high participation level. Van Loon, in his national sample, found great differences between provinces from Prince Edward Island (87% voted in all Federal elections) to Alberta (37% voted in all Federal elections).⁷ Van Loon also found that only three or four per cent of Canadians take part in the gladiatorial roles while 20-25% are active at the transitional level.⁸

In the case of both active and voting participation, socio-economic status (no matter if measured in terms of occupation, education or income) is positively associated with higher participation.⁹

Similar findings in many Western countries show that income is positively correlated with political participation.¹⁰ Jensen showed that middle income persons are significantly more likely to be active in politics than low income persons, but that high income persons are not significantly more likely than middle income persons.¹¹ These findings have been corroborated by Lane,¹² and are in keeping with many studies which have suggested that persons near the centre of society are more likely to participate in politics than people near the periphery.¹³

The findings on education are similar, a trend for those with higher education to participate in politics has been found also in many countries.¹⁴ Almond and Verba,¹⁵ in a five nation study concluded from patterns found in all five countries that educational differences have a greater effect on political behaviour than both income and occupation.

The effects of occupation on political participation have proved difficult to quantify because of the difficulties in categorizing occupations. Use of broad categories such as white collar and blue collar has resulted in conflicting results, but several studies using status ranking of occupations report that persons of higher occupational status are more likely to participate in politics.¹⁶

Lane has suggested that the following characteristics of middle class occupations are such to encourage political participation:¹⁷

1. The development and use of intellectual skills which might carry over to politics;
2. Opportunity to interact with like-minded others;

3. Higher than average stakes in governmental policy;

4. Roles on the job that carry over to public service.

The professional persons, doctors, teachers, lawyers are most likely to have occupations with these attributes and several studies show that professional persons are the most likely to get involved in politics, especially in political office holding.¹⁸ For example, almost half of the state governors in the United States from 1870 to 1950 were practicing lawyers.

Businessmen may also develop political skills depending upon the nature of their jobs and they tend to be quite active in politics.¹⁹ Janosik found that they tended to give money (four times the national average) and work on campaigns but were not office holders and tended to inhibit political discussion for fear of offending associates. Top business executives were more likely to be active in politics than middle and lower management.²⁰

The working class, however, do not have jobs which develop these skills and political decisions often seem remote.²¹ However, exceptions to this low level of involvement do occur where occupational groups are enlisted in union work which develops these skills, or in unusual occupations with very close contact between the workers, such as mining or seafaring.

Almond and Verba considered the effects of participation in 'on the job' decisions and political participation in five countries.²² They found that in the relationship between political and non-political participation that:

The clearest parallel to the data on political participation exists in the data on job participation. Those nations with the most political participation also appear to afford the greatest opportunities for work-place participation, the distinction being especially sharp on the blue collar level.²³

They also found that the nature of the occupation affected the chances of participation at work, in general the higher the status of the occupation, the more likely the individual is to be consulted on decisions.

Almond and Verba suggested that:

The patterns of authority perceived by an individual as most similar are those adult patterns of authority, political and non-political, to which he is contemporaneously exposed - thus democracy in both may develop simultaneously.²⁴

They thought that opportunities for job and political participation have a reciprocal effect on one another, that they develop together and support each other. However, apart from job participation there is a dearth of literature on political participation and other job variables such as job satisfaction (although participation may be one cause of satisfaction), group cohesion, job routine, role definition and technological change, or with type of organization or length of employment with a company.

Age has also been positively correlated with participation. Persons of middle age are more interested and expose themselves to more stimuli about politics than younger people do.²⁵ Actual participation rises with age, reaches a peak and levels off in the forties and fifties and gradually declines after sixty years of age.²⁶ The young and unmarried are the most apathetic of all age groups and there is evidence that young people are not likely to take an active interest in politics until they have become established in a job, bought a home and started

to raise a family.²⁷ Van Loon confirmed these general findings in Canada, no matter what the activity the middle aged group were more likely to participate than either the very young or the very old.²⁸

Men are more likely to be psychologically involved²⁹ and to participate in³⁰ politics than women. This is because, on the whole, men move in environments having more stimuli than do women.³¹ However, the sex difference is being eroded by the improved educational and occupational status of women. Van Loon also found this true in Canada, especially among French Canadian women, (where the woman's traditional role remains unmodified) and particularly at the level of active participation. The differences between males and females tended to disappear at higher educational levels.³²

Ethnic status, according to Lane, is unlikely to depress political interest, and generation or time in the United States did not affect participation in any systematic way.³³ Those nationality groups that settled in cities had somewhat higher rates of participation than those who lived in the country and each group had slightly higher rates than native groups in similar circumstances.³⁴ There is little difference between ethnic and non-ethnic (Anglo-Saxon) participation in national politics in the United States of America. Van Loon's study of political participation in Canada found little difference in activity (active and voting) between the French and English (when education was held constant) and with the exception that relatively few of them are highly active, recent immigrants to Canada did not behave much differently from either of the "charter" ethnic groups.³⁵

United States studies have shown that Jews vote slightly more than

Catholics who in turn vote slightly more than Protestants, though this does not follow in active participation.³⁶ Among the protestant denominations, the more established who have members with generally higher socio-economic status, such as the Episcopalians, tend to be more active.³⁷ Lenski found those who attend church regularly are more likely to vote, especially among working class whites but not so much among the middle class, when the relationship was reversed for members of the Catholic Church (see Table 3-1).³⁸ However, membership

TABLE 3-1³⁹

RELIGION, CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND VOTING PARTICIPATION

	% not voting
White middle class protestants - high church attendance	9
White middle class protestants - low church attendance	16
White middle class catholics - high church attendance	21
White middle class catholics - low church attendance	13

in a religious group may result in "cross pressures," (opposing factors which pull a voter in two different or opposite directions, as for example between high socio-economic status and a low status religious group). Cross pressures may be resolved by diminishing interest in politics.

Cross pressures resulting in diminished interest in political activity also occur through geographic and social mobility. Hyman⁴⁰ argues that geographic mobility brings the child into a new political world and attenuates parental influence. Persons living in an urban environment encounter more stimuli about politics than those living in the country.⁴¹ Political interest is passed on through the family, if

the parents are interested and listen to news events the children are also likely to follow such events.⁴² Rural dwellers do not have such good communications either with their neighbours or with outside events. As a result, United States studies have shown that the larger the community the higher the rate of participation.⁴³ Not only are those growing up in the towns subjected to more stimuli, but the norms and standards of participation are different. Thus, according to Dawson and Prewitt, those who come from a rural background are also subject to cross pressures⁴⁴ (see Chapter V on Intolerance). The environment also has influence if the group that a child grows up in is deviant from the majority, even if that person does not remove himself geographically as an adult. Influence of associates outside the deviant group will introduce cross pressures. However the relationship between opinion deviance and political activity is probably curvilinear, the least and the most deviant are the most active.⁴⁵

The same applies to the socio-economic status of childhood, those growing up in a high socio-economic status home are more likely to be exposed to a high incidence of political discussion etc. and are more likely to maintain a high level of exposure to stimuli when adults.⁴⁶ Congruence in direction of political attitudes increases the probability of participation whereas persons with an occupational status drastically lower than that of their father are less likely to participate in politics.⁴⁷

The upwardly mobile are subject to both geographic and social changes as they climb. Parental influence is attenuated firstly through education and a change in reference groups.⁴⁸ They may change party

allegiance either from one party to another,⁴⁹ or become independents,⁵⁰ or indecision resulting from cross pressures may lead certain people not to vote at all.⁵¹ On the other hand Grusky's study showed that upwardly mobile persons may become active in politics as part of their effort to move upward.⁵²

Group membership (community socialization) may be an important intervening variable in political participation. The more groups an individual belongs to the more likely he is to be an opinion leader.⁵³ Opinion leaders and those who are active in community affairs are more likely to be active in politics.⁵⁴ In his Canadian study, Van Loon found participation in voluntary organizations to be a significant stimulus in virtually all forms of political activity.⁵⁵

American studies have shown those with strong party preferences to pick up more stimuli (primarily from their own side) than those with weak preferences⁵⁶ and to be more likely to participate.⁵⁷ Van Loon showed that identification with a party is a significant correlate of political participation and that in Canada, as in other countries, the so-called "well-informed, active and independent voter is a mythical creature."⁵⁸ The same study showed a great deal of difference in active participation between members of the established (Liberal and Conservative) parties and members of smaller parties. Three times as many N.D.P. and Creditiste supporters were highly active as were members of the old parties and supporters of the Social Credit party were the least active of all parties.⁵⁹

Apart from the variables of political alienation and intolerance of non-conformity, there is a paucity of literature on the relationship between political participation and other political attitudes. The

obvious reason for this is because attitudes towards government control of the economy, welfare and foreign aid are more likely to be related to the direction of political affiliation rather than the quantity or quality of participation in the political system. However, Stouffer's study on intolerance (see Chapter V) showed that those politically active and opinion leaders had significantly more liberal views towards communists, socialists and atheists than had the public at large.⁶⁰ It may also be true that the politically active hold more liberal views towards government control of the economy, welfare measures and to the French Canadians, for studies on the alienated have shown a tendency in this group towards negative or right wing extremist attitudes on many political questions.⁶¹ The relationship between alienation and political participation will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter.

Results

Total Sample

In total the sample has a very high frequency in exercising the franchise, 90% of the sample rating as high on the scale of voting participation which includes both federal and municipal elections (see Table 3-2).

TABLE 3-2

FREQUENCY OF VOTING

Voting turnout	N	%	cum %
Low	18	2.9	2.9
Medium	42	6.8	9.7
High	561	90.3	100.0
Total	621	100.0	

As may be expected, respondents did not participate equally in all political activities, for example not as many 'always' voted in a municipal election as at a federal (see Table 3-3). Nevertheless, if 63% always vote in municipal elections and the frequency of voting in federal elections is very high in comparison with Van Loon's sample of Alberta, and indicates quite strongly the different nature of the two samples.⁶²

TABLE 3-3

RELATIVE VOTING IN FEDERAL AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Item	Always	Usually	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
1. How frequently do you vote in municipal elections?	62.6%	27.1%	5.5%	1.4%	3.4%
2. How frequently do you vote in federal elections?	75.5	17.4	3.9	0.5	2.7
	All	Most	Some	None	
Van Loon's sample Federal Elections 1965 - Alberta only	37	38	22	4	

Van Loon found 20-25% of his sample active in the transitional roles.⁶³ Of the present sample only eight per cent were classified in the highly active category but 70% were classified as medium (see Table 3-4) showing that they had taken more than a purely passive part in the political process at some time. However, since the scales used

TABLE 3-4

ACTIVE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Active Participation	N	%	cum %
Low	137	22.1	22.1
Medium	434	69.9	91.9
High	50	8.1	100.0
Total	621	100.0	

to measure participation were not the same, an exact comparison with Van Loon's sample to show the different compositions of the two samples is not possible.

Thus less than five per cent of the sample never discuss political issues whereas more than 30% frequently do. This sample is by no means apathetic yet less than 10% frequently take an active part other than talking with their friends and only 13% think they contribute anything to community decisions (see Table 3-5). If we include those who sometimes take an active part in the transitional role in the political activity hierarchy the sample appears much more politically active.

TABLE 3-5

RELATIVE PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Item	Frequently	Sometimes	Never
1. When you get together with your friends would you say you discuss public issues like government regulation of business, labour unions, taxes and farm programs?	30.8%	64.7%	4.5%
2. Have you ever written, phoned or talked to your member on city council, in the provincial legislature or the House of Commons, or any other public official about some issue?	6.0	36.1	58.0
3. Have you ever gone to any political meetings, speeches, rallies, dinners, or things like that in connection with an election?	9.5	57.6	32.9
4. Would you say you are			%
a person who contributes to community decisions			12.6
a person who is active, but not one of the decision makers			18.4
just an ordinary person in the community			60.9
not really a part of the community at all			8.2

Demographic Variables and Political Participation

(i) Introduction

Relating demographic variables to political participation reveals who the politically active are and should shed some light on the causes of high and low political activity. The middle class norm of civic duty may impel such a sample as this one to vote frequently. However, Almond and Verba have shown in a study of five other nations (not Canada) that most citizens who feel it is their civic duty to be politically active consider the requirement to be met entirely by voting alone.⁶⁴ Thus we would expect a large difference between those who vote and those who actively participate. Where previous studies have shown that political participation can mainly be explained in terms of socio-economic status, no matter how measured, even small differences between the sub-sections of this reasonably homogeneous sample may have significance.

(ii) The Variables

Even when social class is held constant more or less as in this study, there is still a consistent pattern between income and both frequency of voting (Table 3-6) and active participation (Table 3-7).

TABLE 3-6

INCOME AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Income	Voting Frequency				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Under 7,500	145	4.8%	9.7%	85.5%	100%	2.807
7,501 - 10,000	200	3.0	7.5	89.5	100	2.865
10,501 - 12,500	132	3.0	6.1	90.9	100	2.879
12,501 and over	144	0.7	3.5	95.8	100	2.951
Total	621					

TABLE 3-7

INCOME AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Income	Active Participation					Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total	
Under 7,500	145	30.3%	63.4%	6.2%	100%	1.759
7,501 - 10,000	200	21.0	73.0	6.0	100	1.850
10,501 - 12,500	132	21.2	70.5	8.3	100	1.871
12,501 and over	144	16.0	71.5	12.5	100	1.965
Total	621					

The difference is especially noticeable in active participation and more so at the highest income level where twice as many participated (12.5%) than at the lowest income level (6.2%). The differences, however, may be partly a function of age, since the younger members of the sample who participate less will not yet have reached their full earning capacity.

According to the findings of Almond and Verba and others, educational differences have a greater influence on political behaviour than either income or occupation.⁶⁵ However, the results from this sample show that those with technical education both claim to vote more frequently and to be more active in politics (see Tables 3-8 and 3-9). The college graduates take very little interest in politics, claiming to vote less often than any other group.

TABLE 3-8

EDUCATION AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Highest level of education completed	Voting Frequency				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Junior High	73	0.0%	4.1%	95.9%	100%	2.959
Senior High	238	3.8	5.9	90.3	100	2.866
Technical Institute	44	0.0	2.3	97.7	100	2.977
Some College	128	1.6	7.8	90.6	100	2.891
College Graduates	135	5.2	9.6	85.2	100	2.800
Total	618					

TABLE 3-9

EDUCATION AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Highest level of education completed	N	Low	Active Participation			Total	Mean
			Medium	High			
Junior High	73	20.5%	68.5%	11.0%	100%		1.904
Senior High	238	24.4	70.6	5.0	100		1.807
Technical Institute	44	13.6	68.2	18.2	100		2.045
Some College	128	15.6	77.3	7.0	100		1.914
College Graduate	135	28.1	62.2	9.6	100		1.815
Total	618						

Age may again be a contaminating variable, as the graduates all tend to be young this would explain the 28% who are low in active participation. Tables 3-10 and 3-11 show that age is more positively related to both voting frequency and active participation than either income or education. Both voting and active participation rates increase up to the age of 50 and then drop off. These results do not

TABLE 3-10

AGE AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Age	N	Low	Voting Frequency		Total	Mean
			Medium	High		
21 - 25	80	7.5%	7.5%	85.0%	100%	2.775
26 - 30	141	3.5	11.3	85.1	100	2.816
31 - 35	140	2.9	7.9	92.1	100	2.893
36 - 40	96	1.0	5.2	93.8	100	2.927
41 - 45	75	1.3	2.7	96.0	100	2.947
46 - 50	60	0.0	3.3	96.7	100	2.967
Over 50	24	0.0	8.3	91.7	100	2.917
Total	621					

necessarily conflict with the findings in the literature but can mainly be accounted for by the nature of the sample. The sample on the whole is well educated with incomes much higher than average so the complete

TABLE 3-11
AGE AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Age	Active Participation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
21 - 25	80	32.5%	60.0%	7.5%	100%	1.750
26 - 30	141	34.8	60.3	5.0	100	1.702
31 - 35	140	19.3	73.6	7.1	100	1.879
36 - 40	96	20.8	69.8	9.4	100	1.885
41 - 45	75	10.7	77.3	12.0	100	2.013
46 - 50	60	5.0	86.7	8.3	100	2.033
Over 50	24	12.5	75.0	12.5	100	2.000
Total	621					

education and income spectrum is not present. The sample is also very young compared with the average population. There is scarcely anyone over 50, most are under 35 and have not yet established the things (career, home, family) which past research has found prerequisite to political activity. Consequently age is a much greater determinant of political activity in this sample than we would expect it to be in the population at large.

As predicted, in a sample of women with high socio-economic status and similar education level to the males, who are working and are thus exposed to an environment that gives more personal contacts and political stimuli, the difference in political participation disappears entirely in voting frequency (see Table 3-12) and all but

TABLE 3-12
SEX AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Sex	Voting Frequency				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Male	569	2.8%	6.9%	90.3%	100%	2.875
Female	52	3.8	5.8	90.4	100	2.865
Total	621					

disappears in active participation (see Table 3-13). Although less

TABLE 3-13

SEX AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Sex	Active Participation					
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total	Mean
Male	569	22.1%	69.6%	8.6%	100%	1.861
Female	52	21.2	73.1	5.8	100	1.846
Total	621					

women than men are highly active, there is no difference in the mean scores. This finding confirms Van Loon's finding that the lower participation of Canadian women disappears at the higher educational level, it may also add weight to his finding that French-Canadian women participated much less than females of other ethnic origin, since there were no French-Canadian females in this sample.⁶⁶

The influence of ethnic origin on political participation in this sample seem closer to Lane's⁶⁷ findings in the United States than to Van Loon's Canadian sample.⁶⁸ The Ukrainian ethnics have the highest level of voting participation (97% high in frequency of voting compared to 90% of British origin and 87% of those of German origin, see Table 3-14), whereas they have the lowest overall level of active participation because 30% are low in active participation even though more are highly active (8%) than are those of British origin (7%) (see Table 3-15). The Germans, though lowest on passive (voting) participation, are highest in active participation. Ten per cent are high in this activity and 73% take a moderate part in the "transitional roles."

TABLE 3-14
ETHNIC ORIGIN AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Ethnic Origin	Voting Frequency				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
British	289	1.4%	8.3%	90.3%	100%	2.889
German	69	5.8	7.2	87.0	100	2.812
Ukrainian	61	1.6	1.6	96.7	100	2.951
Total	419					

TABLE 3-15
ETHNIC ORIGIN AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Ethnic Origin	Active Participation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
British	289	21.1%	72.0%	6.9%	100%	1.858
German	69	17.4	72.5	10.1	100	1.928
Ukrainian	61	29.5	62.3	8.2	100	1.787
Total	419					

Catholics tend to vote more frequently than Protestants, although the difference is small (see Table 3-16). This is the relationship

TABLE 3-16
RELIGION AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Religion	Voting Frequency				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Protestant	410	2.9%	5.4%	91.7%	100%	2.888
Catholic	114	1.8	6.1	92.1	100	2.904
Total	524					

predicted from United States studies.⁶⁹ In keeping with the same findings there is less difference in active participation, although more Catholics are highly active (11%) than Protestants (7%), more are low

in active participation (25% low compared with 21% of Protestants).

TABLE 3-17

RELIGION AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Religion	N	Active Participation			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Protestant	410	21.2%	71.5%	7.3%	100%	1.861
Catholic	114	24.6	64.9	10.5	100	1.860
Total	524					

There is a curvilinear relationship between church attendance and all forms of political activity. Both voting participation (see Table 3-18) and active participation (see Table 3-19) are low among

TABLE 3-18

CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Frequency of Attendance	N	Voting Frequency			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
No church att.	81	4.9%	18.5%	81.5%	100%	2.765
Seldom	290	4.1	5.5	90.3	100	2.862
Often	117	0.9	5.1	94.6	100	2.932
Regularly	131	0.8	6.9	92.4	100	2.916
Total	609					

TABLE 3-19

CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Frequency of Attendance	N	Active Participation			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
No church att.	81	30.9%	64.2%	4.9%	100%	1.741
Seldom	290	26.6	66.6	6.9	100	1.803
Often	117	12.8	76.1	11.1	100	1.983
Regularly	131	14.5	76.3	9.2	100	1.947
Total	609					

those who do not attend church at all. This is especially noticeable in voting frequency. Political activity increases greatly among those who attend church even seldom and increases still further among those who claim to attend church often, 94% of this group are high in voting frequency (see Table 3-18) and 11% are high in active participation with another 76% taking a moderate part in some "transitional roles" (see Table 3-19). Both voting frequency and active participation decline among those who attend church regularly. This slightly unexpected result (up to this point the results on church attendance have been in keeping with the findings of Lenski in the United States) may be explained in that the highly active, upward mobile give wholehearted support to traditional norms and use their religious beliefs to reinforce their activities in other spheres, whereas the committed Christian who attends church regularly may be subject to cross pressures from his religious beliefs and the standards of his business and political life.

Cross pressures incurred through geographic mobility do not seem to have influenced the participation rates in this sample, nor do the results confirm the United States findings that the larger the community the higher the rate of participation.⁷⁰ Those from a rural background have the highest level of voting participation (see Table 3-20) and a rate of active participation higher than those with city backgrounds (see Table 3-21). Meanwhile those from a small city or town are the lowest in voting frequency but highest in active participation. There could be many explanations for these findings, age does not appear to be a contaminating factor, those with rural backgrounds

TABLE 3-20

GEOGRAPHIC SOCIALIZATION AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Place of residence as child	N	Voting Frequency			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Large city	233	3.0%	9.9%	90.1%	100%	2.871
Small city	87	3.4	6.9	89.7	100	2.862
Small town	133	4.5	9.0	86.5	100	2.820
Rural	164	1.2	4.3	94.5	100	2.933
Total	617					

TABLE 3-21

GEOGRAPHIC SOCIALIZATION AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Place of residence as child	N	Active Participation			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Large city	233	26.6%	65.2%	8.2%	100%	1.815
Small city	87	19.5	70.1	10.3	100	1.908
Small town	133	18.0	75.2	6.8	100	1.887
Rural	164	20.7	71.3	7.9	100	1.872
Total	617					

being no older or more active than the city group. In this sample with class held more or less constant there will be far fewer differences in the political stimuli received. In Alberta, farmers have a history of political activity and those from small towns and cities would have been more likely to have had personal contact with an official or political figure. Another explanation may be that those upwardly mobile who are also subjected to geographical changes may try even harder to conform to the 'norms' of good citizenship than those who were not subject to cross pressures of geographic mobility.

Nor does the theory of cross pressures hold when political participation is related to social mobility as measured by father's

occupation during the respondent's childhood. Past findings have indicated that children of high socio-economic status will be exposed to more political stimuli and maintain a high level of interest as adults.⁷¹ However, those whose fathers were professionals and managers (and thus in theory the most active politically) vote less than any other group (see Table 3-22) and overall their active participation is lower than both farmers and labourers (see Table 3-23).

TABLE 3-22

FATHER'S OCCUPATION DURING CHILDHOOD AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Father's Occupation	N	Voting Frequency			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Labourer	111	1.8%	9.0%	89.2%	100%	2.874
Middle Occ.Groups	196	4.1	7.1	88.8	100	2.847
Prof. & Manager	138	4.3	8.7	87.0	100	2.826
Farmer	176	1.1	3.4	95.5	100	2.943
Total	621					

TABLE 3-23

FATHER'S OCCUPATION DURING CHILDHOOD AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Father's Occupation	N	Active Participation			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Labourer	111	24.3%	63.1%	12.6%	100%	1.883
Middle Occ.Groups	196	23.0	71.4	5.6	100	1.827
Prof. & Manager	138	21.7	69.6	8.6	100	1.870
Farmer	176	19.9	72.7	7.4	100	1.875
Total	621					

Probably because of the peculiar political history of Alberta, those whose fathers were farmers are highest both in frequency of voting and in active participation. It is of interest to note that the group with

the greatest percentage of highly active people (13%) are those whose fathers were labourers. These differences are still apparent when age is controlled. This result seems to conflict with United States findings that congruence in direction of stimuli increases the probability of participation.⁷² Since those with professional and managerial backgrounds do not participate highly it does not confirm Hyman's theory that those with the most and the least deviant opinions are the most highly active.⁷³ It would, however, support the explanation that the upward mobile with the greatest difference in backgrounds embrace the norms of their new reference group with more enthusiasm than those who are socially stable.

When mobility is measured by comparing the education of the respondents with that of their fathers the interpretation above is confirmed when voting frequency of the socially stable is compared with both the upward and the downward mobile (see Table 3-24). The socially

TABLE 3-24

MOBILITY AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Father's education compared with respondents	Voting Frequency					Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total	
Greater (downward mobile)	157	1.3%	7.6%	91.1%	100%	2.898
Equal (stable)	73	8.2	15.1	76.7	100	2.685
Less (upward mobile)	391	2.6	4.9	92.6	100	2.900
Total	621					

stable vote far less frequently (77% classified as high) than the upward mobile (93%) or the downward mobile 91%. By contrast it is the downward

mobile (those with less education than their fathers) who are the most highly active in politics (10% are categorized as high and 71% medium in active participation), whereas there is no difference between the stable and the upward mobile (as measured by education) in overall active political participation (see Table 3-25).

TABLE 3-25

MOBILITY AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Father's education compared with respondent's	N	Active Participation			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Greater (downward mobile)	157	19.7%	70.7%	9.6%	100%	1.898
Equal (stable)	73	23.3	68.5	8.2	100	1.849
Less (upward mobile)	391	22.8	69.8	7.4	100	1.847
Total	621					

In the review of the literature in this chapter, it was stated that United States observations had shown participation in voluntary groups to be positively related to political activity (the more groups to which an individual belongs the more likely the individual is to be active in politics) and that Van Loon had shown that this relationship held good for a Canadian sample. The results of this study confirm Van Loon's finding for Canada. Of those low in voting frequency (the most politically apathetic) only 11% belonged to four or more groups (though N=18 is a small sample) compared with 26% of those who were high in voting frequency (see Table 3-26). The differences between those who are low and those who are high in active participation are of those who are low in active participation 54% belong to one or no voluntary groups, compared with 16% of those who are high in active participation. At the other end

TABLE 3-26

GROUP MEMBERSHIP, VOTING FREQUENCY AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

No. of Voluntary Groups belonged to	Low in Voting Frequency	High in Voting Frequency	Low in Active Participation	High in Active Participation
0	16.7%	16.4%	25.5%	12.0%
1	22.2	17.3	28.5	4.0
2	33.3	21.0	25.5	10.0
3	16.7	21.0	13.1	16.0
4	5.6	10.5	4.4	22.0
5 or more	5.6	13.7	3.9	36.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	18	561	137	50

of the scale 58% of those high in active participation belonged to four or more voluntary groups, compared with eight per cent of those low in active participation.

Organizational Variables

(i) Introduction

Whereas demographic data reveal how past socialization influences political participation, organizational variables are part of the ongoing socialization of all individuals. Little research has been done on such ongoing socialization in influencing political activity. Our sample of new middle class, upward mobile, white collar workers in professional and managerial positions have more encouragement and more rewards to be gained from political activity than any other group. By examining job variables as related to political activity in such a group, relationships between job activities and political activities, if there are any, should certainly be revealed. The purpose of this

section then is to further test the proposition of Almond and Verba, that there is a symbolic relationship between aspects of the individual's occupation and his tendency to political participation.⁷⁴

(ii) The Variables

Almond and Verba found a positive relationship between participation in on-the-job decisions and political participation.⁷⁵ Although participation in work decisions was not directly measured in our study, we may assume that participation will effect job satisfaction both on theoretical grounds⁷⁶ and because of the nature of the occupations in our sample. Results show that job satisfaction is significantly related to voting frequency; 72% of those low in job satisfaction are high in voting participation compared with 93% of those high in job satisfaction (see Table 3-27). However, there is no relationship

TABLE 3-27
JOB SATISFACTION AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Job Satisfaction	Voting Frequency				
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total
Low	25	4.0%	24.0%	72.0%	100%
Medium	332	3.3	6.9	89.8	100
High	264	2.3	4.9	92.8	100
Total N	621	18	42	561	

$\chi^2 = 14.09454$ with 4.d.f.	significant at .01 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1093	significant at .003 level

whatever between job satisfaction and active participation, for where the chi square test shows the relationship of job satisfaction with voting to be 99% certain, it shows no relationship with active participation with equal certainty.(see Table 3-28).

TABLE 3-28

JOB SATISFACTION AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Job Satisfaction	Active Participation				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	25	20.0%	72.0%	8.0%	100%
Medium	332	22.0	70.2	7.8	100
High	264	22.3	69.3	8.3	100
Total N	621	137	434	50	

$\chi^2 = .13724$ with 4.d.f. significant at .99 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .0599 significant at .068 level

There is also a definite negative relationship between high role definition and both active and passive participation though the correlation is low and the tendency is not significant (see Tables 3-29 and 3-30). It would seem likely that those whose role and

TABLE 3-29

ROLE DEFINITION AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Role Definition	Voting Frequency				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	49	2.0%	14.3%	83.7%	100%
Medium	277	3.2	6.1	90.6	100
High	295	2.7	6.1	91.2	100
Total N	621	18	42	561	

$\chi^2 = 5.07$ with 4.d.f. significant at .30 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = -.0207 significant at .006 level

decision making responsibilities are highly defined would be less likely to participate at work and thus, according to Almond and Verba,⁷⁷ be less likely to participate in the political process. It should be noted that the influence of role definition is much less on voting than

TABLE 3-30

ROLE DEFINITION AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Role definition	Active Participation				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	49	16.3%	71.4%	12.2%	100%
Medium	277	22.4	67.9	9.7	100
High	295	22.7	71.5	5.8	100
Total N	621	137	434	50	

$\chi^2 = 5.07$ with 4.d.f. significant at .30 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = $-.0999$ significant at .006 level

in active participation, where 12% of those with low role definition are highly active, compared with 10% of those who are medium and 6% of those with highly defined role definition.

Following from these findings we may also hypothesize that those with highly routine jobs which do not allow much room for participating in the decision making would also be less likely to participate in the political decision making process. The results are in the predicted direction in both voting frequency and active participation. Whereas 82% of those with highly routine jobs are high in passive participation 93% of those medium and low in job routine vote frequently (see Table 3-31). The positive relationship is statistically significant measured both by the Chi Square test and the Pearson Correlation Coefficient. Although the relationship between routinization and active participation is not statistically significant the results are in the predicted direction, especially if we consider only the highly active. Of those low in job routine 11% are high in active participation, compared with 9% of those whose jobs are moderately routine and 5% of those who have highly routine jobs (see Table 3-32).

TABLE 3-31

JOB ROUTINE AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Job Routine	Voting Frequency				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	80	2.5%	5.0%	92.5%	100%
Medium	386	2.3	4.4	93.3	100
High	155	4.5	13.5	81.9	100
Total N	621	18	42	561	

$$\chi^2 = 17.5847 \text{ with 4.d.f.}$$

significant at .01 level

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = $-.1247$ significant at .001 level

TABLE 3-32

JOB ROUTINE AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Job Routine	Active Participation				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	80	22.5%	66.3%	11.3%	100%
Medium	386	21.0	70.2	8.8	100
High	155	24.5	71.0	4.5	100
Total N	621	137	434	50	

$$\chi^2 = 4.51347 \text{ with 4.d.f.}$$

significant at .50 level

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = $.0601$ significant at .067 level

Just as those who participate actively in voluntary groups may be more politically active, those who work in cohesive work groups, which allow more social interaction and support, may be influenced towards more participation in the political system. The results again proved to be in the predicted direction, significant at the .05 level with voting frequency although not significant with active participation. Linear correlation was low in both cases. Of those who are high in group cohesion, 95% are high in voting participation compared to 85%

unexpected problems, acquiring new knowledge, etc., may prepare their holders to meet the challenges of active political participation but not necessarily inclining them to higher frequency of voting since this is not a challenging activity. Contrary to this expectation the results show that those with the most challenging jobs are the least politically active. Those with moderately challenging jobs vote most frequently (91% are high in voting participation, see Table 3-35) and

TABLE 3-35

JOB UNCERTAINTY AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Job Uncertainty	Voting Frequency			
	N	Low	Medium	High
Low	119	2.5%	8.4%	89.1%
Medium	396	2.3	6.3	91.4
High	106	5.7	6.6	87.7
Total N	621	18	42	561

$\chi^2 = 4.13017$ with 4.d.f. significant at .50 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = 0.0664 significant at .049 level

are most active overall in the transitional roles (less than 20% are low in this activity, see Table 3-36) followed by those whose jobs are

TABLE 3-36

JOB UNCERTAINTY AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Job Uncertainty	Active Participation			
	N	Low	Medium	High
Low	119	26.9%	62.2%	10.9%
Medium	396	19.7	72.5	7.8
High	106	25.5	68.9	5.7
Total	621	137	434	50

$\chi^2 = 6.22273$ with 4.d.f. significant at .20 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = -.0746 significant at .032 level

low in challenge 89% of whom are high in voting and 11% of whom are highly active in the transitional political roles. It would seem that those with challenging jobs are kept sufficiently busy by them that they have less time for political activity, whereas those with moderately challenging jobs look for further challenge in the political sphere.

Probably because the job characteristics examined so far are scattered throughout the jobs in the organization there does not appear to be any consistent relationship between role in the organization and political participation. Those in production, purchasing and personnel are very high in voting participation (see Table 3-37) followed by Marketing, with accounting and finance and research and development showing a high level of participation but noticeably less than the others.

TABLE 3-37

FUNCTION IN THE ORGANIZATION AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Function in the Organization	N	Voting Frequency			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Production	74	0.0%	6.8%	93.2%	100%	2.932
Marketing	161	3.1	4.3	92.5	100	2.894
Acc. and Finance	196	4.6	8.7	86.7	100	2.821
Research and Dev.	69	5.8	8.7	85.5	100	2.797
Purchasing	27	0.0	0.0	100.0	100	3.000
Personnel	54	0.0	3.7	96.3	100	2.963
Total	581					

Marketing and purchasing groups are most active, research and development the least politically active (see Table 3-38). This may be a reflection of the challenging nature of the jobs in this area.

Although foremen and clerical supervisors vote more frequently

TABLE 3-38

FUNCTION IN THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Function in the Organization	N	Active Participation			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Production	74	28.4%	59.5%	12.2%	100%	1.838
Marketing	161	14.9	72.7	12.4	100	1.975
Acc. and Finance	196	19.9	76.5	3.6	100	1.837
Research and Dev.	69	33.3	58.0	8.7	100	1.754
Purchasing	27	22.2	66.7	11.1	100	1.889
Personnel	54	22.2	72.2	5.6	100	1.833
Total	581					

than do staff (see Table 3-39), the general direction of the results is that predicted, the higher the job status the greater the political

TABLE 3-39

LEVEL IN HIERARCHY AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Level	N	Voting Frequency			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Executive	55	0.0%	5.5%	94.5%	100%	2.945
Department Head	211	0.9	6.2	92.9	100	2.919
Staff	261	5.0	8.4	86.6	100	2.816
Foreman/Cler.Sup.	93	3.2	4.3	92.5	100	2.892
Total	620					

participation.⁷⁸ In particular the results confirm Janosik's finding that top business executives were more likely than middle and lower management to be active in politics,⁷⁹ 20% of executives are high in active participation compared with 8% of department heads, 7% of staff and 3% of foremen and clerical supervisors (see Table 3-40).

Number of promotions, however, is not a good indicator of political participation, for although those with over four promotions are high in voting participation (93% classified high, see Table 3-41),

TABLE 3-40

LEVEL IN HIERARCHY AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Level	Active Participation					Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total	
Executive	55	9.1%	70.9%	20.0%	100	2.109
Department Head	211	19.0	73.0	8.1	100	1.891
Staff	261	26.1	66.7	7.3	100	1.812
Foreman/Cler.Sup.	93	25.8	71.0	3.2	100	1.774
Total	620					

TABLE 3-41

NUMBER OF PROMOTIONS AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Number of Promotions	Voting Frequency				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Under 2	286	3.8%	7.3%	88.8%	100%	2.850
2 - 4	220	2.7	6.4	90.9	100	2.882
Over 4	115	0.9	6.1	93.0	100	2.922
Total	621					

they are the least active in the transitional roles (see Table 3-42).

TABLE 3-42

NUMBER OF PROMOTIONS AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Number of Promotions	Active Participation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Under 2	286	19.2%	69.6%	11.2%	100%	1.920
2 - 4	220	23.6	69.5	6.8	100	1.832
Over 4	115	26.1	71.3	2.6	100	1.765
Total	621					

Whereas 11% of those with under two promotions are politically active only 3% of those with more than four promotions in their present company are high in active participation. This may be an indication that those rapidly promoted but not yet executives have more challenging jobs which

keep them busy and out of active political participation.

Length of employment with a particular company does not appear to be highly related to political participation except that more of those with longer length of service (who are probably older) are high in voting participation (see Tables 3-43 and 3-44).

TABLE 3-43

LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT WITH PRESENT COMPANY
AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Service in Years	Voting Frequency				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Less than 5	275	5.5%	9.1%	85.5%	100%	2.860
5 - 9	136	0.7	5.9	93.4	100	2.926
10 or more	210	1.0	4.3	94.8	100	2.938
Total	621					

TABLE 3-44

LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT WITH PRESENT COMPANY
AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Service in Years	Active Participation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Less than 5	275	22.9%	66.5%	10.5%	100%	1.876
5 - 9	136	21.3	72.8	5.9	100	1.846
10 or more	210	21.4	72.4	6.2	100	1.848
Total	621					

The type of organization is also only slightly related to political participation. Those who work for government are more likely to be high in voting participation (94% classified high compared with 89% of those who work in private industry, see Table 3-45), but participate less in the more active transitional roles (see Table 3-46). An interesting comparison can be made between those who work for large

companies five per cent of whom are high in active participation, and those who work in locally owned companies 14% of whom are high in active participation.

TABLE 3-45

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Type of Organization	N	Voting Frequency			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Big Business	248	4.0%	5.6%	90.3%	100%	2.863
Small Business	144	3.5	7.6	88.9	100	2.854
All business	464	3.4	7.5	89.0	100	2.856
Government	157	1.3	4.5	94.3	100	2.930

TABLE 3-46

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Type of Organization	N	Active Participation			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Big Business	248	24.6%	70.2%	5.2%	100%	1.806
Small Business	144	18.8	67.4	13.9	100	1.951
All Business	464	21.3	70.3	8.3	100	1.871
Government	157	24.2	68.8	7.0	100	1.828

Political Variables

(i) Introduction

In examining the relationships between participation and political variables there is a twofold aim. Firstly, we wish to find the effects of political party affiliation, and the effects of strength of affiliation on voting frequency and active participation for this particular sample, since the general positive correlation is well documented. Secondly, the effects of past and present socialization on present political participation have been examined in the two preceding sections. In this section the relationship between high (or low)

participation and other political variables will be examined to determine if there are any systematic differences in political attitudes between those who participate, either actively or merely by voting, and those who do not.

(ii) The Variables

The results of this sample are not totally in accord with previous empirical findings on the relationship of party affiliation and political participation. Firstly, the independents in this sample are less high in active participation (see Table 3-48), nevertheless 85% of them are classified as high in voting frequency (see Table 3-47)

TABLE 3-47

PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Party	Voting Frequency				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Independents	58	3.4%	12.1%	84.5%	100%	2.810
Social Credit	61	0.0	8.2	91.8	100	2.918
Conservatives	228	1.3	3.5	95.2	100	2.939
Liberals	201	2.0	7.5	90.5	100	2.886

TABLE 3-48

PARTY AFFILIATION AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Party	Active Participation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Independents	58	25.9%	70.7%	3.4%	100%	1.776
Social Credit	61	14.8	73.8	11.5	100	1.967
Conservatives	228	19.7	71.9	8.3	100	1.886
Liberals	201	19.9	72.1	8.0	100	1.881

which may indicate that Van Loon's⁸⁰ mythical "independent voter" may in fact exist in fairly large numbers among middle class upward mobiles. Secondly, Social Credit supporters, far from being less active than the

supporters of the two big parties were more active, 11.5% being high in active participation as opposed to eight per cent of Liberals and Conservatives.⁸¹

As may be expected in such a homogeneous group as the present sample, other political attitudes are not much affected by either voting or active political participation. The most we can note are slight tendencies. The greatest relationship naturally is to be found between voting frequency and active participation, those who vote frequently being more likely to take some active interest in political decision making (see Table 3-49).

TABLE 3-49

VOTING FREQUENCY AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Voting Frequency	N	Active Participation			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	18	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	100%
Medium	42	40.5	57.1	2.4	100
High	561	19.8	71.5	8.7	100
Total N	621	137	434	50	

$\chi^2 = 19.79080$ with 4.d.f. significant at .001 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .2413 significant at .001 level

It may be expected that there would be a relationship between voting, active political participation, alienation and nineteenth century Liberalism, as previous studies on alienation have found correlations between these variables.⁸² However, since the relationships in this sample were so slight as to be negligible, we must conclude, like Van Loon, that alienation or political efficacy do not determine participation among the middle class.⁸³ This topic will be dealt with in

detail in Chapter IV.

Unlike Stouffer's results which showed that the politically active were more tolerant than the public in general, the results of this study show no meaningful relationship between participation (active or passive) and intolerance.⁸⁴ This finding may be explained by the high level of tolerance in the sample from which these politically active are drawn. However, there is a much more noticeable negative relationship between political participation and anti-French attitudes, although this relationship is still not significant statistically. Of the total sample almost half are high in anti-French feelings, however only 28% of those who are low in voting participation are high in anti-French attitudes (see Table 3-50). Those who are high in active participation are even more likely to have anti-French attitudes than those who are simply high in voting frequency, 58% of this group are highly anti-French compared with 42% of those who are low in active political participation (see Table 3-51). It would seem

TABLE 3-50

VOTING FREQUENCY AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Voting Frequency	N	Anti-French Attitudes			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	18	11.1%	61.1%	27.8%	100%
Medium	42	9.5	57.1	33.3	100
High	561	7.8	42.1	50.1	100
Total N	621	50	271	300	

$\chi^2 = 7.5726$ with 4.d.f.	significant at .2 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1079	significant at .004 level

TABLE 3-51

ACTIVE PARTICIPATION AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Active Participation	N	Anti-French Attitudes			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	137	6.6%	51.1%	42.3%	100%
Medium	434	8.3	42.6	49.1	100
High	30	10.0	32.0	58.0	100
Total N	621	50	271	300	

$\chi^2 = 6.077774$ with 4.d.f. significant at .2 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1079 significant at .004 level

that in Western Canada we have a situation where the active and the opinion leaders are, in this case, more intolerant than the general public.

The results do not show any significant relationship between political activity and attitudes towards government welfare measures. It is probable that on the whole welfare measures do not interest this group as much as government control of the economy. There is a slight but noticeable relationship between attitudes towards government control of business and voting behaviour which is not statistically significant (see Table 3-52), however there is an interesting non linear

TABLE 3-52

VOTING FREQUENCY AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Voting Frequency	N	Laissez-faire attitudes			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	18	27.8%	61.1%	11.1%	100%
Medium	42	11.9	73.8	14.3	100
High	561	11.4	67.9	20.7	100
Total N	621	74	423	124	

$\chi^2 = 5.78$ with 4.d.f. significant at .3 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .0925 significant at .011 level

relationship between active participation and attitudes towards government control (see Table 3-53). Those who vote most often also tend to believe most often in the rights of private enterprise to be

TABLE 3-53

ACTIVE PARTICIPATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Active Participation	N	Laissez-faire attitudes			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	137	10.9%	75.9%	13.1%	100%
Medium	434	11.8	67.7	20.5	100
High	50	16.0	50.0	34.0	100
Total N	621	74	423	124	

$\chi^2 = 12.65121$ significant at .02 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .0433 significant at .141 level

free of government interference, whereas the group which actively participates most, not unexpectedly dichotemizes on this issue, more are for government controls (16%) more against (34%), but less have moderate opinions (50% of the highly active are medium, compared with 76% of those low in active participation).

Summary

In the sample as a whole voting frequency is very high and active participation also is fairly high. The analysis of data showed that within the new middle class (which is held more or less constant by this sample) expected trends of differences in participation occur with income and education. However, because the class differences are minimized, age is a more discriminating variable. Little or no differences occur with sex or ethnic origin or religion. Those who

attend church regularly tend to participate politically more than those who do not. Those from the country are just as active politically and vote as often as those from large cities. Political socialization in a family whose head is professional or managerial in occupation does not result in more political activity or voting, however upward mobility does seem to be related. Both upward and downward mobile vote more frequently than those who are socially stable, whereas there is no noticeable difference in active participation.

There is a tendency for voting frequency to be positively related to job satisfaction and negatively related to role definition and job routinization. There is no relationship with group cohesion. These results are what would be expected from the hypothesized relationship between on the job decision making and political decision making. There are no relationships between organizational function, number of promotions, or years of employment with present company, and political participation. A positive relationship was discernible between level in hierarchy and active participation and those who work in locally owned businesses.

Those who participate highly in the political system are no more tolerant and are certainly more anti-French than the average member of the sample. Not surprisingly, since the most satisfied and the executive levels are the most highly politically active, those high in political activity also tend to be high in support for laissez-faire doctrines.

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CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL ALIENATION

Introduction

Political alienation is the apathy and cynicism resulting from a perceived inability to influence or control issues in the political process. Numerous studies of political participation in the United States have shown that, among those who are politically alienated withdrawal from the social system is expressed in non-participation in the political process, resentment, negative or unfavourable attitudes to both the system and the issues, and susceptibility to extremism.¹ The effects of political alienation are most noticeable in local politics.² These undesirable attitudes are mainly associated with persons of low socio-economic background, which in turn are associated with feelings of political inefficacy (powerlessness) and a general feeling of social alienation or anomia.³ Alienation is not, however, confined only to those low in status. Horton and Thompson found many affluent citizens who are alienated and sometimes the effects of alienation are more pronounced among the white collar workers than among those of lower socio-economic status.⁴

Political Alienation Scale

Dwight G. Dean distinguishes three types or meanings of alienation; powerlessness, normlessness and social isolation.⁵ Hegel and Marx first described powerlessness as "the separation of the worker from the tools of production."⁶ Weber extended Marx's concept to the separation of the modern professional worker as well.⁷ Rosenberg has

stated that the sense of powerlessness leads to political apathy:

Politics is avoided because of feelings of psychological inadequacy or weakness. . . . Other factors in the world view of the individual which discourage political action are powerlessness and fatalism. In our complex urban mass society, individuals devote themselves to minute, specialized tasks woven into the complex fabric of our economy. The great economic and power blocs, typified by giant corporations and unions, thrust the individual about with pressures too great to resist. As a consequence, the individual is likely to feel overwhelmed and powerless. Given this feeling, the idea that his puny strength can match the giants is absurd, and he feels that a lonely individual can do nothing to change the way the world is run. Raising his weak voice against the massive roar of the mass media and the political giants is futile. For this reason, many people with political convictions do nothing but vote, convinced that they can have no substantial effect on any event.⁸

Normlessness may be either lack of clear norms or a conflict among norms, such as the Christian ethic versus the success norm. This results in cross pressures which could induce political apathy.

Social isolation is the perception of losing effective contact with significant and supporting groups, rejection loneliness and impersonality which Lipset and others have associated with tendencies to either political apathy or political extremism.⁹

Although all three aspects are relevant to one or more parts of this study, this scale (adapted largely from that used by Thompson and Horton¹⁰) attempts only to measure alienation as a situationally-related variable. That is, political alienation defined as a combination of perceived lack of power in community affairs and a distrust of those who hold power positions. It is true that an individual may be highly alienated politically, but low alienation with regard to religion. It is worth noting, however, that Templeton states that similar results are produced whether the scale attempts to measure "social integration," "powerlessness," "political alienation" or

"sense of political efficacy,"¹¹ and Dean shows that the three types of alienation, though theoretically distinct, are highly interrelated, for example the correlation of powerlessness with total alienation is .9.¹²

Review of Past Research

As already stated in the introduction, past empirical studies have shown that alienation is primarily related to social status, whether measured by education, occupation or income rather than to any other demographic variables.¹³ For example, in a Canadian study Van Loon found that only eight per cent of his lower class respondents had high levels of perceived political efficacy, compared with 18% of the working class, 38% of the middle class and 49% of the upper middle class.¹⁴ Thompson and Horton found 35% of college graduates alienated compared with 58% of those with some college training, 62% of those who completed high school and 83% of those with less than high school.¹⁵ McDill and Ridley showed that education was a more important determinant of voting and participation than was alienation, but that alienation affects the direction of participation, that is, gives rise to negative attitudes in a plebiscite issue.¹⁶

Templeton found that when socio-economic status was controlled there was no consistent relationship between alienation and demographic variables such as sex and age.¹⁷ Dean found a small positive correlation which he attributed to the diminishing status of the old.¹⁸ Thompson and Horton corroborated this interpretation, they found the mature adults less alienated than either the young (21-30) or the old.¹⁹

Bell, using Srole's scale found no correlation between anomie

and belonging to Catholic, Protestant or Jewish religions, or with frequency of church attendance, when socio-economic status was controlled.²⁰ However, Quinney, in a study of mountain counties in the Southern Appalachians, found religious fundamentalism to be somewhat more important than social status in determining political alienation.²² As Dean says, fundamentalists might well be politically apathetic because they believe that political and social problems cannot be solved by man.²²

Thompson and Horton and others²³ have suggested that the individual's identification with, or alienation from society is experienced with reference to primary groups²⁴ or voluntary associations,²⁵ and that without identification with these groups intervening between the individual and society, political apathy or extremism results in the event of economic insecurity.

Although economic insecurity is most often found in the working class it is also to be found in the upward mobile middle class and among the small businessmen who feel themselves bi-passed. Thus Thompson and Horton²⁶ found alienation high among farmers (regardless of income) and Trow²⁷ found the same among small businessmen. Lipset explains the rise of Nazism in Germany to middle class alienation. However, in spite of the hypothesized link between economic insecurity and alienation very little work has been done empirically on job variables and alienation with class held constant.

There does not seem to be any evidence of correlation between political party affiliation and alienation. Templeton showed no correlation between alienation and voting democrat or republican.²⁸ Thompson and Horton found the alienated only slightly less likely to

have voted but more likely to have negative attitudes to the issue (school bond floatation).²⁹ Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, in their study of economic failure and alienation, showed that even workers who were unemployed for two years after the shutdown of the Packard automobile company had high levels of voting turnout.³⁰ Riesman and Glazer suggest that highly alienated individuals may frantically indulge in politics for apolitical motivations such as conformity or psychopathological needs.³¹ Presthus' investigation of the upward mobile showed this group anxious to conform to socially accepted norms and using community activities as means to ends even if they are cynical of the political process.³² Grusky verified this empirically.³³ Van Loon, in a study of Canadian participation, showed that people with a sense of efficacy are more likely to be participants in the electoral process but that as many of those highly active have a low sense of efficacy as have high, and that most of these were middle and upper middle class. He concludes:

It does appear possible to be middle class and highly active in politics without being particularly efficacious: to many middle class people, politics may be just another club-type activity.³⁴

Results

Total Sample

Past research would indicate that a middle class sample of upward mobile, white collar bureaucrats should not show any significant amount of political alienation. Twenty per cent of the sample could be classified as high in alienation, (see Table 4-1) 80% of the

TABLE 4-1

ALIENATION

Alienation	N	% of Sample	Cum %
Low	146	23.5	23.5
Medium	349	56.2	79.7
High	126	20.3	100.0
Total	621	100.0	

sample were low or moderately alienated, however the fact that over half of the respondents (56%) felt moderately alienated, shows a good deal of cynicism towards the political system among the middle class.

This cynicism was least noticeable in the last item (see Table 4-2) in that less than one quarter of the sample ($n = 150$) seriously doubted the integrity of elected officials. The effectiveness of the party system in representing the interests of the little man was doubted by 37%, and by six per cent who were not sure.

TABLE 4-2

RESPONSES TO ITEMS IN ALIENATION SCALE

	Agree %	Don't Know%	Disagree %
1. It doesn't matter which party wins the elections, the interests of the little man don't count.	36.9	6.1	57.0
2. Elected officials become tools of special interests, no matter what.	44.4	15.3	40.2
3. Local officials lose touch with the people who elect them.	64.3	7.9	27.7
4. If people really knew what was going on in high places, it would blow the lid off things.	47.3	21.6	31.1
5. People who go into public office are usually out for all they can get.	24.2	11.3	64.5

Despite the fact that less than a quarter thought that people who go into public office are 'out for all they can get', 44% agreed that elected officials do, in fact, become 'tools of special interests' and almost half the sample agreed with the statement that knowledge of what went on in high places would 'blow the lid off things.' The third item revealed clearly the greatest source of middle class alienation from the political system; 64% agreed that local officials lose touch with the people who elect them. This may be taken as evidence that Mills was correct in saying that the new middle class had no representatives of their interests in the government.³⁵

Demographic Variables and Alienation

(i) Introduction

The purpose of relating the scale with various demographic features enables us to find out who the alienated are, so that we can describe them and in the future predict who is likely to be alienated. Previous studies have shown 'status', however measured, to be the most important predictive demographic variable, but in this study 'social class', one of the measures of status, is held constant to a large degree (although there will, no doubt, be variations of status within the sample). Holding social class constant enables the isolation of the effects of such variables as education (removed from the contamination of class) in relation to political attitudes. Because of the limited sample of the study correlations between the independent and dependent variables would be expected to be low. However, this may reveal more subtle demographic indicators of alienation which would not be apparent in a more heterogeneous sample.

(ii) The Variables

With social class held approximately constant there is no consistent pattern of alienation with education. This is not consistent with the findings of Thompson and Horton (see Table 4-3). Only 19% of

TABLE 4-3

EDUCATION AND ALIENATION

Highest level of education completed	N	Alienation			Total	Mean	Thompson & Horton % alienated
		Low	Medium	High			
Junior High	73	20.5%	60.3%	19.2%	100%	1.986	} 83
Senior High	238	24.4	56.3	19.3	100	1.950	
Technical Inst.	44	25.0	45.5	29.5	100	2.045	n.a.
Some College	128	22.7	50.0	27.3	100	2.047	62
College Graduate	135	24.4	63.0	12.6	100	1.881	35
Total	618						

those with high school or less of this sample were high in alienation compared with 83% of Thompson and Horton's sample. In the present study those with some college were the most alienated (27%) but not as alienated as the 62% in Thompson and Horton's study. The college graduates were the least alienated in both studies. Those with technical education also tend to be high in alienation, surprisingly because of their high level of political participation. The large difference even between college graduates may be accounted for partially by cultural differences (Canada versus the United States) and methodology (differences in scoring and categorizing), but the fact that education is not clearly related to alienation in the present sample is probably the result of holding social class approximately constant.

Even controlling for social class, there is still some effect of

income on alienation in the predicted direction although slight (see Table 4-4). Those who earn under \$7,500 are slightly more alienated than those earning over that amount (27% highly alienated) and those

TABLE 4-4
INCOME AND ALIENATION

Income	Alienation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Under 7,500	145	13.8%	59.3%	26.9%	100%	2.131
7,501-10,000	200	26.0	54.5	19.5	100	1.935
10,501-12,500	132	22.0	59.1	18.9	100	1.970
Over 12,501	144	31.3	52.8	16.0	100	1.847
Total	621					

earning over \$12,500 are slightly less alienated (16% highly alienated). Those earning between \$7,501 and \$12,500 show little difference in alienation (19% highly alienated) among themselves and fall between the high and the low in the continuum of alienation.

Thompson and Horton³⁶ found those who were 21 to 30 years of age just as likely to be politically alienated as those who were old, with the least alienation occurring among the mature adult (30-40 years old). They suggest this is the result of lack of institutionalized power among this group. The same trends show clearly in the present sample (see Table 4-5).

It could be hypothesized that since women take less part in politics, women in general may be more politically alienated, however there is no real difference in alienation between males and females in this sample (see Table 4-6).

Though Bell found no relationship between alienation and

TABLE 4-5
AGE AND ALIENATION

Age	Alienation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
21-25	80	16.2%	55.0%	28.7%	100%	2.125
26-30	141	17.0	61.7	21.3	100	2.043
31-35	140	30.0	53.4	16.4	100	1.864
36-40	96	22.9	62.5	14.6	100	1.917
41-45	75	26.7	52.0	21.3	100	1.947
46-50	60	31.7	45.0	23.3	100	1.917
Over 50	24	25.0	54.2	20.8	100	1.958
Total	616					

TABLE 4-6
SEX AND ALIENATION

Sex	Alienation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Male	569	23.4%	56.6%	20.0%	100%	1.967
Female	52	25.0	51.9	23.1	100	1.981
Total	621					

religion and church attendance when status was controlled,³⁷ these relationships do not disappear entirely in this sample, in fact the relationship of alienation with church attendance comes out strongly (see Table 4-7). There is a positive linear relationship between those

TABLE 4-7
CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND ALIENATION

Church Attendance	Alienation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Never	81	19.8%	46.9%	33.3%	100%	2.136
Seldom	290	22.8	58.3	19.0	100	1.962
Often	117	23.1	57.3	19.7	100	1.966
Regularly	131	28.2	56.5	15.3	100	1.870
Total	619					

who never attend (20% low in alienation, 33% high) up to those who attend regularly (28% low in alienation and 15% high). Maybe those who attend regularly view the political scene with more faith in human kind than those who never attend, or possibly regular church attendance is part of a syndrome in which the middle class and upward mobile content themselves with doing the right things and supporting the status quo.

There is also a slight difference in alienation between Protestants (25% of whom are low in alienation, 17% high) and Catholics, 23% of whom are low in alienation and 23% high, but the difference is quite small (see Table 4-8).

TABLE 4-8

RELIGION AND ALIENATION

Denomination	Alienation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Catholic	114	22.8%	54.4%	22.8%	100%	2.000
Protestant	410	24.9	58.3	16.8	100	1.920
Total	524					

Thompson and Horton noted that farmers, no matter what their income, tended to be alienated.³⁸ This sample showed substantial differences in alienation with geographic (urban rural) socialization (see Table 4-9) and father's occupation (see Table 4-10). Those integrated into small city or town backgrounds appear much less alienated than those brought up in either a large city or rural area. Of those raised in a small city 32.2% are low in political alienation and ten per cent high in alienation, but of those with a more traditional, authori-

TABLE 4-9

GEOGRAPHIC SOCIALIZATION AND ALIENATION

Place of Residence up to 15 years old	N	Alienation			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Large City	233	23.6%	54.9%	21.5%	100%	1.979
Small City	87	32.2	57.5	10.3	100	1.782
Town	133	21.1	63.2	15.8	100	1.947
Rural	164	20.1	51.8	28.0	100	2.079
Total	617					

TABLE 4-10

FATHER'S OCCUPATION AND ALIENATION

Father's Occupation (during childhood)	N	Alienation			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Prof. & Managerial	138	31.2%	49.3%	19.6%	100%	1.884
Middle Income Occ.	196	21.9	62.2	15.8	100	1.939
Labourers	111	18.9	63.1	18.0	100	1.991
Farmers	176	22.2	50.6	27.3	100	2.051
Total	621					

tarian, rural background, 20% are low and 28% high; 22% of those with large city backgrounds are also highly alienated, probably because there would be less personal involvement with politicians and officials in the impersonal background of a large city.

Rural background may result in a conflict of norms leading to political apathy among those with a rural background or who are upwardly mobile. Thus there is a relationship between father's occupation and alienation in spite of the homogeneous present status of the sample, although the relationship is not linear and does not follow a clear pattern (see Table 4-10). Thus 31% of those whose father's occupations were classified professional and managerial were low in alienation com-

pared with 22% whose fathers were farmers; whereas 27% of the latter were high in alienation compared with 16% of those whose father's occupations fell into the middle income and status categories.

If economic adversity leads to alienation it may be thought that those who are downward mobile (measured in this case by comparing respondents' education with that of their fathers) would experience more feelings of inadequacy and powerlessness which would lead to political alienation. The data does not confirm this hypothesis, not even to the relationship being in the predicted direction (see Table 4-11).

TABLE 4-11

MOBILITY AND EDUCATION AND ALIENATION

Education of father compared with res- pondent	N	Low	Alienation Medium	High	Total	Mean
Father's education greater (downward mobile)	157	22.3%	58.6%	19.1%	100%	1.968
Father's education equal (stable)	73	20.5	56.2	23.3	100	2.027
Father's education less (upward mobile)	391	24.6	55.2	20.2	100	1.957
Total	621					

Ethnic origin is also unrelated to alienation (see Table 4-12).

In this middle class sample there does not seem any relationship between group membership and alienation. Just as many of those who were highly alienated (16%) were members of five or more groups as those who were low in alienation (14%) (see Table 4-13).

TABLE 4-12

ETHNIC ORIGIN AND ALIENATION

Ethnic origin	Alienation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
British	289	23.5%	59.5%	17.0%	100%	1.934
German	69	24.6	49.3	26.1	100	2.014
Ukrainian	61	21.3	57.4	21.3	100	2.001
Total	419					

TABLE 4-13

GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND ALIENATION

Number of voluntary groups belonged to	Low in Alienation	High in Alienation
0	15.8%	20.6%
1	17.8	17.5
2	23.3	19.8
3	18.5	18.3
4	11.0	7.9
5 or more	13.7	15.9
Total	100.0	100.0
N =	146	126

Organizational Variables

(i) Introduction

The purpose of this section is to describe the alienated and less alienated in terms of employment characteristics. Who are the alienated in the organization, executive or foremen?, new employees or old ones?, accountants or personnel staff? Then the alienation scale will be compared with the variables arrived at from the scales measuring job satisfaction, group cohesion, etc. to see if alienation scores are

related to scores on these other variables.

In effect this section tests the propositions of Marx, Weber, Rosenberg³⁹ that separation of the worker from his 'tools of production' results in a sense of powerlessness that leads to political apathy. Mills saw the new middle class white collar worker as not only having no control over the capital, no owning interest in the bureaucracy for which they worked, but also having sold their personalities as well as their labour.⁴⁰ The hope of upward mobility prevented the formation of unions to represent them. Thus without powerful representation of their interests they would become politically apathetic and politically alienated. However, this theory has never been adequately tested empirically, certainly not in a Canadian setting.

(ii) The Variables

Alienation is not more pronounced at any level of the organization than at any other (see Table 4-14). Staff are no more alienated than

TABLE 4-14

LEVEL IN HIERARCHY AND ALIENATION

Level	Alienation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Executive	55	23.6%	56.4%	20.0%	100%	1.964
Department Head	211	24.2	55.9	19.9	100	1.957
Staff	261	24.1	55.6	20.3	100	1.962
Foreman Cler/Sup.	93	19.4	59.1	21.5	100	2.022
Total	620					

department heads or chief executives, nor does alienation decrease with the number of promotions or length of service with the company. Contrary to Grusky's findings that as one progresses up the management hierarchy

the tendency to alienation diminishes; there is no discernible relationship between these organizational variables and alienation.

More surprising still is that those who work in small owner managed companies are not any more alienated than those who work for big business or government (see Table 4-15), though it might have been suspected that these would be more likely to have nineteenth century liberal attitudes which are associated with alienation.

TABLE 4-15

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION AND ALIENATION

Type of Organization	N	Alienation			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Small business	144	22.2%	56.9%	20.8%	100%	1.986
Big business	248	25.8	53.2	21.0	100	1.952
Government	157	22.3	58.6	19.1	100	1.968
All private industry	464	23.9	55.4	20.5	100	1.968

None of these non-relationships is surprising because of the homogeneous status level of the sample. As a result of this we would also not expect to find much difference between different functions or roles in the organization. However, distinct differences in alienation are found in the sample (see Table 4-16) and it could be hypothesized that, as Marx suggested, those who have the least control over their jobs have a feeling of powerlessness which extends to political alienation and that Weber was correct when he suggested that professionals and management could not avoid this anymore than the manual labourer.⁴¹ Research and Development and personnel are the least alienated having over 30% of each function who are low in alienation and 13% or less who are high in alienation. Purchasing personnel, on the other hand,

TABLE 4-16

FUNCTION IN ORGANIZATION AND ALIENATION

Function	Alienation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Production	74	20.3%	60.8%	18.9%	100%	1.986
Marketing	161	23.0	51.6	25.5	100	2.025
Acc. and Finance	196	20.4	57.7	21.9	100	2.015
Research and Dev.	69	30.4	58.0	11.6	100	1.812
Purchasing	27	11.1	66.7	22.2	100	2.111
Personnel	54	33.3	53.7	13.0	100	1.796
Total	581					

appear the most alienated, 11% are low in alienation but 22% are high. Production, marketing and accounting and finance are bunched together in between. Since functions differ in the amount of alienation experience, this may be the result of some work being more satisfying than other work or because supportive group relationships in the work situation reduce impersonalization and feelings of alienation.

If, as Dean and others⁴² have stated, alienation is linked with feelings of distrust, impersonality, loneliness and rejection from loss of contact with supporting groups, then we might hypothesize that those in more cohesive work groups receive more social support and should show less tendencies towards alienation. However, such an hypothesis cannot be confirmed with the data here. Those high in work group cohesion are less likely to be highly alienated than those either low or medium in cohesion, but those low in cohesiveness are more likely to be low in alienation than either the medium or high in cohesion (see Table 4-17). The relationship must, therefore, be far from a simple one.

Although the support of a cohesive work group appears to have very little effect on alienation, there is a positive relationship

TABLE 4-17

COHESION AND ALIENATION

Cohesion	Alienation				
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total
Low	65	32.3%	46.2%	21.5%	100%
Medium	337	20.8	57.6	21.7	100
High	219	25.1	57.1	17.8	100
Total N	621	146	349	126	

$$\chi^2 = 5.79 \text{ with 4.d.f.}$$

significant at .3 level

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .0484 significant at .114 level

significant at better than .001 level between alienation and job satisfaction. Forty four per cent of those who are low in job satisfaction are high in alienation from the political system (see Table 4-18). Of

TABLE 4-18

JOB SATISFACTION AND ALIENATION

Satisfaction	Alienation				
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total
Low	25	16.0%	40.0%	44.0%	100%
Medium	332	21.4	54.5	24.1	100
High	264	26.9	59.8	13.3	100
Total N	621	146	349	126	

$$\chi^2 = 20.215 \text{ with 4 d.f.}$$

significant at better than .001 level

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = -.1465 significant at .001 level

those who are moderately satisfied with their jobs 24% are alienated, but only 13% of those who are highly satisfied with their work are high in alienation, a third as many compared with those who are low in alienation. Since it would not seem logical to suppose that alienation

from the political system would cause dissatisfaction with employment, we may conclude that job dissatisfaction does lead to alienation even, as Weber⁴³ and Mills⁴⁴ predicted, among white collar and professional workers.

There is also a significant relationship between the amount of changes in job content and alienation (see Table 4-19). Changing the

TABLE 4-19

JOB CHANGES AND ALIENATION

Job change	Alienation				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	232	31.1%	47.7%	21.2%	100%
Medium	324	24.1	59.0	17.0	100
High	65	16.4	57.6	26.1	100
Total N	621				

$\chi^2 = 13.52465$ with 4.d.f.

significant at .01 level

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1499

significant at .001 level

content of a job, or reorganization of methods and techniques brings with it behavioural problems as the incumbents of the existing positions are uncertain as to their competence to meet the changes. Floyd and Mann, for example, observed such behavioural problems occurring when a public utility company introduced electronic data processing equipment.⁴⁵ Those who are meeting such challenges would be high on the job change scale, 16% of this group are low in alienation. Of those who are low in job changes 31% are low in alienation and 21% high. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that those who face technological and other job uncertainties tend to be more alienated than those who do not face these uncertainties. This also tends to confirm the suggestion

of Lipsetz⁴⁶ that the middle classes may have causes for alienation that do not apply to the working class. There was no significant relationship between alienation and other job variables, job uncertainty, routine or role definition.

Political Variables

(i) Introduction

Political alienation has been related, not to party affiliation so much as to political extremism outside the normal party system which is not meeting the needs of the alienated, as they see them. The extremism takes the form of left wing extremism among the working class and right wing extremism among the middle class. However, such disaffection is not usually expressed where supportive social relationships exist, unless economic conditions are unfavourable. We would not, therefore, expect much expression of alienation from a sample of middle class upward mobiles, however if Mills is correct such discontent may be latent, and may influence other political attitudes. How the relatively alienated and unalienated regard other issues will be examined in this section.

(ii) The Variables

The first variable considered was party affiliation to see if in any way it related to alienation. The independents, those that have no party to represent them, are the most alienated and refuse to give their allegiance to a party in a system of which they do not feel a part (see Table 4-20). Only 15% of the independents are low in alienation whereas 31% of those who support the liberals fall into this category. There is not a great deal of difference in alienation between those who

support the social credit party and those who support the conservatives, they are less alienated than the independents but more alienated than the liberals. For example, 13% of liberals are highly alienated compared to 25% of the supporters of social credit.

TABLE 4-20

POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND ALIENATION

Affiliation	Alienation				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Liberals	201	31.3%	55.2%	13.4%	100%	1.821
Conservatives	228	20.2	59.2	20.6	100	2.004
Social Credit	61	23.0	52.6	24.6	100	2.016
Independents	58	15.0	62.1	22.4	100	2.069
Total	548					

These findings are consistent with those of Thompson and Horton who found that alienation was more likely to influence direction of vote rather than the likelihood of participation.⁴⁸ In Canada, third parties such as social credit have traditionally been thought of as movements supported by the alienated.⁴⁹ However, there are no empirical studies testing if social credit supporters are really more alienated than conservative party supporters.

The data from this study are consistent with the results of those United States and Canadian studies which show very little effect of alienation upon frequency of voting.⁵⁰ The norm of voting is strongly held whether by middle class upward mobiles,⁵¹ or by working class union members,⁵² so that actual voting behaviour is not influenced to any great extent by cynicism, job dissatisfaction or economic instability. There is a consistent negative relationship between alienation and

voting, those who are alienated do vote less but the differences are small, in the order of two per cent in each case, and we cannot be certain that this correlation is not the result of chance or sampling error (see Table 4-21).

TABLE 4-21
ALIENATION AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR

Alienation	Voting Behaviour				
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total
Low	146	2.1%	5.5%	92.5%	100%
Medium	349	2.3	7.7	90.0	100
High	126	5.6	5.6	88.9	100
Total N	621	18	42	561	

$\chi^2 = 5.09383$ with 4.d.f. significant at .3 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = -.09 significant at .012 level

The data shown in Table 4-22 reveal no relationship at all between active participation in politics and alienation. This is consistent with both Dean's⁵³ and Van Loon's⁵⁴ findings and supports the

TABLE 4-22
ALIENATION AND ACTIVE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Alienation	Active Political Participation				
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total
Low	146	18.5%	71.9%	9.6%	100%
Medium	349	24.4	68.2	7.4	100
High	126	19.8	72.2	7.9	100
Total N	621	137	434	50	

$\chi^2 = 2.87167$ with 4.d.f. significant at .70 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1082 significant at .003 level

theories of Presthus,⁵⁵ Van Loon⁵⁶ and Reisman and Glazer⁵⁷ that reasons for indulging in political activities have nothing to do with one's views on the viability of the system or perceptions of one's own political efficacy.

Only a small number, 86 out of the total sample of 621, are classified as high in nineteenth century liberal attitudes, that is are against both the influence of big unions and big business. Trow found nineteenth century liberal attitudes significantly related to alienation and right wing extremism⁵⁸ and Wolfinger et.al. found these attitudes, but not feelings of political inefficacy, prevalent among right wing extremists.⁵⁹ The data here show that of those low in alienation 38% are low in nineteenth century liberal attitudes and eight per cent are high. Of those highly alienated 15% are low in nineteenth century liberalism and 27% high (see Table 4-23). Those who

TABLE 4-23

ALIENATION AND NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERALISM

Alienation	Nineteenth Century Liberalism				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	146	37.7%	54.1%	8.2%	100%
Medium	349	25.2	63.3	11.5	100
High	126	15.1	57.9	27.0	100
Total N	621	162	373	86	

$\chi^2 = 35.51448$ with 4.d.f. significant at better than .001 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .3305 significant at better than .001 level.

are moderately alienated fall midway on the continuum. There is a positive .33 correlation which is significant at the .001 level and a

very high chi square showing positively that the relationship between alienation and nineteenth century liberalism could not have occurred by chance or sampling error alone.

In many instances attitudes towards big business and unions had gone along with attitudes towards government interference in the free market, economic laissez-faire liberalism. In this case, however, the nineteenth century liberals form a distinct group; those who are highly alienated are not significantly likely to be more for unions and government control of business than are those who are low in alienation. Although there is a very slight positive correlation it is not significant (see Table 4-24).

TABLE 4-24

ALIENATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE

Alienation	N	Laissez-faire			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	146	11.0%	69.2%	19.9%	100%
Medium	349	11.7	70.2	18.1	100
High	126	13.7	61.1	25.4	100
Total N	621	74	423	124	

$\chi^2 = 4.04011$ with 4.d.f. significant at .5 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = 0.0554 significant at .084 level

The correlation between alienation and intolerance is also slight but reaches the .05 level of significance on the chi square test. Thirteen per cent of those who are highly alienated are also intolerant, whereas only seven per cent of those who are low in alienation are high in intolerance (see Table 4-25). However, because of the small number

TABLE 4-25

ALIENATION AND INTOLERANCE

Alienation	Intolerance				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	146	62.3%	30.8%	6.8%	100%
Medium	349	53.6	39.8	6.6	100
High	126	57.1	30.2	12.7	100
Total N	621	350	222	49	

$\chi^2 = 9.77154$ with 4.d.f. significant at .05 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = 0.053 significant at .09 level

(49 in the entire sample) who fell into the high intolerance classification, these conclusions are tentative.

Whereas alienation is only slightly related to intolerance of non-conformists, there is a positive .27 correlation with intolerance of the French-Canadian minority, which is significant at the .001 level and has a very high chi-square which is significant at better than .001 level (see Table 4-26). Also, since almost half (300) of the obser-

TABLE 4-26

ALIENATION AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Alienation	Anti-French Attitudes				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	146	15.1%	50.7%	34.2%	100%
Medium	349	6.9	43.3	49.9	100
High	126	3.2	36.5	60.3	100
Total N	621	50	271	300	

$\chi^2 = 26.29947$ with 4.d.f. significant at better than .001 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .2736 significant at .001 level

vations fall into the highly anti-French category, we can be fairly confident that alienation is related to anti-French feelings. High intolerance of the French increases from 34% of those who are low in alienation to 50% of those medium in alienation and to 60% of those who are high in alienation.

Summary

In total this sample showed a good deal of alienation; one in five was highly alienated and further, three out of five were moderately alienated. These figures give some support to the theories of Weber and Mills⁶⁰ that the new middle class would become alienated. There is a tendency for the alienation to decrease as education, income and church attendance increases. Tendencies towards alienation are higher in the under 30 and over 40 groups than they are in the 30-40 group. Little or no relationship was found between alienation and sex, religious preference, geographic area of socialization, ethnic origin or participation in voluntary social groups. Those whose fathers were farmers tend to be more alienated and those who are upward or downward mobile tend to be less alienated than those who are socially stable.

There was no relationship between alienation and the type of organization for which the respondent worked. There was, however, a distinct relationship between level in the hierarchy, job satisfaction and alienation. Those who were most satisfied, those at the top of the hierarchy, were the least likely to be alienated. The results suggest that whereas positive job factors such as a cohesive work group do not reduce alienation, negative factors such as threats to job security increase alienation.

Alienation does not have any drastic effect on the frequency of voting and there is no relationship at all with active participation. Those who support the Liberal Party tend to be less alienated than independents and supporters of other parties. The alienated also show a tendency to be more intolerant of non-conformists and more likely to hold nineteenth century liberal (anti big business and big unions) attitudes.

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CHAPTER V

INTOLERANCE

Introduction

Tolerance as used in this study implies the conceding of the right to free expression of views and full participation within society for those individuals or groups whose views are unpopular, without interference from officials or harassment from other more unlawful bodies. It is an important variable in this study because willingness to tolerate non-conformity and the rights of minorities is basic to a working democratic form of government. Transient opinions may do little harm but latent attitudes or dispositions toward intolerance may result in the repression of civil rights for a minority or for non-conformists to the norms of the society. All governments have powers enabling them to repress civil liberties in the event of war or other national catastrophe. Canadian government can evoke the "War Measures Act" in an emergency when the nation's security is threatened. Sometimes the threat to a nation's security is more imagined than real and innocent people are victimized as in the McCarthy hearings in the United States in the early fifties. Totalitarian regimes are unwilling to tolerate anything less than total support from their citizenry. Tolerance may be considered one of the hallmarks of a working democracy.

The Intolerance Scale

The scale used here is adapted from that used by Stouffer in his 'Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties.'¹ The scale attempts to measure the willingness of the respondent to grant the rights and pro-

tection of the law, even to those of whose views he does not approve, such as socialists, atheists and communists. It is limited then in that it deals only with attitudes towards certain non-conformists (as above), it does not measure tolerance in general. For example, it does not deal with tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minorities, long hair or criminals. Indeed, as we shall see later, attitudes of tolerance change noticeably when the subject is French Canada (ethnic minority) and we cannot say that those who are tolerant of socialists and the aspirations of the Quebecois will necessarily hold tolerant attitudes towards native Indians. There is also a fairly noticeable difference in attitudes in the sample between different categories of non-conformity.

Review of Past Research

Many of the past studies of intolerance have been made in the United States of America. Many of them involved class differences in intolerance. Lipset hypothesized that the higher a person's socio-economic status the more liberal his political preferences and the more tolerant of concepts which do not conflict with class distinctions:

The poorer strata everywhere are more liberal or leftist on economic issues; they favor more welfare state measures, higher wages, graduated income taxes, support of trade-unions, and so forth. But when liberalism is defined in non-economic terms - as support of civil liberties, internationalism, etc. - the correlation is reversed. The more well do to are more liberal, the poorer are more intolerant.¹

Others claimed that the middle class, especially small businessmen, displayed more intolerant attitudes. Trow, for example, found that small businessmen were more likely than any other occupational group to approve of McCarthy's political views and methods.² This suggests that

occupational variables may be as important as "class" since economic or status insecurities may have a greater effect on one class (viz. the middle class) than another.³ Lipsetz further suggests that discussion of authoritarianism (which is manifested by intolerance) in "class" terms should give way to:

. . . more specific analysis focusing more directly on variables such as economic and status insecurity, work dissatisfaction, lack of education, autocratic family structure, etc. . . . Appropriate research would seek to relate these variables to particular occupations and in turn to political and social attitudes.⁴

Lipsetz' study showed that working class members did tend to be more authoritarian, but they were less sharply differentiated from middle class respondents on questions dealing more directly with political and social issues.⁵ Moreover many differences were not statistically significant and they tended to disappear altogether with education controlled.⁶ Alonzo and Kinch concluded that socio-economic differences did not account for differences in tolerance in their study of high school students.⁷

The sample in the present study is fairly homogeneous from the aspect of class, enabling the testing of intolerance with demographic variables, such as education, and occupational variables, such as job satisfaction, reducing interference from class differences. In addition this enables the examination of the influence of upward mobility and Lenski's concept of status consistency on intolerance with social class to be held constant.⁸

Dawson and Prewitt⁹ noted that the movement from one social and economic stratum to another may create discontinuities in political maturation. Lipset¹⁰ hypothesized that those who have a stable socio-

economic status are likely to be more tolerant than those who are upwardly or downwardly mobile, since mobility, particularly downward mobility, induces cross pressures on the individual which will cause an increase in intolerance. This was confirmed in the study of Packard workers after the auto company closed its plant.¹¹ Workers who suffered unemployment and a change in wages in a second job (whether up or down) or who lost a second job, were more likely to have extremist and anti-democratic (pro McCarthy) political attitudes.

Lenski found that low status consistency (differences in status measured in terms of education, income, occupation or ethnic origin) was associated with liberal attitudes to economic policies,¹² however this study did not deal directly with tolerance and Kenkle's replication of Lenski's study failed to confirm his results.¹³ A further study by Kelly and Chambliss¹⁴ also failed to confirm Lenski's findings while confirming that the least status consistent were more reactionary to issues of civil liberties, however the correlations were weak. This study also found no difference whether status inconsistency was measured by some objective criteria or in terms of the respondent's perception.

Robert Presthus examined the patterns of accommodation of status inconsistent upward mobiles in his book The Organizational Society.¹⁵ He concluded that the chief characteristic of upward mobiles is their respect for authority and low tolerance of ambiguity. They identify with the organizational goals and make them their own, they rationalize power on the basis of equality of opportunity. Acceptance of the organization's goals requires self discipline and commits the upward mobile to conformity, making them hostile to heterodoxy and impatient

with those who dissent. Although the upward mobile are potentially authoritarian, they are able to play many roles in order to manipulate or not to alienate others. They pay lip service to democracy and equality but dislike controversial or partisan issues to the point of embracing liberal and progressive ideas and participating actively in socially accepted and philanthropic activities.

Status inconsistency may also arise from geographic mobility which uproots people from one kind of background and places them in another environment. Dawson and Prewitt argue that those brought up in rural areas are early taught to respect the established hierarchy and traditional ways, but on moving to an industrial city are confronted with political pressures and cues that are not congruent with previous experiences, resulting in discontinuities in political socialization.¹⁶ This discontinuity may be viewed as a variation of Lenski's concept of status inconsistency in that this group has the greatest status change - rural to urban - than any of the urban groups and cross pressures would result in greater intolerance.¹⁷ However, Stouffer's study showed rural residents to be more intolerant than city dwellers in every region of the United States of America¹⁸ and we have no reason to believe that the greater intolerance of those socialized in rural areas is not more the result of rural traditional conservatism than the result of cross pressures from moving to city life.

A third aspect of status inconsistency may arise out of ethnic origin. Lenski, in his Chicago study, thought ethnic origin an important variable in determining liberalism, although his scale did not measure tolerance of civil liberties.¹⁹ Wolfinger et.al. found first or second

generation Americans less likely to join right wing radical movements than those born of native parents.²⁰ However, Lane suggests that trying to hold on to the values of an ethnic minority in a North American, English speaking culture may generate intense cross pressures, especially if that ethnic group has not traditionally placed high value on civil liberties.²¹ This may result in greater intolerance.

In most of the studies in the United States seeking to explain intolerance, education has proved the most important explanatory variable.²² The evidence in these studies shows education to be the best predictor of political attitudes such as tolerance because the more education the greater the exposure to ideas and values different from one's own. Thus the higher the level of formal education the larger the percentage who could be classified more tolerant. Kelly and Chamblis show that education is the best predictor of all political attitudes (not only confined to tolerance)²³ and Alonzo and Kinch suggest that:

Education not only has the effect of increasing favourable attitudes towards civil liberties but that the educational process beyond the secondary level has the additional effect of polarizing values and clarifying the connection between abstract logical principles and specific behavioural responses.²⁴

By contrast, Wolfinger et.al. found supporters of a radical right wing organization to have four times the number of college educated than the general population.²⁵

Stouffer's study on intolerance of non-conformists showed the percentage with intolerant attitudes increased with age. When each age group was broken down into educational levels, at every level intolerance increased with age and among those with college education or more, the

increase was proportionately greater than among those with lower levels.²⁶ Subsequent studies have confirmed these findings.²⁷

Sex, according to Stouffer and others,²⁸ is also highly related to intolerance. Females are more conservative and tend towards intolerance of non-conformity although they are not more authoritarian or intolerant in general, and on some issues, for example war and the rights of minorities, they are somewhat more liberal than males.²⁹ These relationships hold even when age and education variables are controlled.

Many studies have also related religion to intolerance.³⁰ There does not appear to be any strong trend in the United States, but the Catholics have been consistently more liberal than Protestants on issues of social welfare, trade unions, public works and racial segregation.³¹ In Stouffer's study the two groups differed little in attitudes towards communism, free speech and other civil liberties.³² However, Lenski disagreed with Stouffer's findings.

From a survey made in Detroit in 1958, Lenski compared the attitudes of white middle class Protestants and Catholics on freedom of speech and found that the Protestants were one quarter to one third more likely than Catholics to adopt the liberal position. He suggested that Stouffer's findings were the result of failing to separate negro and white Protestants, as negro Protestants, even when controlled for both class and education, were the most conservative of the groups that Lenski studied.³³ Religious fundamentalism was the most significant variable in the Wolfinger et.al. study.³⁴

A study by J.M. Bochel and P.T. Denver of political behaviour

and religious affiliation in Scotland showed only where respondents claimed full membership or adherence was religious affiliation significant.³⁵ They then went on to demonstrate how membership in established churches led to more conservative attitudes at every educational, age and social level. This approach was recognized by Stouffer who measured affiliation by attendance at church in the last month. He then compared those who did attend with those who did not and found church attendance to be consistently related to intolerance, regardless of denomination.³⁶

United States studies have shown party affiliation to be the earliest formed and the least subject to change of all political attitudes.³⁷ A child knows that he is a Republican or Democrat long before he has any conception of the ideologies these entail. Moreover mobility and education have only little influence on party preference once it is set. Political affiliation is not strictly an independent variable since it is dependent largely on the early socialization by the family, and those influences which make for a liberal political affiliation or no affiliation at all (free thinkers) should also make that individual more tolerant than another whose socializing influence resulted in a conservative affiliation.

Many American studies have also tried to correlate intolerance with political party affiliation in the United States. In some studies Democrats appeared to be slightly more tolerant than Republicans but in others no difference or contrary results of intolerance of non-conformity were found. Wolfinger et.al., in a study of those attending a Christian Anti-Communist Crusade in Oakland, California in 1962, found

66% were Republican, 19% Independents and only eight per cent Democrats.³⁸ Stouffer found 32% of Republicans and 27% of Democrats more tolerant.³⁹ Alonzo and Kinch found no difference in tolerance among a study of high school students between those who identified with the Republican Party and those who identified with the Democratic Party, however Independents tended to score higher in tolerance than either party identified groups.⁴⁰

If the relationship between political party and tolerance is not clearly defined, this does not mean that tolerance is uncorrelated with other political attitudes. Studies by Trow,⁴¹ Wolfinger, et.al.⁴² show those whom they call nineteenth century liberals (hostile to both labour unions and big business) to be more intolerant than those who were not against one or both. This was the most significant explanatory variable in the Wolfinger et.al. study, after religious fundamentalism.⁴³

Results

Total Sample

In total the sample appears highly tolerant. Dividing the range of possible scores on the intolerance scale into three groups in the manner previously discussed, only 7.9% of our sample were relatively high in intolerance, 35.7% fell into the medium category and more than half the sample, 56.4%, scored low in intolerance of non-conformists. Tolerance was not uniformly distributed among the three categories of non-conformists (see Table 5-1).

The sample feels least threatened by government ownership of big business; 86% of the sample would agree to a speech in his community favouring such action. In spite of the bible-belt reputation of Alberta, 81% would allow an atheist to make his views public. However, a com-

TABLE 5-1

RELATIVE TOLERANCE OF NON-CONFORMISTS

Question	Disagree	Don't Know	Agree
1. If a person wanted to make a speech in your community against churches and religion should he be allowed to do so?	12.9%	6.1%	81.0%
2. Should such a person be allowed to teach at a Canadian University?	23.8	11.0	65.2
3. If a person wanted to make a speech in your community favouring government ownership, should he be allowed to do so?	9.3	4.7	86.0
4. Should such a person be allowed to teach at a Canadian University?	17.4	10.6	72.0
5. If a Communist wanted to make a speech in your community, should he be allowed to speak?	16.3	5.3	78.4
6. Should such a person be allowed to teach at a Canadian University?	42.8	12.9	44.3

munist evokes a somewhat less tolerant response, 78% being in favour of according him the same right. The differences in percentages are surprisingly slight however, considering that a communist is likely to be both an atheist and more radical than a socialist. Even more remarkable are the high percentages who favour this civil liberty for non-conformists. This sample may be genuinely tolerant or they may simply be paying lip service to democracy and liberal ideals, in the manner of Presthus's theory of upward mobiles who will not say, or do anything controversial.⁴⁴ (Intolerance and upward mobility will be dealt with later).

On the second set of questions there was much less agreement on allowing non-conformists the right to teach in a Canadian university where their ideas may influence youth. Even here, however, the sample

displayed quite tolerant attitudes towards socialists (72% agreed) and atheists (65% agreed). Only in the case of the communist did the percentage slip to less than half the sample (44%) agreeing to his right to teach. Since more respondents agreed than disagreed to the extreme case of allowing a communist to teach, the sample as a whole must be considered highly tolerant of non-conformity. As this is an upper middle class sample, these results tend to support Lipset's hypothesis that the higher a person's socio-economic status the more tolerance is shown towards concepts which do not conflict with class economic interests. That is, the more liberal on civil liberties but the less liberal on welfare measures.⁴⁵ However tolerant of non-conformity an individual is, this does not imply that the same individual will support the rights of racial or ethnic minorities. In the United States such prejudices have been found to be almost totally unrelated to general intolerance or support of civil liberties. The attitudes of this Western Canadian sample to the rights of the French Canadian minority will be examined in this light in the next chapter.

Demographic Variables and Intolerance

(i) Introduction

In the review of the literature on intolerance, several studies were found which had related education, age, sex, mobility, religion and other demographic variables, with intolerance. The purpose of this section is to relate these variables to the degree of intolerance to non-conformity as measured by the scale used in this study. The demographic variables are independent variables, intolerance the dependent variable.

Previous studies have used heterogeneous rather than homogeneous samples and there is no known Canadian study. If previous findings are confirmed with a different cultural and social sample this adds to the generality of previous findings. If the previous relationships do not hold good for this sample, new dimensions of a relationship may be discovered.

(ii) The Variables

Previous studies have indicated that education is an important socializing influence and an important independent variable in predicting political attitudes such as intolerance.⁴⁶ The results of this study show results consistent with past empirical evidence that tolerance increases with level of education (see Table 5-2). This can best be seen by the

TABLE 5-2

EDUCATION AND INTOLERANCE

Highest level of education completed	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Junior High	73	41.1%	43.8%	15.1%	100%	1.740
Senior High	238	46.2	47.1	6.7	100	1.605
Technical Institute	44	61.4	25.0	13.6	100	1.523
Some College	128	65.6	26.6	7.3	100	1.422
College Graduates	135	72.6	23.0	4.4	100	1.319
Total	618					

mean score on intolerance which diminishes as education increases.

Whereas 41% of those who finished junior high school only are relatively low in intolerance, the percentage of relatively tolerant people increases with education until at the graduate level 73% of the sample was relatively tolerant.

Stouffer and others have indicated that intolerance increases with age and that this trend is most pronounced in the better educated.⁴⁷

The results of this survey show a similar pattern; the mean score on intolerance increases gradually with age up to the age of 40, then there is a fairly noticeable decrease in intolerance which is further accentuated in those over the age of 50. Wolfinger et.al. also found age to be significant only at the upper end of the age spectrum.⁴⁸

(See Table 5-3)

TABLE 5-3
AGE AND INTOLERANCE

Age	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
21-25	80	65.0%	27.5%	7.5%	100%	1.425
26-30	141	59.6	35.5	5.0	100	1.454
31-35	140	60.1	30.0	9.3	100	1.486
36-40	96	57.3	36.5	6.2	100	1.490
41-45	75	45.3	45.3	9.3	100	1.640
46-50	60	45.0	48.3	6.7	100	1.617
Over 50	24	45.8	41.7	12.5	100	1.667
Total	621					

Females have shown consistently less tolerance of non-conformity than males, even when matched for age, education, place of residence, occupation and church attendance with male samples have the same characteristics.⁴⁹

Thus, 17% of the females could be classified as intolerant compared with only seven per cent of the males in the same and only 35% were low in intolerance compared with 58% of the males (see Table 5-4). This does not mean, as Stouffer points out, that women are more generally intolerant than men, for in many other attitudes they are more liberal.⁵⁰ This is shown in the relative attitudes of the sexes to the French, which will be dealt with in the next chapter. However, even

with education controlled the women in this sample are more intolerant of non-conformity than are the men.

TABLE 5-4
SEX AND INTOLERANCE

Sex	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Male	569	58.3%	38.3%	7.0%	100%	1.487
Female	52	34.6	48.1	17.3	100	1.827
Total	621					

There is some dispute over income as an independent variable of intolerance. Kelly and Chambliss found it a significant indicator of tolerance of non-conformity,⁵¹ whereas Alonzo and Kinch concluded that socio-economic differences did not account for differences in tolerance.⁵² No income group scores significantly differently from the average, all groups having between 50 and 60% in the relatively low intolerant group (see Table 5-5). There is no discernible trend but this is only to be

TABLE 5-5
INCOME AND INTOLERANCE

Income	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Under 7,500	145	52%	41%	7%	100%	1.552
7,501-10,000	200	59	33	9	100	1.505
10,001-12,500	132	58	36	6	100	1.477
Over 12,500	144	56	35	9	100	1.528
Total	621					

expected since virtually all the sample falls within the middle socio-economic class.

Although there are no comparisons in this sample from the viewpoint of class, not all the sample is equally mobile; some are stable, some upward and some downward in mobility. A test of class mobility was taken by comparing the respondent's education with that of his father. If the level of education of the father was greater, the respondent was classified as downward mobile, if equal the respondent was classified as stable and if less than the respondent was said to be upward mobile. A further measure of upward striving was taken from the number of promotions the respondent had had in his present company.

The findings in this sample tend to confirm Lipset's hypothesis. Of those who are stable only seven per cent are high in intolerance (lower per cent than either upward or downward mobile, and the highest percentage (60%) are classified as low in intolerance (see Table 5-6).

TABLE 5-6

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND INTOLERANCE

Education level of father compared to respondent	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Greater (downward mobile)	157	50.3%	39.5%	10.2%	100%	1.599
Equal (stable)	73	60.3	32.9	6.8	100	1.466
Less (upward mobile)	391	58.1	34.8	7.2	100	1.491
Total	621					

Those downwardly mobile show the greatest tendency towards intolerance scoring considerably higher in intolerance (10% classified as relatively high in intolerance and the smallest proportion 50% classified as low in intolerance; 10% less than those who are stable). There is not very much difference in the proportion of upward mobiles and stables who are

relatively intolerant but a trend is discernible. There does appear to be some support here for the theory of cross pressures causing the upward or downward mobile to become more intolerant. However, when the levels of education are compared for each group, the upward mobile group contains disproportionately more of the better educated and proportionately less of those with junior high school or less. Therefore education is an intervening variable, contaminating the effect of mobility per se.

Father's occupation is used as a measure of the socio-economic status of the respondent in childhood. In some respects it is also a measure of geographic and economic mobility which may have brought cross pressures to bear on the individual. The findings here confirm those found in geographic socialization, there is little difference between the professional and managerial, the labouring and the middle income groups, whereas there is a noticeable rise in intolerance in those whose fathers were farmers (see Table 5-7).

TABLE 5-7.

FATHER'S OCCUPATION AND INTOLERANCE

Father's Occupation	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Labourers	111	64.1%	34.4%	4.5%	100%	1.414
Middle Income Gps.	196	59.7	37.2	3.1	100	1.434
Professional and Managerial	138	62.3	30.4	7.2	100	1.449
Farmers	176	43.8	40.3	15.9	100	1.722
Total	621					

The proportion of farmers' sons classified relatively high in intolerance (16%) is more than twice that of the next highest group,

professional and managerial, where seven per cent are classified as high, and more than five times as great as the lowest group (middle income groups such as clerks, salemen, skilled tradesmen) of whom only three per cent are classified high in intolerance. The difference is also noted in the proportions classified as relatively low in intolerance; 64% of those whose father was a labourer, 62% of the children of professionals and managers, 60% of those from the middle income category, but only 44% of those whose fathers were farmers are classified as low in intolerance.

Place of residence as a child may be an important independent variable determining political attitudes such as intolerance since previous findings in the United States⁵³ have indicated those with a rural background to be more intolerant and resistant to change. In this sample there is no discernible difference between the urban groups but those with rural backgrounds are far more intolerant (see Table 5-8).

TABLE 5-8

RURAL/URBAN SOCIALIZATION AND INTOLERANCE

Place of Residence up to age 15	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Large City	233	59%	35%	6%	100%	1.464
Small City	87	68	26	6	100	1.379
Town	133	59	36	4.5	100	1.451
Rural (Farm)	164	44	42	15	100	1.707
Total	621					

Fifteen per cent of those with rural backgrounds could be classified as high in intolerance compared with six per cent of those from the cities and only 4.5% of those from small towns, whereas only 44% of those from

rural areas are relatively low in intolerance compared with 59% of those from large cities and towns and 68% of those from towns.

Those from rural areas have the same age distribution as other groups but are under represented at the higher educational levels. Greater intolerance of those from rural areas may also be the result of:

- a. traditional rural resistance to new ideas;
- b. cross pressures due to the differences between socialization and city life.

Ethnic origin is also an important socializing variable and other researchers have considered it significant as an independent variable determining intolerance. In our sample there are appreciable differences in tolerance with ethnic background, the British majority (least threatened group) showing a higher level of tolerance (four per cent high in intolerance, 63% low in intolerance) as opposed to the minority Ukrainian group (10% high in intolerance and only 49% low in intolerance) (see Table 5-9). The German group, which is a rather sub-

TABLE 5-9

ETHNIC ORIGIN AND INTOLERANCE

Ethnic origin of father	Intolerance				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
British	289	63%	34%	4%	100%	1.408
German	69	55	40	6	100	1.507
Ukrainian	61	49	41	10	100	1.607
Total	419					

stantial group, (11% of the sample, 12% of Edmonton as a whole) falls between the two extremes, six per cent of them being high in intolerance

and 55% low in intolerance.

Lenski's findings in Detroit showed white middle class protestants to be more tolerant on freedom of speech than the more authoritarian Catholics,⁵⁵ whereas Stouffer found no difference in tolerance between protestants and Catholics.⁵⁶

The results of the present survey do not confirm Lenski's finding. Although this is a middle class sample differences between the United States and Canada may account for the fact that there is no significant difference in tolerance between the two groups (see Table 5-10). The trend is towards the Catholics being more tolerant, only five per cent of them being high in intolerance and 59% being relatively low in intolerance, compared with nine per cent high and only 52% low for those who have a protestant religious preference.

TABLE 5-10
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE AND INTOLERANCE

Religious Preference	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Protestant	410	52.2%	38.8%	9.0%	100%	1.568
Catholic	119	58.8	36.0	5.3	100	1.465
Total	524					

The data show those who do not attend church to be noticeably more tolerant than those who do, four per cent of non-attenders being classified high in intolerance and 80% being low in intolerance (see Table 5-11). However, intolerance does not increase in direct proportion to the frequency of church attendance, those claiming to attend often are the most intolerant; 11% of them are high in intolerance and 50% low,

whereas of those who attend regularly, only six per cent are high and 56% are low.

TABLE 5-11

CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND INTOLERANCE

Church Attendance	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Does not attend	81	80.2%	16.0%	3.7%	100%	1.235
Attends seldom	290	54.1	37.2	8.6	100	1.545
Attends often	117	50.4	38.5	11.1	100	1.607
Attends regularly	131	51.4	42.0	6.1	100	1.542
Total	619					

It may be that those claiming to attend regularly are more truthful in their claim to religious membership and may strive harder to attain Christian ideals of brotherhood and tolerance. Those who claim to go 'often' may be exaggerating their attendance because of its social acceptability and/or using religion as a philosophical justification for their upward mobility.

Political Variables and Intolerance

(i) Introduction

In the preceding chapter some demographic variables which may account for relative tolerance or intolerance were considered as independent variables. In this section the relationship of intolerance to other political variables will be examined. While no direction of causality can be certain, political party preference is taken, like the demographic variables, as being the independent variable and intolerance the dependent variable. However, in seeking a relationship with other political attitudes, intolerance is treated as the independent variable

and relative tolerance and intolerance related to other attitudes to test if those with intolerant attitudes are likely to be more anti-French, or alienated etc., than those who are low in intolerance.

(ii) The Variables

In this sample intolerance occurs in the predicted direction with party preference (see Table 5-12). Although those who support the

TABLE 5-12

PARTY PREFERENCE AND INTOLERANCE

Party Preference	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Social Credit	61	41.0%	45.9%	13.1%	100%	1.721
Conservative	228	48.7	43.0	8.3	100	1.596
Liberal	201	65.7	28.9	5.5	100	1.398
Independent	58	77.6	17.2	5.2	100	1.276
Total	548					

social credit party are noticeably more intolerant than all the others (13% being highly intolerant and 41% low in intolerance), there is also a significant difference in means between the conservatives (of whom eight per cent are high in intolerance and less than half, 49%, are low), and liberals and independents of whom more than half are low in intolerance. No less than 78% of independents are low in intolerance.

Intolerance also occurs in the direction predicted by Trow⁵⁷ and Wolfinger et.al.⁵⁸ with laissez-faire and nineteenth century liberal attitudes (see Table 5-13). This first variable measures the amount of opposition to government and union interference with the prerogatives of the businessman.

Almost twice as many (39%) of those who are high in intolerance are supporters of the unregulated prerogatives of businessmen compared

with only 20% of those who are low in intolerance. Of those who are medium in tolerance, 75% fall in the medium on the anti-government control variable.

TABLE 5-13

LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES AND INTOLERANCE

Intolerance	Laissez-faire attitudes				
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total
Low	350	13.7%	66.3%	20.0%	100%
Medium	222	9.5	74.8	15.8	100
High	49	10.2	51.0	38.8	100
Total N	621	74	423	124	

$\chi^2 = 16.55783$ with 4.d.f. significant at .01 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .131 significant at .002 level

The second variable measures attitudes which are against both big business and labour unions. This attitude Trow called nineteenth century liberalism. It is in some ways similar to that of laissez-faire attitudes, but it is even more significantly correlated with intolerance (at the .001 level) (see Table 5-14).

TABLE 5-14

NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERALISM AND INTOLERANCE

Intolerance	Nineteenth Century Liberalism			
	N	Low	Medium	High
Low	350	30.0%	59.1%	10.9%
Medium	222	19.8	64.4	15.8
High	49	26.5	46.9	26.5
Total N	621	162	373	86

$\chi^2 = 16.09639$ with 4.d.f. significant at .01 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1441 significant at .001 level

Only 11% of those who are most tolerant have nineteenth century liberal attitudes, whereas 26% of those with high intolerance also score highly on nineteenth century liberalism.

Intolerance was not significantly related to the other political attitude scales, government welfare, French-Canadian attitudes and active and passive participation. There was a slightly significant relationship between intolerance and political alienation in this sample (see Table 5-15). Those high in intolerance had a tendency to be more

TABLE 5-15

ALIENATION AND INTOLERANCE

Intolerance	N	Alienation			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	350	26.0%	53.4%	20.6%	100%
Medium	222	20.3	62.6	17.1	100
High	49	20.4	49.6	32.7	100
Total N	621	146	349	126	

$\chi^2 = 9.77154$ with 4.d.f.

significant at .094 level

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .053

significant at .094 level

alienated than those low in intolerance.

Organization Variables and Intolerance

(i) Introduction

All the independent variables so far examined have been the socializing variables of the past, sex, age, ethnic, geographic, educational, religious and political party background. The organizational variables are those aspects of the organization and the job which may have a continuing socializing influence on political attitudes.

Lipsetz⁵⁹ suggests that variables such as economic and status insecurity, work dissatisfaction, may be more important causal factors of intolerance than class itself.

In this section, intolerance is treated as the dependent variable, the rationalization being that organization or job factors may tend to make an individual more intolerant or more tolerant. This would seem more probable than arguing that intolerant people are more likely to seek employment in jobs or organizations with certain characteristics, though this interpretation is not always impossible.

(ii) The Variables

The analysis of this sample reveals a relationship between job satisfaction and job definition with intolerance. The other organizational variables, occupational routine, changes, uncertainty and cohesion appear to be only weakly related to intolerance. Those who are low in role definition in their work show a definite tendency to be low in intolerance (71% low in intolerance) compared with those who are high in role definition (51% low in intolerance) (see Table 5-16).

TABLE 5-16

JOB DEFINITION AND INTOLERANCE

Job Definition	Intolerance				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	49	71.4%	24.5%	4.1%	100%
Medium	277	59.2	34.3	6.5	100
High	295	51.2	39.0	9.8	100
Total N	621	350	222	49	

$\chi^2 = 9.52586$ with 4.d.f.

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1373

significant at .05 level

significant at .001 level

Although only four per cent of those low in role definition are high in intolerance, 10% of those whose roles in the organization are highly defined are intolerant. This is not to suggest a causal relationship. It may be as Almond and Verba found with participation, that industrial and political participation grew symbolically, or it may be that those who have a high tolerance of ambiguity choose jobs which are less well defined compared with those who are more intolerant. There is nothing to suggest that a highly defined work role would lead to political intolerance.⁶⁰

Presthus suggested that the upward mobiles would be both more satisfied with their work and more intolerant of others who did not subscribe to the norms that they had laboured under to achieve success.⁶¹ Lipsetz, on the other hand, suggested that lack of success would make those who subscribed to middle class norms of success more intolerant.⁶² In this sample none of those low in job satisfaction are high in intolerance compared with 10% of those high in job satisfaction (see Table 5-17). However, 72% of the low in job satisfaction are low in

TABLE 5-17

JOB SATISFACTION AND INTOLERANCE

Job Satisfaction	Intolerance				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	25	72.0%	28.0%	0.0%	100%
Medium	332	59.3	33.4	7.2	100
High	264	51.1	39.4	9.5	100
Total N	621	335	222	49	

$$\chi^2 = 7.77538 \text{ with 4.d.f.}$$

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1257

significant at .10 level
significant at .001 level

intolerance compared with 51% of those high in job satisfaction. This would suggest that in this sample the job factors which Lipsetz thought might encourage tolerance (and the sample as a whole is relatively tolerant) are not as important in determining tolerance as are the personality factors which Presthus predicted would make the upward mobile more intolerant.

If level in hierarchy is examined it appears that the executives are both more intolerant and more satisfied (see Table 5-18). The mean

TABLE 5-18

LEVEL IN HIERARCHY AND INTOLERANCE

Level in Hierarchy	Intolerance				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Executive	55	47%	38%	15%	100%	1.673
Department Head	211	57	37	6	100	1.483
Staff	261	58	32	10	100	1.513
Foreman/Cler.Sup.	93	55	41	4	100	1.495
Total	620					

level of intolerance for executives is greater than in any other group, 15% of the former are high in intolerance and only 47% low in intolerance. It is also apparent that executives have a higher level of satisfaction than the other groups, 61% of them having high satisfaction compared with 46% of department heads, 41% of staff and only 28% of foremen and clerical supervisors.⁶³ On the other hand no executives admitted to having low job satisfaction. This evidence bears out Presthus' and refutes Lipsetz' hypothesis. However, if number of promotions with the present company is taken as a measure of economic mobility, a different pattern emerges (see Table 5-19).

TABLE 5-19

NUMBER OF PROMOTIONS (ECONOMIC MOBILITY) AND INTOLERANCE

Number of Promotions	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
2 or less	286	56.6%	34.6%	8.7%	100%	1.521
2 - 4	220	60.9	33.2	5.9	100	1.450
4 or more	115	47.0	43.5	9.6	100	1.626
Total	621					

Those who have four or more promotions, the higher achievers like the executive, are more intolerant, 10% of them being high in intolerance and 47% being low, compared with those having two to four promotions, only six per cent of whom are high in intolerance and 61% low in intolerance. The under achievers (less than two promotions) also appear to be more intolerant than those with two to four promotions although not as intolerant as the high achievers. Interestingly however, those with the moderate performance who are most tolerant do not have any less job satisfaction than either the under or over achievers, for although not significant, they tend to be the most satisfied having a higher percentage satisfied and a lower percentage low in satisfaction.⁶⁴ In this breakdown, therefore, we have some confirmation of Lipsetz' idea that lack of job satisfaction may lead to more intolerant attitudes, although there is no reason to say that this is a causal relationship.

Those who have a tendency to be intolerant and to have low tolerance for ambiguity may select jobs which are well defined, or high job definition could add to political intolerance. In the same manner those socialized to be intolerant may choose certain functions within the organization or these functions may influence the intolerance level

of the holders. Regardless of the direction of causality, it was hypothesized that those functions which concern dealing with the public are likely to be more tolerant than those which have few public dealings. Although there are differences between different roles in the organization these differences are definitely not related to the amount of public contact inherent in that role, in fact those in marketing (13% high, 54% low) and purchasing (11% high and 44% low), both outwardly oriented, appear more intolerant than those in production (eight per cent high, 61% low) which is inwardly oriented (see Table 5-20). Those in personnel, though inwardly oriented, might, because of the human orientation, be less intolerant.

TABLE 5-20

ROLE IN ORGANIZATION AND INTOLERANCE

Function in Organization	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Production	74	61%	31%	8%	100%	1.473
Marketing	161	54	33	13	100	1.590
Acc. and Finance	196	53	41	6	100	1.526
Research and Dev.	69	83	15	3	100	1.203
Purchasing	27	44	44	11	100	1.667
Personnel	54	52	42	6	100	1.537
Total	621					

Although one might expect from the stereotyped images of various functions that those who worked in accounting (inwardly oriented function) would be more intolerant than the more sympathetic individual who worked in the personnel area with its human relations aspect, there is no difference in those who are more intolerant (six per cent in each case) and only one per cent difference among those who are less intolerant

(53% and 52% respectively). Education would appear to be a far greater determinant of intolerance since the Research and Development group (inwardly oriented to the scientific community) which probably has the least dealings with the public but the highest level of formal education, has a noticeably higher level of tolerance. Only three per cent of this group fall into the classification of high in intolerance, but 83% are classified as being low in intolerance. The relationship with education holds good for all functions. Those with the most formal education are the most tolerant. We must, therefore, conclude that formal education is a better predictor of intolerance than organization role.

The form of ownership and institutional purpose of the organization was also measured and compared with intolerant attitudes. It was hypothesized that those who worked for the government would be more tolerant than those who were working in the private sector, and that those working in smaller owner/managed businesses would be less tolerant than those who worked for large companies.

The relationship between intolerance and type of organization proves to be in the predicted direction between each pair of organizations (see Table 5-21). Those who work for government are less inclined towards high intolerance than those who work in private industry (six per cent against nine per cent respectively) and more inclined to be low in intolerance (59% compared with 55%). Of those who work in small businesses, 56% are low in intolerance compared with 62% of those who work in big businesses. However, those who work in government are no more tolerant than those who work in big business.

Thus it cannot be said that this relationship holds.

TABLE 5-21

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION AND INTOLERANCE

Type of Organization	N	Intolerance			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Government	157	59.2%	35.0%	5.7%	100%	1.465
All Private Business	464	55.4	26.0	8.6	100	1.532
Big Business	248	62.1	30.6	7.3	100	1.452
Small Business	144	55.6	36.8	7.6	100	1.521

Summary

In this sample, even with social class held constant, there was a predictable tendency for intolerance to be related to education, age, sex, rural socialization and ethnic origin. Intolerance was not related to income level and was related curvilinearly with church attendance. Those whose fathers were farmers tended to be high in intolerance compared with those whose fathers were part of other occupational groups.

Political party affiliation was related to intolerance, the more conservative the identification the higher the proportion of intolerant supporters. The intolerant tended to be against government interference, big unions and big business and to be generally more alienated than those who were relatively intolerant.

Some organizational and job variables appear to have a strong relationship in intolerance. It is impossible to prove causality, but it is suspected that high job definition and satisfaction increase intolerance of non-conformity, probably because these groups are forced

themselves to a high level of conformity. Progress up the hierarchy seems to increase intolerance, but the type of organization is not related to intolerance.

References - Chapter V

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CHAPTER VI

ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Introduction

The accommodation by Canada's English speaking majority of French Canadian aspirations is probably one of the most critical tests which Canada faces as a nation.

The chances of sympathetic and successful accommodation depend not on the objective legitimacy of the demands, but on the perceived legitimacy of the demands made and measures taken; in the present case the attitudes of the English speaking majority to the French minority.

Thus this scale is not simply an academic offshoot of the intolerance variable--Western Canada is reputed to be the area most resistant to French Canadian demands. J.E. Boyd, in a paper presented to the Canadian Psychological Association, Calgary, 1968, said:

It seems likely that the climate of opinion is somewhat different in Western Canada than, for example, Ontario and Quebec. For one thing, there appears to be a more prevalent conservative point of view in the Western provinces. One gets the impression that this viewpoint is strongly reflected in places like newspaper editorials, letters to editors, and indeed the amount of radio and newspaper content concerning the news of French-Canadian affairs.¹

If this group, or its opinion leaders is not as anti-French as supposed, the problems of Canada as a nation would be more likely to result in an agreeable outcome. If this group is highly anti-French however, it is difficult to see how a satisfactory accommodation could be achieved. It then becomes even more important to discover what factors cause Western Canadians to be anti-French and what influence this attitude has on other political attitudes.

The Anti-French Scale

The anti-French scale was developed as a measure of the specific intolerance of the French which is supposed to be typical of those living in Western Canada. The object was to find out if the West is as anti-French as often supposed, and if so what socializing influences in background or in organization gave rise to Francophobia.

Review of the Literature

In their book Political Socialization, Dawson and Prewitt give Canada as an example of a country which has a fragmented political culture:

In Canada religious-ethnic ties sharply differentiate the political outlooks, including basic political attachments, of the French-Canadians from other Canadians. The French-Canadians, because they tend to share political values and loyalties that are different from those of the larger society, constitute a particular political sub-culture.²

Such distinctive and enduring sub-cultures are likely to be subject to and subjects of prejudice, brought on by erroneous generalizations and hostility between the sub-cultures. Allport defines ethnic prejudice as:

An antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group.³

In this study, antipathy expressed towards a group rather than individuals is being investigated. Surprisingly, although many opinions are expressed on the French Canadian problem, little empirical evidence is to be found. Mildred Schwartz, for example, while acknowledging this to be "the most critical question" in Canada today, is concerned more with how the French regard their own problems and English attitudes than with how the English regard the French and the French status in Canada.⁴

She found, however, that in a survey made in 1961, 71% of English speaking respondents thought that French should be compulsory in English Canadian public schools and 67% agreed that public school pupils learning both English and French would lead to better understanding between French- and English-speaking Canadians (1956 survey).⁵ However she does not say where these surveys were conducted. She also showed that whereas French Canadians thought relations between English- and French-speaking Canadians were improving, English Canadians thought they were worsening (1963 survey).⁶

In evaluating confederation, the same author found that in 1960 23% of respondents in a questionnaire thought that Quebec was more powerful in running Canada than it should be, 14% thought Ontario too powerful and 61% had no opinion.⁷ In a 1963 survey, 53% of English-speaking Canadians thought that French Canadians had been given their full rights under confederation compared with only six per cent of French Canadians, a rather large discrepancy.⁸ In spite of this, 72% of another 1963 survey disagreed that the differences between the various parts of Canada were too great to be solved and that Confederation would break up.⁹ It would seem that such an assessment was not based on an accurate picture of the antipathy between the two sub-cultures.

Mildred Schwartz' study did not include relating these attitudes to other demographic or political variables. However, in a study of the attitudes towards French Canadians of junior and senior high school students and their parents in Calgary, J. Edwin Boyd found that the attitudes of the students were related to the socio-economic class and level of education of their parents. These attitudes also relate to

age as there was a more positive attitude exhibited on the part of the students which was not related to the original attitudes expressed by their parents. Boyd suggests that, "while there is no direct relationship between the attitudes of parents and children, the level of socio-economic status for a family may indirectly be related to more positive French Canadian attitudes."¹⁰

Among the parents, socio-economic class, years of school and knowledge of the French language all correlated significantly with French Canadian attitudes.¹¹ Knowledge of a language other than French was negatively correlated with French Canadian attitudes but the relationship was not significant. Boyd concludes that more positive attitudes are exhibited by parents who are in the higher educational and socio-economic level of this group of subjects.¹²

Results

Total Sample

Overall, the sample appeared to be, in contrast to the high level of general tolerance, highly anti-French, 48% of the sample scoring in the highly anti-French range, 44% moderately anti-French and only 8.1% scored in the tolerant range (see Table 6-1). It is also significant

TABLE 6-1

ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Anti-French Attitudes	Number	% of sample	cum%
Low	50	8.1	8.1
Medium	271	43.6	51.7
High	300	48.3	100.0
Total	621	100.0	

that the mode occurred on the lowest possible (most anti-French) score of three, and 15% scored this score.

There is little difference in responses to the first two questions except that opinions appear to harden when it comes to deciding that the French make too many demands, a question that demands less thought than one which requires weighing Federal efforts in Quebec against other provinces (see Table 6-2). On two official languages opinion seems to be more polarized. There are 59% who are very much opposed to two official languages but 38% are not opposed. Very few score 'don't know' on this question.

TABLE 6-2

ITEM SCORES ON ANTI-FRENCH SCALE

	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree
1. Do you think that the Federal Government is doing too much for Quebec in relation to other provinces?	65%	19%	16%
2. Do you think the French Canadians are making unreasonable demands?	71	13	16
3. Do you agree with the policy of the Federal Government to make both French and English the official languages of Canada?	38	3	59

Demographic Variables and Anti-French Attitudes

(i) Introduction

Having discovered, not unexpectedly, that this sample is highly anti-French, anti-French attitudes are now related to demographic variables such as age, sex, etc. to see if these relationships will throw light on the causal factors in the socialization of Westerners

which may give rise to anti-French attitudes. It should be noted that 76% of this sample was raised in the three Prairie provinces and another five per cent in British Columbia. Those who were not are included in the breakdown since if they have divergent opinions from those raised here they will modify public opinion in real life just as they modify the results of this sample. Neither was it thought necessary to exclude those of French ethnic origin from the sample, since there were only 22 of French descent and their views on the French question were not uniformly pro-French but were randomly distributed over the whole spectrum of attitudes from high to low.

(ii) The Variables

Unlike active and passive participation and intolerance and in spite of Boyd's findings,¹³ anti-French feelings do not appear to be related to any aspect of socio-economic status as far as we can measure it here, the sample being homogeneously middle class. There is no consistent relationship with income - those having the highest income being the most highly anti-French (see Table 6-3). The relationship

TABLE 6-3

INCOME AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Income	Anti-French Attitudes				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Under \$7,500	145	5.5%	48.3%	46.2%	100%	2.407
7,501-10,000	200	8.0	45.5	46.5	100	2.385
10,001-12,500	132	10.6	40.2	49.2	100	2.386
Over 12,500	144	8.3	39.6	52.1	100	2.437
Total	621					

between education and anti-French attitudes, though clearer, is only

slight (see Table 6-4).

TABLE 6-4

EDUCATION AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Highest level of education completed	N	Anti-French Attitudes			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Junior High or less	73	4.1%	39.7%	56.2%	100%	2.521
Senior High	238	8.0	48.3	43.7	100	2.537
Technical Institute	44	9.1	36.4	54.4	100	2.455
Some College	128	7.0	43.0	50.0	100	2.430
College Graduates	135	11.1	41.5	47.4	100	2.363
Total	518					

Anti-French attitudes seem all pervasive and equally distributed over all the demographic variables. For instance, age is not related to anti-French attitudes, the youngest and the oldest age groups have exactly the same mean score (see Table 6-5). Neither is sex clearly

TABLE 6-5

AGE AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Age	N	Anti-French Attitudes			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
21-25	80	11.2%	40.0%	48.7%	100%	2.375
26-30	141	8.5	47.5	44.0	100	2.355
31-35	140	6.4	44.3	49.3	100	2.429
36-40	96	6.2	50.0	43.8	100	2.375
41-45	75	8.0	38.7	53.3	100	2.453
46-50	60	10.0	33.3	56.7	100	2.467
Over 50	24	8.3	45.8	45.8	100	2.375
Total	621					

related although women tend to be less anti-French in general in keeping with other evidence on women's attitudes to minorities and underdogs¹⁴ (see Table 6-6).

TABLE 6-6

SEX AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Sex	Anti-French Attitudes				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Male	569	8.6%	42.2%	49.2%	100%	2.406
Female	52	1.9	59.6	38.5	100	2.365
Total	621					.

Relationships with other demographic data do show some differences. For example, Ukrainians are noticeably more anti-French than those of either British or German descent. This is consistent with Boyd's findings¹⁵ and is not surprising because Ukrainian spokesmen have probably equated their ethnic group with the French and they are probably disgruntled that they do not get the same special attention (see Table 6-7).

TABLE 6-7

ETHNIC ORIGIN AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Ethnic Origin of Father	Anti-French Attitudes				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
British	289	7.3%	45.3%	47.4%	100%	2.401
German	69	10.1	40.6	49.3	100	2.391
Ukrainian	61	3.3	44.3	52.5	100	2.492
Total	419					

There is a dichotomy between those who come from small towns and rural areas and those who come from city areas (see Table 6-8). This is probably a result of the more generally intolerant attitudes of rural and small town people who are exposed to less varied outlooks. This slight tendency towards anti-French feelings is also related to the

TABLE 6-8

GEOGRAPHIC SOCIALIZATION AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Place of Residence up to age 15	N	Anti-French Attitudes			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Large City	233	11.2%	43.8%	45.1%	100%	2.339
Small City	87	10.3	47.1	42.5	100	2.322
Small Town	133	4.5	40.6	54.9	100	2.504
Rural	164	4.9	43.9	51.2	100	2.563
Total	617					

occupational status of the childhood family. Those whose fathers were farmers were most anti-French (50% high) followed by those whose fathers were labourers (49.5%), those from the middle income and status groups (48.5% high) and managers and professionals' children (45%) (see Table 6-9). This result is consistent with Boyd's findings¹⁶ but the differences

TABLE 6-9

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF CHILDHOOD AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Father's Occupation	N	Anti-French Attitudes			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Labourer	111	5.4%	45.0%	49.5%	100%	2.441
Middle Income Occ.	196	9.2	42.3	48.5	100	2.393
Prof. & Managerial	138	11.6	43.5	44.9	100	2.333
Farmers	176	5.7	44.3	50.0	100	2.443
Total	621					

are very small. Mobility is measured by comparing fathers' educational level with that of respondents showed those who remained stable were slightly less anti-French than either upward or downward mobiles (see Table 6-10). However the differences are small, so that this evidence cannot be used to confirm Lenski's status crystalization theory.¹⁷

TABLE 6-10

MOBILITY AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Education of father compared to respondent	N	Anti-French Attitudes			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Greater (downward mobile)	157	9.6%	38.9%	51.6%	100%	2.420
Equal (stable)	73	8.2	46.6	45.2	100	2.370
Less (upward mobile)	391	7.4	45.0	47.6	100	2.402
Total	621					

Catholics are much more sympathetic towards the French than are Protestants (see Table 6-11) and those who do not attend church are more sympathetic than those who do (see Table 6-12).

TABLE 6-11

RELIGION AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Denomination	N	Anti-French Attitudes			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Catholic	114	10.5%	46.5%	43.0%	100%	2.325
Protestant	410	6.1	41.0	52.9	100	2.468
Total	524					

TABLE 6-12

CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Frequency of Church Attendance	N	Anti-French Attitudes			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
No church attendance	81	13.6%	42.0%	44.4%	100%	2.309
Seldom	290	7.2	44.5	48.3	100	2.410
Often	117	5.1	43.6	51.3	100	2.462
Regular	131	9.2	43.5	47.3	100	2.382
Total	619					

Organizational Variables and Anti-French Attitudes

(i) Introduction

In this section scores on the anti-French scale will be compared with organizational data. Comparisons between the anti-French scale and other demographic variables showed that anti-French feelings were spread out over the whole range of backgrounds, age and sex, and although there were slight differences, the outstanding finding was that all the sample are highly anti-French. In this section the relationship between occupational and anti-French variables will be examined to see if this same relationship applies. It may not do so, for example, in the type of business organization. Those who work for the Federal Government and have to learn French because of the Federal Government's bilingual policy, may be more anti-French than individuals employed in locally owned companies who are not subject to such pressures.

(ii) The Variables

The first variable to be considered is the influence of the employing organization on attitudes towards the French. As hypothesized, those who work for government are more anti-French (50% high) than those who work in locally owned industries (47% high), with those working for large corporations only slightly lower overall than government employees (see Table 6-13). When government is broken down into municipal, provincial and federal workers, it is found that provincial employees are less anti-French than the locally owned companies, but that federal and municipal workers are higher in anti-French attitudes than those who work for large branch plant corporations. Municipal employees are, surprisingly, even more anti-French than those who work for the Federal

Government.

TABLE 6-13

BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Type of Organization	N	Anti-French Attitudes			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Big Business	248	8.1%	41.5%	50.4%	100%	2.423
Small Business	144	11.1	42.4	46.5	100	2.354
All Business	464	8.6	43.5	47.8	100	2.392
Municipal Govt.	29	6.9	31.0	62.1	100	2.552
Provincial Govt.	79	8.9	48.1	43.0	100	2.342
Federal Govt.	49	2.0	44.9	53.1	100	2.510
All Government	157	6.4	43.3	49.7	100	2.433

Executives are more likely to be anti-French than any other group (58% high). There are no great differences between the other groups; Department Heads (49% high), staff (46% high) and Foremen (45% high) (see Table 6-14).

TABLE 6-14

LEVEL IN THE HIERARCHY AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Level in Hierarchy	N	Anti-French Attitudes			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Executives	55	7.3%	34.5%	58.2%	100%	2.509
Department Heads	211	9.5	41.2	49.3	100	2.398
Staff	261	8.4	45.2	46.4	100	2.379
Foremen/Cler.Sup.	93	4.3	50.5	45.2	100	2.409
Total	620					

Some functional areas also seem more anti-French than others. Purchasing (56% high), Production (50% high), Accounting and Finance (51% high), Research and Development (54% high) are considerably more anti-French than Marketing (46% high) and Personnel (37% high) (see Table 6-15). It may be thought that not wishing to hold controversial

TABLE 6-15

ROLE IN ORGANIZATION AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Functional Area	Anti-French Attitudes				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Production	74	9.5%	39.2%	51.2%	100%	2.419
Marketing	161	9.3	44.7	46.0	100	2.366
Acc. and Finance	196	4.6	44.9	50.5	100	2.459
Research & Dev.	69	13.0	33.3	53.6	100	2.406
Purchasing	27	7.4	37.0	55.6	100	2.481
Personnel	54	9.3	53.7	37.0	100	2.278
Total	581					

opinions, the upward mobiles who come into contact with many people avoid extremist positions. In the areas of marketing and personnel, extreme attitudes might affect success and promotion, but this is unlikely where attitudes do not impinge on the world outside work in areas such as production or accounting and finance.

Anti-French attitudes were not related significantly to any of the job variables, routine, uncertainty, technical change, role definition, cohesion or job satisfaction.

Political Variables

(i) Introduction

From the last two sections we conclude that anti-French attitudes are prevalent among all sections of this middle class Western sample, and that these attitudes are not significantly related to either demographic or occupational variables. In this section the relationship between this ubiquitous trait and political variables will be examined to see if these widely held feelings influence choice of political allegiance or any other political attitudes.

(ii) The Variables

The supporters of some political parties are disproportionately anti-French. Almost twice as many Conservatives (63%) as Liberals (33%) are high on the anti-French scale (see Table 6-16). In between

TABLE 6-16

POLITICAL PARTY AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Party affiliation	Anti-French Attitudes				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Social Credit	61	4.9%	41.0%	54.0%	100%	2.492
Conservative	228	3.5	33.8	62.7	100	2.592
Liberal	201	14.4	52.7	32.8	100	2.184
Independent	58	8.6	44.8	46.6	100	2.379
Total	548					

are Social Credit supporters (54% high) and Independents (47% high).

Party affiliation is the only independent variable which radically differentiates the relationship of sub-groups with anti-French attitudes. However, this does not show any causal relationship. It is not certain whether those with highly anti-French attitudes prefer to support the Conservative Party or whether the party leadership and ethos induces its supporters to take up anti-French attitudes.

The anti-French attitude taken as an independent variable however, was also strongly related to other political attitudes. The strongest relationship was with alienation (see Table 6-17). Those low in anti-French feelings were relatively low in alienation (44% low in alienation eight per cent high) (see Table 6-17). Those who were high in anti-French attitudes were relatively more alienated (17% low in alienation, 25% high). For the politically alienated the French may be the scape-

TABLE 6-17

ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES AND ALIENATION

Anti-French Attitudes	N	Alienation			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	50	44.0%	48.0%	8.0%	100%
Medium	271	27.3	55.7	17.0	100
High	300	16.7	58.0	25.3	100
Total	621	146	349	126	

$\chi^2 = 26.29948$ with 4.d.f. significant at .001 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .2736 significant at .001 level

goat, as the Jews were to Germans or as Communists were to McCarthyites.

Anti-French feelings are also positively related to Laissez-faire attitudes. Of those who are low in anti-French attitudes, 18% are low in laissez-faire attitudes also and eight per cent are high (see Table 6-18). However, of those who are high in anti-French atti-

TABLE 6-18

ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Anti-French Attitudes	N	Alienation			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	50	18.0%	74.0%	8.0%	100%
Medium	271	12.9	72.3	14.8	100
High	300	10.0	63.3	26.7	100
Total	621	74	423	124	

$\chi^2 = 18.67984$ with 4.d.f. significant at .001 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1938 significant at .001 level

tudes, 10% are low and 27% high in economic liberalism.

Since the most successful (in terms of position and income) are those likely to be high in laissez-faire attitudes and since the French,

by and large, not only have not been 'successful' by such standards but may also be suspected of not subscribing to the values of the capitalistic free market system, it is not surprising that those who do believe in these values are not sympathetic towards the French.

Likewise there is a relationship between nineteenth century liberalism and anti-French attitudes. This is partly to be expected since one item was part of both the nineteenth century liberal and the laissez-faire scales. Of those low in anti-French feelings, 34% were high on the nineteenth century liberalism scale compared with six per cent high (see Table 6-19). Of those highly anti-French, 22% were low and 16% high in nineteenth century liberalism.

TABLE 6-19

ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES AND NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERALISM

Anti-French Attitudes	N	Nineteenth Century Liberalism			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	50	34.0%	60.0%	6.0%	100%
Medium	271	29.8	57.9	13.3	100
High	300	22.3	62.0	15.7	100
Total	621	74	423	124	

$\chi^2 = 6.96961$ with 4.d.f. significant at .20 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1567 significant at .001 level

There is a slight relationship between anti-French attitudes and passive political participation. Those who are highly anti-French vote more frequently than those who are low on this variable (see Table 6-20). It is difficult to find an explanation for the correlation between anti-French sentiments and a high voting turnout, unless both are a product

TABLE 6-20

ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Anti-French Attitudes	N	Voting Frequency			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	50	4.0%	8.0%	88.0%	100%
Medium	271	4.1	8.9	87.1	100
High	300	1.7	4.7	93.7	100
Total	621				

$$\chi^2 = 7.57263 \text{ with 4.d.f.}$$

significant at .20 level

$$\text{Pearson Correlation Coefficient} = .1079$$

significant at .004 level

of a socialization which requires conformity to middle class norms and sentiments. Although Stouffer¹⁸ found opinion leaders to be more tolerant of communists etc., there is no significant relationship between active participation and anti-French feelings and we cannot say that our active participants in the political participation are less anti-French.

Nor is there any significant relationship between anti-French attitudes and attitudes of intolerance to non-conformity. Table 6-21 shows that those who are highly anti-French are slightly more likely to

TABLE 6-21

ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES AND INTOLERANCE

Anti-French Attitudes	N	Intolerance			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	50	68.0%	26.0%	6.0%	100%
Medium	271	57.6	36.5	5.9	100
High	300	53.3	36.7	10.0	100
Total	621	350	222	49	

$$\chi^2 = 6.47937 \text{ with 4.d.f.}$$

significant at .20 level

$$\text{Pearson Correlation Coefficient} = .0923$$

significant at .011 level

be high in intolerance but not to any significant degree. It is, therefore, concluded that intolerance of French aspirations is to the Western Canadian businessman totally separate from the tolerance with which he regards other groups.

Summary

The main conclusion from the analysis of the anti-French variable is that anti-French attitudes are widely held, cutting across divisions of income, age, education, sex, ethnic origin and socialization. There is a slight tendency for Catholics to be less anti-French than the average and for downward mobiles to be more anti-French.

Both federal and municipal government employees tend to be more anti-French than employees of other organizations. Executives tend to be more anti-French than lower levels in the hierarchy and those employed in functions which do not require extensive human-relations are more anti-French than those employed in roles where progress is not likely to be impeded by the expression of anti-French attitudes. French attitudes were not related to job satisfaction or any other job variables.

The only independent variable which relates highly to anti-French attitudes is political affiliation; Liberals being noticeably more sympathetic towards the French than the Conservatives. Those holding highly anti-French attitudes also tended to be more highly alienated, to be slightly more intolerant, to vote more frequently and to hold more strongly laissez-faire and nineteenth century liberal economic and political attitudes.

References - Chapter VI

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2. Dawson and Prewitt, op.cit., p. 185.
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5. Ibid., p. 84.
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8. Ibid., pp. 92-3.
9. Ibid., p. 92.
10. Boyd, op.cit., p. 5.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
14. Robinson, et.al., op.cit., p.53.
15. Boyd, op.cit., Table 4.
16. Ibid., p. 5.
17. Lenski, "Status Crystalization," op.cit.
18. Stouffer, op.cit., Chapter 2.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL WELFARE

Introduction

It has long been apparent that "liberalism" is not a cohesive or unified attitude but that those who express liberal attitudes on some subjects will display illiberal or intolerant attitudes on another.

Lipset¹ and others² have shown that the lower social strata are more likely to have liberal ideas towards welfare and economics and to have less liberal attitudes towards civil liberties compared with the upper strata who show a reversed pattern. The attitudes of tolerance towards non-conformists in this sample have already been examined (see Chapter V), however liberal attitudes to non-conformity were not at all related to liberal attitudes towards the French, indicating that already we are measuring two different aspects of liberalism. Kelly and Chambliss measure liberal attitudes on four scales; civil liberties, foreign policy, welfare and civil rights, and found that:

Although liberalism on one dimension is related to liberalism on the other dimensions, it certainly cannot be predicted from it. It is especially clear that a person's liberalism on civil rights and civil liberties cannot be predicted at all well from his liberalism on welfare issues.³

In the present study we have gone one step further than Kelly and Chambliss in that we have divided the scale measuring economic attitudes into two scales, one measuring attitudes towards social welfare measures (welfare) and one measuring attitudes towards government interference and the place of unions in the economy (laissez-faire liberalism). As a further corollary to this scale is a scale to measure nineteenth

century liberalism (opposition to both big business and labour unions) which has been found to be an important variable in other studies on political attitudes. The purpose of this chapter is to examine attitudes towards welfare.

The Welfare Scale

The welfare scale attempts to measure attitudes to the desirability of welfare and government aid, rather than government or union interference with private enterprise. Liberal attitudes to social welfare appear to be a different aspect of liberalism more akin to community mindedness and not necessarily opposition to liberal laissez-faire attitudes. The items measured attitudes to government intervention in matters of medical care, unemployment, education and housing.

Review of the Literature

In a middle class sample we would not expect much support for welfare or variation in attitudes between the various sub-groups. Previous studies already cited⁴ have concluded that the middle classes support civil liberties but are not prepared to support economic liberalism. Once again socio-economic status, no matter now measured, appears to be the best predictor of attitudes towards welfare than any other factor.

However, previous studies have usually taken one variable "economic liberalism" or "welfare" covering both attitudes towards government activities which provide welfare services to all members of the community and activities which limit the freedom of private enterprise by regulation, legislation or provisions for union representation.

In this study these two aspects of economic liberalism were treated separately so as to be more in keeping with sociological conditions in Canada where these two attitudes are not totally congruent although there is some overlap.

Thus, it is very difficult to make predictions of findings by examining results using "welfare" as part of a joint scale. Even when the scale is divided it would be logical to suppose that those with lower socio-economic status would be more likely to favour welfare measures. Because of the homogeneous nature of this sample results should show little effects of status since a group of white collar workers, even those whose income or education might not meet middle class standards, identify with or aspire to, middle class status.

Age has been found to influence many aspects of liberalism in the United States. The old have tended to regard poverty as due to lack of individual effort rather than to social and economic circumstances.⁵ It can, therefore, be predicted that the older the individual the less likely he would be to hold favourable attitudes to welfare schemes, except those for old age pensions and other benefits accruing primarily to old people. Women, on the other hand, would be expected to be more likely to hold favourable attitudes. Hero states that women in the United States have been:

. . . more favourably disposed towards such programs as aid to dependent children, unemployment assistance, old age benefits, medicare, anti-poverty programs, and 'relief' generally.⁶

Lenski's work on status crystalization would seem to indicate that where ethnic origin gives an individual "inferior" status compared with his occupation, income, and education, that individual is likely to be

more liberal and a greater supporter of social welfare than those whose ethnic background does not produce cross pressures.⁷ We could also apply findings on cross pressures and apply them to other measures of mobility - geographical, educational or occupational. In considering geographic and occupational mobility the conservatism of farmers and rural dwellers should be noted; we should expect these groups to be less liberal on this aspect.

In his book, The Religion Factor, Lenski found the mean percentage of White Middle Class Protestants and Catholics on three surveys taken in 1952, 1957 and 1958.⁸ The questions dealt with support of government powers in unemployment, education, social security, price controls and medical care. On questions very similar to the ones used in the present study, Lenski found 39% of the Protestants and 58% of the Catholics held attitudes consistent with the welfare state philosophy. We would consequently expect Catholics to be more liberal than Protestants.

Very little empirical research has been done in Canada on the attitudes of Canadians to the welfare measures of the government. Mildred Schwartz, in her study of Gallup and newspaper polls however, found widespread approval among the population at large for government participation in social welfare.⁹ Nor is this approval new. In 1943, 65% of one sample were found to be willing to pay five cents in every dollar to guarantee every Canadian enough to live on if he were out of a job.¹⁰ As far back as 1944, 80% of respondents were willing to pay a small part of their income to a government-sponsored national health plan.¹¹ Support for family allowances increased from their introduction until, in 1955, 90% of a sample thought that generally speaking they

were a good thing.¹² Approval for non-contributory old-age pensions is also fairly uniform.¹³

Because of the limitations of the Gallup data for such purposes, Mildred Schwartz was not able to make detailed analyses of differences of opinion related to origin and regions. She did, however, comment on "the surprising lack of differentiation in opinions between social class levels."¹⁴

Results

Total Sample

Relative to the United States findings, in total the sample held highly favourable attitudes towards government welfare (see Table 7-1).

TABLE 7-1

ATTITUDES TO GOVERNMENT WELFARE PROGRAMS

Favourable attitudes to welfare	N	%	cum %
Low	24	3.9	3.9
Medium	280	45.1	49.0
High	317	51.0	100.0
Total	621	100.0	

Over half the sample, 51%, held attitudes which could be classified as high in support of welfare. There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly, it can be explained as a cultural difference between Canada and the United States. As Lipset noted, Canadians have different ideas of the role and scope of the government.¹⁵ Lenski also pointed out that middle class liberalism has a certain amount of altruism in that the middle class are concerned more for the good of all rather than

personal benefit.¹⁶ Perhaps in Canada these attitudes are carried into government welfare. This overall favourable attitude to social welfare is consistent with the attitudes found by Mildred Schwartz, which were not closely related to social class.¹⁷

A second explanation could be that Canadians are no different from Americans but that the scale measures this aspect of economic liberalism differently from others. As Cambell et.al. point out, attitudes may be different if the question of increasing taxes to pay for such schemes were broached.¹⁸ Almost all other scales on liberalism have not only measured attitudes to welfare programs, they have also included government control of private enterprise. It appears quite likely that a respondent who favours welfare measures for the poor and underprivileged may be very much opposed to any measure which limited the scope within which private enterprise operated. Perhaps even Americans are not as opposed to welfare measures as "mixed" scales would indicate.

There are some quite large and noticeable differences in response to the various items in the scale. There is overwhelming support for educational help to the poor (item 3) and three quarters of the sample think that the government should help with low cost housing (item 4) (see Table 7-2). Proportionately less, though still more than half the sample, think that the government should be involved in finding jobs for the unemployed or providing low cost medical treatment for all.

The responses to the individual items may, perhaps, be in part the result of self interest. As upwardly mobile middle class they are probably concerned both with the cost of their own education and the

TABLE 7-2

RESPONSES TO INDIVIDUAL ITEMS--WELFARE SCALE

Item	Question	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree
1.	The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost.	68.1%	4.8%	37.1%
2.	The government in Ottawa ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job.	67.6	6.0	34.5
3.	The government ought to have special programs so that children from poor families receive help to get as much education as possible.	92.3	3.2	4.5
4.	The government ought to see that the poor get good housing at low cost.	73.6	5.6	20.7

cost of their children's education in the future. They may also have had housing problems but they are not as likely to have been unemployed and probably have good personal insurance in case of sickness.

Demographic Variables and Attitudes to Welfare Measures

(i) Introduction

Demographic characteristics determine past socialization, the socialization of youth usually fixes party preference and often other attitudes also. The purpose of this section is to discover what independent variables, such as age, education, geographic socialization, etc., determine attitudes to welfare; with, in this case, class being held constant.

(ii) The Variables

Within a homogeneous sample with "social" class held relatively constant, we would expect the relationship between income, education and occupation to be slight or to disappear altogether. These effects can

be noted in relation to both education and income. With education the relationship does not disappear entirely; of those with junior high school education, 56% are classified high in support of government welfare compared with 48% of those with some college and 44% of graduates (see Table 7-3). The difference, though slight, is in the

TABLE 7-3

EDUCATION AND WELFARE

Level of Education	Support of Welfare Measures				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Junior High	73	4.1%	39.7%	56.2%	100%	2.521
Senior High	238	3.8	41.2	55.0	100	2.513
Technical Institute	44	2.3	47.7	50.0	100	2.477
Some College	128	4.7	46.9	48.4	100	2.437
College Graduates	135	3.7	51.9	44.4	100	2.407
Total	618					

predicted direction. With income, however, the relationship disappears altogether, the two middle groups being more favourable towards welfare schemes than either the lowest (under \$7,500) income group, or the highest (over \$12,500) income group (see Table 7-4). This may be explained by the under \$7,500 group being young and identifying with the attitudes of those at the top of the material hierarchy.

A further surprise is that, with class held constant, it is the old rather than the young who most favour government welfare (see Table 7-5). Of those over 40, 62% were classified as high in support of government welfare, whereas only 50% of those 36-40, 49% of those 21-30 and 44% of those 31-35 were high in support of such schemes. Perhaps those over 40 remember times before such schemes made living easier.

TABLE 7-4
INCOME AND WELFARE

Income	Support of Welfare Measures				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Under \$7,500	145	6.2%	45.5%	48.3%	100%	2.421
\$7,501-\$10,000	200	3.0	43.0	54.0	100	2.510
\$10,001-\$12,500	132	3.0	43.2	53.8	100	2.508
\$12,501 and over	144	3.5	59.3	47.2	100	2.437
Total	621					

TABLE 7-5
AGE AND WELFARE

Age	Support of Welfare Measures				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
21-30	226	4.4%	49.6%	48.7%	100%	2.442
31-35	140	3.6	52.9	43.6	100	2.40
36-40	96	5.2	44.8	50.0	100	2.448
Over 40	159	2.5	35.8	61.6	100	2.591
Total	621					

Women, as predicted, are more sympathetic to welfare schemes than men (see Table 7-6). Sixty per cent of women are high in support of

TABLE 7-6
SEX AND WELFARE

Sex	Support of Welfare Measures				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Male	569	3.9%	45.9%	50.3%	100%	2.464
Female	52	3.8	36.5	59.6	100	2.558
Total	621					

government welfare compared with 50% of the men. Although more conservative in other ways, women are more sympathetic to the underdog,

hence more liberal in their acceptance of welfare schemes.

Ethnic origin also appears to influence attitudes to welfare (see Table 7-7); 65% of Ukrainians are classified high in support,

TABLE 7-7

ETHNIC ORIGIN AND WELFARE

Ethnic Origin of Father	N	Support of Welfare Measures			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
British	289	4.2%	47.4%	48.4%	100%	2.443
German	69	1.4	50.7	47.8	100	2.464
Ukrainian	61	4.9	31.1	63.9	100	2.590
Total	419					

compared with 48% of those of British and German descent. It is conceivable that Ukrainians regard such measures as means whereby they, as a group, can ultimately achieve parity of social prestige with British, German and Scandinavian groups. This finding tends to confirm Lenski's theory that differences in economic and ethnic status result in more liberal attitudes.¹⁹

A theory of cross pressures on those who are mobile, socially or geographically may lead us to conclude that mobile groups would be less likely to support social welfare measures. Conversely we could hypothesize that those with working class backgrounds would bring with them more liberal attitudes on social welfare.

The results, however, bear out neither of these hypotheses. If we measure social mobility by comparing the education of the respondents with their fathers, we find some slight support for Lenski's "status-crystalization" theory.²⁰ Of those who have a stable social status, 55% are high in support of social welfare compared with 51% of the downward

mobile and 50% of the upward mobile (see Table 7-8). When occupation

TABLE 7-8

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND WELFARE

Education of father compared with respondent	N	Support of Welfare Measures			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Greater (downward mobile)	157	2.5%	46.5%	51.0%	100%	2.484
Equal (stable)	73	5.5	59.7	54.8	100	2.493
Less (upward mobile)	391	4.1	45.5	50.4	100	2.463
Total	621					

of father is considered we may expect those whose fathers were professionals or managers to be more status consistent than the other groups. Examination of the mean scores of each group (see Table 7-9) does show

TABLE 7-9

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF CHILDHOOD AND WELFARE

Father's occupation during childhood	N	Support of Welfare Measures			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Labourer	111	2.7%	44.1%	53.2%	100%	2.505
Middle Income	196	5.6	43.9	50.5	100	2.449
Prof. & Managerial	138	1.4	46.4	52.2	100	2.507
Farmer	176	4.5	46.0	49.4	100	4.449
Total	621					

that this group is highest in its support of social welfare. However, the next highest (and very close indeed) in support for welfare are those whose fathers were labourers and thus, supposedly, the most status inconsistent. There is no overall difference in support between those whose fathers fell into the middle income category or those whose

fathers were farmers. From these results we cannot dismiss either theory.

Examination of the geographic mobility of the sample also sheds no light on the theory of cross pressures since those from small cities and towns are noticeably more likely to support social welfare measures than either those who are from big cities or those from rural areas (see Table 7-10).

TABLE 7-10

GEOGRAPHIC SOCIALIZATION AND WELFARE

Place of residence up to 15 years old	Support of Welfare Measures					Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total	
Large City	233	3.9%	48.1%	48.1%	100%	2.442
Small City	87	2.3	44.8	52.9	100	2.506
Small Town	133	4.5	38.3	57.1	100	2.526
Rural	164	4.3	47.0	48.0	100	2.445
Total	617					

The relationship between religion and attitudes to social welfare is, however, in the predicted direction. Whereas 45% of Protestants were classified high in support of welfare measures, 60% of Catholics fell into this category (see Table 7-11). These results are almost

TABLE 7-11

RELIGION AND WELFARE

Religion	Support of Welfare Measures					Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total	
Protestant	410	4.4%	50.5%	45.1%	100%	2.407
Catholics	114	2.6	37.7	59.6	100	2.570
Total	524					
United	225	5.3	50.2	44.4	100	2.391
Anglican	88	2.3	47.7	50.0	100	2.477

exactly the same as those obtained by Lenski as an overall index of attitudes towards the welfare state.²¹

Church attendance seems to make very little difference to welfare attitudes, those who attend church having more humanitarian ideals do, as Lenski points out, tend to support welfare measures more than those who do not attend²² (see Table 7-12). Those who attend 'often' however, are more liberal on this dimension than those who attend regularly.

TABLE 7-12

CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND WELFARE

Frequency of Attendance	Support of Welfare Measures				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
No attendance	81	7.4%	40.7%	51.9%	100%	2.444
Seldom	290	3.8	46.9	49.3	100	2.455
Often	117	1.7	43.6	54.7	100	2.530
Regularly	131	3.8	45.8	50.4	100	4.466
Total	619					

Organizational Variables

(i) Introduction

It is the intention of this section to examine the relationships of job and organization variables to find out if these variables inhibit or change the influence of demographic factors on welfare attitudes. Does job satisfaction or a high position in the hierarchy make one more impatient or more sympathetic towards those who have not done as well for themselves? Does working with people in personnel or marketing make one more liberal in outlook compared with those whose work is totally encompassed by the organization such as production or accounting? Job variables are considered as independent variables and social welfare

attitudes as the dependent variable in this section.

(ii) The Variables

The first variable to be considered is the type of organization worked for. We have hypothesized that those who work for government would be more liberal on this dimension than those who work for private industry. This proves to be true but the difference is very small indeed. The mean score of those in private industry being 2.466 compared with 2.49 for those who work for a branch of government (see Table 7-13). However, there are big differences between those who work for

TABLE 7-13

BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND WELFARE

Type of Organization	N	Support of Welfare Measures			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Big Business	248	5.2%	51.2%	43.5%	100%	2.383
Small Business	144	2.1	41.0	56.9	100	2.549
All Business	564	4.3	44.8	50.9	100	2.466
Government	157	2.5	45.9	51.6	100	2.490

branch plants of big businesses and those who work for locally owned companies; 57% of the latter are high in support for social welfare compared with 44% of the former. This is unexpected since we may have expected those working in smaller, less hierarchical concerns to be less bureaucratic and more committed ideologically to individual responsibility.

Support for social welfare is pretty uniform throughout the levels in the hierarchy, although there is a tendency towards greater support at the foreman/clerical supervisor level (see Table 7-14). Since the sample is so homogeneous, the attitudes shown in Table 7-14 cannot be compared with those held by blue collar or unskilled workers. There was

TABLE 7-14

POSITION IN HIERARCHY AND WELFARE

Level in the Hierarchy	Support of Welfare Measures					Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total	
Executive	55	7.3%	41.8%	50.9%	100%	2.436
Department Head	211	2.8	50.7	46.4	100	2.430
Staff	261	5.0	42.5	52.5	100	2.475
Foreman/Cler.Sup.	93	1.1	41.9	57.0	100	2.559
Total	620					

no relationship between support for social welfare and number of pro-
motions.

The relationship between function in the hierarchy and support
for social welfare is in the opposite direction from that predicted by
the hypothesis that those with more dealings with people would be more
liberal than those "locked-inside" the organization. In this case those
in Production (53% high) and Research and Development (54% high) are the
most liberal (see Table 7-15). The least liberal are Purchasing (41%

TABLE 7-15

FUNCTION AND WELFARE

Function in the Organization	Support of Welfare Measures					Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total	
Production	74	1.4%	45.9%	52.7%	100%	2.514
Marketing	161	3.7	44.7	51.6	100	2.478
Acc.and Finance	196	5.1	43.4	51.5	100	2.464
Research and Dev.	69	2.9	43.5	53.6	100	2.507
Purchasing	27	3.7	55.6	40.7	100	2.370
Personnel	54	7.4	46.3	46.3	100	2.389
Total	581					

high) and Personnel (46% high). Marketing and Accounting and Finance,
both with 52% classified high, fall in between. It would seem that

attitudes towards social welfare are more a function of education (those in production and research and development being the most well educated) than with dealing with the public on the job

On the whole attitudes towards social welfare seem little influenced by job variables such as role definition, job uncertainty, group cohesion, and job change, etc. The relationship between job satisfaction and attitudes toward social welfare is in the direction predicted. Those more satisfied with their jobs give less support to social welfare. Of those low in job satisfaction, 72% were high in social welfare compared with the 56% of those medium in satisfaction who scored high, and 46% of those high in job satisfaction (see Table 7-16). It might seem reasonable to assume that greater job satisfaction makes one less sympathetic for those less able.

TABLE 7-16

JOB SATISFACTION AND WELFARE

Job Satisfaction	Support of Welfare Measures				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	25	8.0%	20.0%	72.0%	100%
Medium	332	4.2	42.5	55.8	100
High	264	3.0	50.8	46.2	100
Total	621	24	280	317	

$\chi^2 = 11.25807$ with 4.d.f. significant at .05 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = $-.0851$ significant at .017 level

There was also a slight positive relationship between job routine and welfare attitudes though this was not statistically significant; those whose jobs being more routine tending to give more support to social welfare programs. This finding corroborates the findings of the

relationship between this variable and job satisfaction.

Political Variables

(i) Introduction

In the last section it was found that job variables had little influence on liberal attitudes towards welfare. In this section the relationship between this aspect of liberalism (as the independent variable) and other political variables, including the other dimensions of liberalism (dependent variables) will be examined. The purpose is to show how this variable relates to other aspects of liberalism, with participation and political affiliation to give a profile of the middle class in Western Canada.

(ii) The Variables

In overall support for social welfare (as measured by the mean) supporters of the Liberal Party were the most liberal on social welfare, followed by Independents, Social Crediters and Conservatives in order of decreasing liberality (see Table 7-17). However, the differences

TABLE 7-17

POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND WELFARE

Political Affiliation	Support of Welfare Measures				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Independent	58	3.4%	43.1%	53.4%	100%	2.500
Liberal	201	2.5	42.3	55.2	100	2.527
Conservative	228	4.4	52.6	43.0	100	2.386
Social Credit	61	6.6	37.7	55.7	100	2.492
Total	588					

were not great and surprisingly it was among those who supported Social Credit that the highest percentage classified high in support for social

welfare was found.

No relationship was found between attitudes towards social welfare and active participation or anti-French attitudes, but statistically significant relationships were found with all the other political variables.

Of those who are low in support of social welfare, four per cent are low in support of laissez-faire liberalism compared with 14% of those who are high in support of social welfare. On the other hand 33% of the former group are high in laissez-faire attitudes compared with only 16% of the latter (see Table 7-18). In this case job satisfaction

TABLE 7-18
WELFARE AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE LIBERALISM

Welfare	N	Laissez-faire Liberalism			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	24	4.2%	62.5%	33.3%	100%
Medium	280	10.0	66.8	23.2	100
High	317	14.2	69.7	16.1	100
Total	621	74	423	124	

$\chi^2 = 9.77185$ with 4.d.f.	significant at .05 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient	significant at .001 level

may be proposed as an intervening variable, those high in job satisfaction giving more support than other groups to laissez-faire liberalism but less support to social welfare programs. It would normally be expected that those who support unfettered free enterprise would also tend to be against government activity in welfare schemes.

There is a smaller positive relationship between attitudes on social welfare and nineteenth century liberalism (see Table 7-19).

TABLE 7-20

WELFARE AND INTOLERANCE

Welfare	Intolerance				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	24	50.0%	25.0%	25.0%	100%
Medium	280	56.1	35.7	8.2	100
High	317	57.1	36.6	6.3	100
Total	621	350	220	49	

$\chi^2 = 10.99171$ with 4.d.f. significant at .05 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = -0.0783 significant at .026 level

ship between welfare and nineteenth century liberalism is also seen in the relationship between welfare and alienation (see Table 7-21). Those who score medium on the welfare scale tend to be less alienated than

TABLE 7-21

WELFARE AND ALIENATION

Welfare	Alienation			Total
	N	Low	Medium	
Low	24	37.5%	37.5%	100%
Medium	280	26.8	59.6	100
High	317	19.6	54.6	100
Total	621	146	349	126

$\chi^2 = 18.96626$ with 4.d.f. significant at .001 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = 0.1484 significant at .001 level

either those who scored high or low. Those who scored low on social welfare seem to be divided into a large group who are low in alienation (38%) and those who are highly alienated (25%). Those low in alienation are likely to be the highly successful with high job satisfaction, those who are high in alienation could be the nineteenth century liberals. It

is harder to explain why those who score high should be so highly alienated. Perhaps those less satisfied with their jobs want to become alienated from both the economic and political systems and would prefer a welfare state for support.

The higher alienation among the groups which are either high or low in their support of social welfare is reflected in their voting patterns (see Table 7-22). Those who score medium on the social welfare scale vote slightly more than the other two groups.

TABLE 7-22
WELFARE AND VOTING FREQUENCY

Welfare	Voting Frequency				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	24	8.3%	4.2%	87.5%	100%
Medium	280	1.1	7.5	91.4	100
High	317	4.1	6.3	89.6	100
Total	621	18	42	561	

$\chi^2 = 7.89018$ with 4.d.f. significant at .10 level
Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .0709 significant at .039 level

Summary

The sample shows an unexpectedly uniform support of social welfare measures which can be judged mainly as altruism or community consciousness rather than self interest. Support for social welfare tends to increase with higher education and age. Women tend to give greater support than do men, Catholics more than Protestants and Ukrainians more than other ethnic groups. No relationship was found between support of social welfare and income, social mobility, geographic socialization,

socio-economic status of childhood, or church attendance.

Little relationship was found between organizational variables, type of organization, position in organization, and function in organization with support for social welfare when education was controlled. Those low in job satisfaction, however, were distinctly more likely to support government welfare.

Support for social welfare was also linked to other aspects of liberalism, though the relationship was not always straightforward. There was a not unexpected negative relationship with laissez-faire attitudes. Those who scored either high or low on the welfare scale tended to be more alienated, more likely to hold nineteenth century liberal attitudes, and slightly less likely to vote than those who had a moderate attitude towards government welfare. Those low in support of social welfare tended to be more intolerant than the other groups.

References - Chapter VII

1. Lipset, Political Man, op.cit., pp. 95-130.
2. Kelly and Chambliss, op.cit., p. 380.
3. Ibid., p. 379.
4. Lipset, op.cit.; Kelly and Chambliss, op.cit.
5. For summary see: Robinson, et.al., op.cit., p. 52.
6. Ibid., p. 53.
7. Lenski, "Status Crystalization," op.cit.
8. Lenski, The Religious Factor, op.cit., pp. 135-142.
9. Schwartz, op.cit., pp. 98-101.
10. Ibid., p. 99.
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12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 100.
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15. Lipset, The First New Nation, op.cit., p. 309.
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17. Schwartz, op.cit.
18. Cambell, Angus; Converse, Philip E.; Miller, Warren E.; and Stokes, Donald E. The American Voter. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960.
19. Lenski, "Status Crystalization," op.cit.
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22. Ibid., p. 185.
23. Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII

LAISSEZ-FAIRE LIBERALISM

Introduction

Another side of the spectrum of liberalism is the economic liberalism of private enterprise. This is the attitude towards the interference of government in the affairs of the enterprises of the country. Those who hold laissez-faire attitudes believe, to some extent, in Adam Smith's invisible hand, that left to itself private enterprise in seeking its own profit will result in public benefit for all, that the government's job is to ensure an environment, law, financial and banking institutions etc. which will give private enterprise the freedom in which it may grow. In other words, the less government the better. This is the attitude which believes in the free market and private enterprise.

It was once considered "liberal" to hold such attitudes. In the second half of the twentieth century however, these attitudes have become conservative. The post-Keynesian liberal no longer believes that an unregulated economy leads to full employment or that private profit necessarily results in anything beyond private profit. Government has attempted to deal with the deficiencies of a free-enterprise capitalistic system by, among other things, permitting the growth of strong unions and nationalizing or regulating natural monopolies such as communications and utilities. It is this aspect of liberalism which is dealt with in this chapter. What limits should be placed on the freedom of private enterprise?

The Laissez-faire Scale

This scale attempts to measure attitudes to the desirability of government interference with the free market economy, limiting the freedom of private enterprise. It should be noted that this aspect of liberalism is not directly related to government action in other spheres, providing education, housing and medical care. Those who believe that the government should provide education for all may believe fervently that the government has no business owning an oil company.

Review of the Literature

The review of past literature must again be kept in general terms as explained in the last chapter, since more specific studies have used this variable not separately but in conjunction with attitudes on government welfare schemes. In Western Canada, the individual who asserts the right of private enterprise to do what it wants in a free market may also support government education and housing programs. Nevertheless, on the whole we might expect in relating laissez-faire attitudes with other variables, that in general a similar pattern might emerge with the findings on the welfare variable.

Briefly, without re-citing the evidence we would expect the highest socio-economic groups, measured by education, income or position in the hierarchy to be most likely to hold forth for laissez-faire values by which they have prospered, whereas those who have not done so well may not be such enthusiastic supporters of capitalism.¹ We would expect the older groups to be more conservative and, therefore, more likely to subscribe to nineteenth century liberalism and conservative attitudes.² Women have been shown to be more conservative and more

likely to hold laissez-faire attitudes than men.³

Those who are subject to cross pressures because of ethnic origin would be expected to be more liberal and less likely to hold laissez-faire attitudes than those not subject to such pressures.⁴ The same theory of cross pressures would lead to the hypothesis that those who are most mobile, geographically, occupationally and educationally, would be less likely to support these laissez-faire values.⁵ However, this does not seem rational because it is just as likely for upward mobiles to accept the system that makes them better off than their parents as it is for the downward mobiles to reject it. Moreover, the factors in geographic mobility are more complicated, those who come from rural areas being more conservative are even more likely to support economic liberalism than those from the cities.

In Lenski's 1958 survey, respondents were asked if they thought the government was doing too much, about right, or not enough in social welfare.⁶ If the respondent answered that the government was not doing sufficient he was then asked if he would like to see the government go as far as nationalization of railroads or the steel industry. Only one per cent of all the Protestants in the sample were either in favour of or uncertain about such a step, compared with seven per cent of Catholics. Although the percentages are small, Catholics may be expected to be less likely to hold laissez-faire attitudes.

It is also hypothesized that this variable will be more strongly related to occupational variables than any other since it is most directly related. Those being the most successful and the most satisfied are likely to hold laissez-faire attitudes.⁷ Those who work for private industry, especially in small unbureaucratized companies are more likely

to hold individualistic laissez-faire attitudes than those who work for government.

It is also likely that attitudes towards the role of free enterprise in society are related to other aspects of liberalism. In Chapter VII, it was noted that Canadians in general were more liberal in their expectations of government measures than United States samples have shown Americans to be. It was also shown that this sample was relatively high in support of government welfare.

Mildred Schwartz' survey of Gallup and other polls also shows that Canadians are less opposed to government ownership of specific industries and resources (railways, banks, telephones, iron and steel, farm implements and meat packers).⁸ Between 1943 and 1957 usually about one-third of those surveyed were in favour.⁹ In Lenski's United States survey in 1958, by contrast, only seven per cent said they would like to see the government run the big industries.¹⁰

In the same study, Mildred Schwartz also showed considerable feeling that government intervention was needed to ensure sufficient employment opportunities.¹¹ Such attitudes were most often held by C.C.F. (N.D.P.) supporters, residents of Quebec, and those at a low socio-economic level.¹² Generally however, there has been no concern about 'creeping socialism' in Canada.¹³ In a survey in 1961, respondents were asked which they would choose if the main issue at the next election were free enterprise versus socialism; 52% chose free enterprise, eight per cent socialism and 40% could not say. Westerners and farmers were slightly more likely than others to choose socialism.¹⁴

From these findings it may be expected that the ideological

commitment to free enterprise found in United States studies may be absent, even among middle class white collar workers, in a Canadian study.

Results

Total Sample

Most of the sample (68%) held moderate attitudes (classified as medium on the scale) towards the amount of government interference in the economy and 12% were low in laissez-faire attitudes. This gave a total of 80% of the sample who recognized and accepted the right of government and unions to limit the power of private enterprise (see Table 8-1). Only 20% of the sample held the views which would not have

TABLE 8-1

LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Laissez-faire Attitudes	N	%	Cum %
Low	74	11.9	11.9
Medium	423	68.1	80.0
High	124	20.0	100.0
Total	621	100.0	

been questioned by a nineteenth century businessman. A remarkable and overwhelming acceptance of post-Keynesian Liberalism.

However, when the scale is broken down into items, the lack of laissez-faire attitudes does not look quite so convincing. Interestingly, although more than two-thirds (68%) believe that unions do the country more harm than good, an equal number (69%) do not think that Canada would be better off with no unions at all (see Table 8-2). Apparently, what-

TABLE 8-2

RESPONSE TO ITEMS IN LAISSEZ-FAIRE SCALE

Item	Question	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree
1.	Do you agree or disagree that the way they are run now, labor unions do this country more harm than good?	68.4%	9.7%	21.9%
2.	The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle	44.6	9.3	46.1
3.	We need more government controls over business practices and profits.	33.7	7.7	58.6
4.	Canada would be better off without any labor unions at all.	21.5	9.2	69.2

ever faults they see in unions, management is not prepared to say that Canada would be better off without them. The sample splits almost evenly on item 2, 47% agreeing that the government should not be in areas such as utilities and housing but 46% supporting the government's right to provide these goods and services. Far less however, 34%, are prepared to agree that the government should have more control over business practices and profits. In some respects, considering the nature of the sample, it is remarkable that one-third should agree to such a proposition.

Demographic Variables and Laissez-faire Attitudes

(i) Introduction

Compared with attitudes to social welfare which were found (not surprisingly) to be almost totally uncorrelated with job variables, we would expect attitudes which are of direct concern to promotions, advancement and upward mobility to be more highly related to job

variables. This is not to say that past socialization and socio-economic status will not have influence on attitudes towards the place of private enterprise in the total community. We should, for example, expect those with a working-class background to place more value on the union than say those whose fathers were farmers, and thus they should score less highly in laissez-faire liberalism. On the other hand, since socio-economic status is held approximately constant we may find that the upward mobile have abandoned the old ideas in favour of those ideas more consistent with the status they now hold. Examination of demographic variables in relation to the scale of laissez-faire attitudes will help to answer such questions.

(ii) The Variables

Even when class is largely controlled there is still a consistent relationship in the predicted relationship between income and laissez-faire attitudes, the higher the income the greater the percentage who subscribe to the values of free enterprise which have resulted in success for them (see Table 8-3). Almost twice as many of those with

TABLE 8-3

INCOME AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Income	Laissez-faire				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Under 7,500	145	13.1%	71.0%	15.9%	100%	2.028
7,501-10,000	200	15.1	68.5	16.0	100	2.005
10,001-12,500	132	12.1	67.4	20.5	100	2.083
Over 12,500	144	5.6	65.3	29.2	100	2.236
Total	621					

incomes over \$12,500 are high in support of laissez-faire attitudes (29%) than those whose incomes are under \$7,500 (16%).

This relationship also holds true for education. The higher the level of education reached the more support for laissez-faire attitudes but the differences are slight (see Table 8-4). Probably from the

TABLE 8-4

EDUCATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Education	N	Laissez-faire			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Junior High	73	12.3%	67.1%	20.5%	100%	2.082
Senior High	238	12.6	72.7	14.7	100	2.021
Technical Institute	44	13.6	65.9	20.5	100	2.068
Some College	128	12.5	62.5	25.0	100	2.125
College Graduates	135	9.6	66.7	23.7	100	2.141
Total	618					

point of view of self interest, as one climbs the educational ladder one is better equipped to compete in a capitalist economy in which the returns to higher education have, until the present time, been large. The fact that graduates are not higher in laissez-faire attitudes may result from exposure to liberal professors or a wider point of view during their higher education.

An interesting and rather unexpected finding is that laissez-faire attitudes, far from increasing with age are actually less strongly held by those over 40 than by any other group (see Table 8-5). It is those who see success just within their grasp, those between the ages of 31 and 35, who are most likely to hold laissez-faire attitudes (24% of this group scored high). By comparison, 22% of the 35-40 age group and 20% of the 21-30 age group held high laissez-faire attitudes, but only 15% of those over 40 (perhaps disillusioned) scored high on this scale.

It was hypothesized that women, being in general more conservative

TABLE 8-5

AGE AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Age	Laissez-faire				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
21-30	226	9.3%	70.4%	20.4%	100%	2.111
31-35	140	11.4	64.3	24.3	100	2.129
36-40	96	14.6	63.5	21.9	100	2.073
Over 40	159	14.5	71.1	14.5	100	2.000
Total	621					

than men, would be more likely to hold laissez-faire attitudes. However, results show no significant difference between the sexes, and the slight difference that does exist is in the opposite direction from that expected (see Table 8-6).

TABLE 8-6

SEX AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Sex	Laissez-faire				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Male	569	11.8%	68.2%	20.0%	100%	2.083
Female	52	13.5	67.3	19.2	100	2.058
Total	621					

Though the differences in laissez-faire attitudes with ethnic origin are small it is those of German origin who are strongest in support of laissez-faire liberalism (see Table 8-7). The Ukrainians, perhaps sensing an ethnic disadvantage in the system, are least likely to support it (18% high and 26% low) and those of British descent are in between (20% high).

Although those upward mobiles of Ukrainian origin are less likely to embrace capitalist values, on the whole those most upward mobile in

TABLE 8-7

ETHNIC ORIGIN AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Ethnic Origin	Laissez-faire					Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total	
British	289	9.7%	70.2%	20.1%	100%	2.104
German	69	10.1	66.7	23.2	100	2.130
Ukrainian	61	26.2	55.7	18.0	100	1.918
Total	419					

the sample are those most likely to hold strong laissez-faire attitudes, (21% high, compared with 20% of those stable and 17% of those downward mobile (see Table 8-8). This suggests that mobility may influence out-

TABLE 8-8

MOBILITY AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Education of father compared with respondent	Laissez-faire					Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High	Total	
Greater (downward mobile)	157	15.3%	67.5%	17.2%	100%	2.019
Equal (stable)	73	11.0	68.5	20.5	100	2.102
Less (upward mobile)	391	10.7	68.3	21.0	100	2.102
Total	621					

look on capitalism so that those who become middle class take on the same attitudes as those who were born into and maintained their status. Only those with a 'slipping' status express a different attitude towards laissez-faire liberalism. Yet since all of the sample is middle class the differences are small and not statistically significant.

This interpretation is corroborated by the results of the relationship between father's occupation and laissez-faire attitudes. Although

there are differences in the percentages who scored high on this scale in comparison with the mean, those whose fathers were in the middle occupations, clerks, skilled and semi-skilled tradesmen, etc., show the greatest acceptance of laissez-faire attitudes (see Table 8-9).

TABLE 8-9

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF CHILDHOOD AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Father's occupation during childhood	N	Laissez-faire attitudes			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Labourer	111	12.6%	71.2%	16.2%	100%	2.036
Middle Occupations	196	9.2	71.4	19.4	100	2.102
Prof. & Managerial	138	12.3	65.9	21.7	100	2.094
Farmers	176	14.2	64.2	21.6	100	2.074
Total	621					

They are followed by those whose fathers were professionals and managers who would not be subject to the same cross pressures as those whose fathers were in the middle income group. Third in overall support for laissez-faire ideals are farmers; those traditional upholders of nineteenth century liberalism, and lastly the most upward mobile whose fathers were labourers. Only this last group shows any variation from the general sample support for laissez-faire liberalism, indicating that perhaps for the most upward mobile past socialization does have a more lasting effect.

A similar interpretation can be given for the relationship between geographical socialization and laissez-faire attitudes. In this case, those from the large city and the rural areas prove to be lower overall in support of laissez-faire attitudes than those from small cities or towns where it might have been expected those from the large

cities and rural traditionalists would be more likely to hold these ideals (see Table 8-10). It may be that the upward mobile not only

TABLE 8-10

SOCIALIZATION AND LAISSEZ FAIRE ATTITUDES

Place of Residence under 15 years	N	Laissez-faire			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Large City	233	12.4%	70.0%	17.6%	100%	2.052
Small City	87	10.3	64.4	25.3	100	2.149
Town	133	8.3	72.2	19.5	100	2.113
Rural	164	15.2	63.4	21.3	100	2.061
Total	617					

take on the attitudes of those they expect to emulate, but improve upon it!

Since the non-interference of government in the economy is such a part of the protestant work ethic, it is not surprising to find a large difference between Catholics and Protestants, even with social class held constant (see Table 8-11). Where 24% of Protestants are high

TABLE 8-11

RELIGION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Religious Denomination	N	Laissez-faire			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Catholic	114	19.3%	68.4%	12.3%	100%	1.930
Protestant	410	8.5	67.8	25.7	100	2.151
Total	524					

in support of laissez-faire liberalism, half as many (12%) of Catholics are so inclined, and 19% of Catholics rate 'low' on the scale compared to nine per cent of Protestants who were low.

However, the relationship between church attendance and laissez-faire attitudes shows a distinct and unexpected dichotomy between those who do not attend or attend only seldom and those who attend regularly or often (see Table 8-12). Where one might expect church attenders to

TABLE 8-12

CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Frequency of Attendance	N	Laissez-faire			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
No church attendance	81	14.8%	61.7%	23.5%	100%	2.086
Seldom	290	10.0	69.3	20.7	100	2.107
Often	117	14.5	65.8	19.7	100	2.051
Regularly	131	12.2	71.0	16.8	100	2.046
Total	619					

have greater expectation of individual effort and less confidence in government and unions, those who attend often are less likely to support uncontrolled capitalism than those who do not attend at all. Part of the explanation for this is that the Catholics tend to attend church more regularly than their Protestant brethren.

Organization Variables and Laissez-faire Attitudes

(i) Introduction

In the introduction to the last section, it was hypothesized that organizational variables would have stronger relationships with this scale which pertains directly to the economic environment of work than to scales which measure attitudes to social welfare. Thus, an individual may hold positive attitudes towards more equitable division of educational and housing resources among classes, but would not support unions or a government policy which may interfere directly in his work.

Some functions or levels in the organization may feel these threats more keenly or more personally. In this section the relationships between job and organizational variables and laissez-faire attitudes will be examined.

(ii) The Variables

Even type of organization worked in makes a distinct difference to laissez-faire attitudes. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that government employees are less likely to subscribe to laissez-faire attitudes than are those who work for private enterprise, and that those who work in large companies will be more liberal in this respect than those who work for locally owned companies. Twenty three per cent of those who worked for private companies scored high on the laissez-faire scale compared with 10% of those who worked for government (see Table 8-13). The difference between branch plant and locally owned

TABLE 8-13

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Type of Organization	N	Laiseez-faire			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Big Business	248	7.3%	69.4%	23.4%	100%	2.161
Small Business	144	9.0	64.6	26.4	100	2.174
All Business	464	9.1	67.9	23.1	100	2.140
Government	157	20.4	68.8	10.8	100	1.904

companies is smaller, 23% of those working in branch plants of national companies scored high compared with 26% of those working for locally owned companies.

The relationship of level in the hierarchy and laissez-faire attitudes is also in the predicted direction; no less than 33% of executive having strong laissez-faire attitudes compared with 22% of

department heads, 16% of staff and 18% of foremen and clerical supervisors (see Table 8-14). At the other end of the scale, four per cent

TABLE 8-14

LEVEL IN HIERARCHY AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Level in Hierarchy	N	Laissez-faire			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Executive	55	3.6%	63.6%	32.7%	100%	2.291
Department Head	211	11.4	66.8	21.8	100	2.104
Staff	261	12.3	71.3	16.3	100	2.042
Foreman/Cler Sup.	93	17.2	64.5	18.3	100	2.011
Total	620					

of executives had low laissez-faire attitudes, a quarter of the number of foremen/clerical supervisors who held those attitudes (17%). However, there was no relationship at all between number of promotions and laissez-faire attitudes.

There were also indications that the function in the organization had some influence on this aspect of liberalism. In overall acceptance the marketing function gave the greatest support to laissez-faire economics, 27% of this group scoring high (see Table 8-15). At the other

TABLE 8-15

FUNCTION IN ORGANIZATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Function	N	Laissez-faire			Total	Mean
		Low	Medium	High		
Production	74	14.9%	64.9%	20.3%	100%	2.054
Marketing	161	9.3	63.4	27.3	100	2.180
Acc. and Finance	196	8.7	72.4	18.9	100	2.102
Research and Dev.	69	11.6	69.6	18.8	100	2.072
Purchasing	27	18.5	59.3	22.2	100	2.037
Personnel	54	13.0	75.9	11.1	100	1.981
Total	571					

end the personnel function gave least support to laissez-faire ideals, 11% of this group scored high. In between in order of increasing laissez-faire came purchasing, production, research and development and accounting and finance functions. These results can be seen as a changing orientation from the free market outlook which the marketing man desires as a suitable environment for his job, to the personnel man who is not concerned with the market at all but rather with the welfare of those who work in his plant. In some functions there is a clustering about the mean, for example accountants and personnel. In others there is a wide spread of attitudes towards laissez-faire economics, for example in purchasing and production.

There is a clear and significant relationship between job satisfaction and laissez-faire attitudes in the predicted direction, that is, those who are satisfied are more likely to subscribe to the system and values of unrestrained free enterprise than those who are not satisfied (see Table 8-16). In this sample, of those who were highly satisfied

TABLE 8-16

JOB SATISFACTION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Job Satisfaction	N	Laissez-faire			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	25	24.0%	64.0%	12.0%	100%
Medium	332	14.5	69.0	16.6	100
High	264	7.6	67.4	25.0	100
Total N	621	74	423	124	

$$\chi^2 = 15.22045 \text{ with 4.d.f.}$$

significant at .01 level

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = 0.1735 significant at .001 level

one quarter (25%) were high in laissez-faire attitudes compared with 12% of those who were low in satisfaction. Conversely, 24% of the latter group are low in laissez-faire attitudes compared with eight per cent of the former group.

Apart from this relationship with satisfaction, laissez-faire attitudes are not clearly related to the work variables of job routine, technological changes, job uncertainty or role definition. There is a trend, which is not statistically significant, showing those who are high in group cohesiveness are more likely to hold strong laissez-faire attitudes (see Table 8-17), showing the influence of the work group on political attitudes. Those in less cohesive groups are more likely to maintain their original attitudes as they are under less social pressure to conform to the free enterprise norm.

TABLE 8-17

GROUP COHESION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES

Group Cohesiveness	N	Laissez-faire			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	65	16.9%	67.7%	15.4%	100%
Medium	337	12.5	69.1	18.4	100
High	219	9.6	66.7	23.7	100
Total N	621	74	423	124	

$\chi^2 = 5.23241$ with 4.d.f.

significant at .3 level

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .0749

significant at .031 level

The Political Variables and Laissez-faire Attitudes

(i) Introduction

The purpose of this section is to relate the laissez-faire aspect of liberalism to the other aspects of liberalism and to other political

variables including party affiliation. The latter is important since party attitude towards government control of the economy and free enterprise is likely to be important for those in this class in choosing a party which will represent their interests.

The conservative party clearly obtains allegiance of many of those who are high in laissez-faire attitudes (see Table 8-18).

TABLE 8-18

LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION

Party	Laissez-faire				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Independent	58	19.0%	67.2%	13.8%	100%	1.962
Social Credit	61	11.5	68.9	19.7	100	2.060
Conservative	228	7.5	67.1	25.4	100	2.134
Liberal	201	13.4	71.1	15.4	100	2.014
Total	448					

Interestingly, social credit supporters are not more likely than conservatives to be supporters of untrammelled capitalism (20% high), liberals are even less likely to support laissez-faire (15% high) and the independents still less likely (14% of independents scored high on this scale while 19% scored low). That supporters of the more conservative parties show a higher support for laissez-faire ideology is not surprising.

The strong negative correlation between support for social welfare and support for laissez-faire attitudes was commented upon in the last chapter and will not be dealt with further here (see Table 7-18).

Naturally there is a very strong correlation between the scale measuring nineteenth century liberalism and that measuring laissez-faire

attitudes since the two attitudes do, in reality, overlap and that someone who is against both unions and big business is likely to be against government interference with free market capitalism, though not necessarily vice-versa. Indeed, one of the questions (on the harmful effects of trade unions) was common to both scales, this of itself accounts for part of the correlation (see Table 8-19).

TABLE 8-19

LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES AND NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERALISM

Laissez-faire	N	Nineteenth Century Liberalism			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Low	74	24.3%	75.7%	0.0%	100%
Medium	423	29.6	59.3	11.1	100
High	124	15.3	53.2	31.5	100
Total N	621	162	373	86	

$\chi^2 = 51.82874$ with 4.d.f. significant at .001 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .2892 significant at .001 level

There was also a significant positive correlation between laissez-faire and another aspect of liberalism, tolerance of non-conformity. Of those who are high in laissez-faire attitudes, 57% are low in intolerance and 15% high (see Table 8-20). Of those who are low in laissez-faire liberalism, 65% are low in intolerance and 15% high. Even though this sample is very tolerant on the whole those who support laissez-faire attitudes are not so likely to be tolerant. Of the 49 respondents who were high in intolerance 19 were high on the laissez-faire scale, though only 20% of the total sample was high in laissez-faire.

The relationship of laissez-faire attitudes with prejudice towards the French Canadians is even more significant, for in a sample that is

TABLE 8-20

LAISSEZ-FAIRE ATTITUDES AND INTOLERANCE

Laissez-faire	Intolerance				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	74	64.9%	28.4%	6.8%	100%
Medium	423	54.8	39.2	5.9	100
High	124	56.5	28.2	15.3	100
Total N	621	350	222	49	

$$\chi^2 = 16.55783$$

significant at .01 level

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1131 significant at .002 level

highly anti-French, those who are high in laissez-faire attitudes are disproportionately more so. Of those who are high on the laissez-faire scale three per cent are low in anti-French feelings, 65% are high, compared with those who are low on the laissez-faire scale, 12% of whom are low in anti-French feelings and 41% high (see Table 8-21). In some

TABLE 8-21

LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND ANTI-FRENCH ATTITUDES

Laissez-faire	Anti-French Attitudes				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	74	12.2%	47.3%	40.5%	100%
Medium	423	8.7	46.3	44.9	100
High	124	3.2	32.3	64.5	100
Total N	621	50	271	300	

$$\chi^2 = 18.67984 \text{ with 4.d.f.}$$

significant at .001 level

Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .1938 significant at .001 level

respects the score on the laissez-faire scale is the best predictor of the other aspects of liberalism. An individual who high in laissez-faire attitudes is also likely to be low in social welfare and high in

intolerance for non-conformists and for the French.

Those who are high in laissez-faire attitudes also have a tendency to be high in active participation (see Table 8-22). This is

TABLE 8-22

LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Laissez-faire	Active Participation				Total
	N	Low	Medium	High	
Low	74	20.3%	68.9%	10.8%	100%
Medium	423	24.6	69.5	5.9	100
High	124	14.5	71.8	13.7	100
Total N	621	137	434	50	

$\chi^2 = 12.65121$ with 4.d.f. significant at .02 level
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient = .0433 (note the relationship is
 not linear) significant at .02 level.

important since it is the active who are opinion leaders and whose voice is likely to be heard by those in government. In Alberta it would seem likely that the supporters of free enterprise have more influence than their numerical strength would warrant. However those most against uncontrolled free enterprise are also highly active.

Summary

As expected among a group of managers and white collar workers, support for private enterprise is moderately high, though 80% of the sample have at least some reservations. Support for free enterprise increased with income and education, though not with age, and women held no different attitudes from those of the men. Germans were more likely to support this ideology than any other ethnic group, but those who were downward mobile or who were upward mobile from the labouring

class were less likely to support it. Catholics and others who attended church frequently were less likely to support this doctrine than Protestants and infrequent or non-church attenders. There was no relationship between this variable and geographic socialization.

Laissez-faire attitudes were more likely held by those working in private industry rather than government, those at the executive level, those high in job satisfaction and those in functions where unrestricted free enterprise matched with their self-interest, such as marketing.

More than one quarter of all Conservative Party supporters were high in laissez-faire attitudes, more than in any other party. Those who scored highly in laissez-faire attitudes were also more likely to hold nineteenth century liberal attitudes, to be more intolerant, more anti-French and to take an active part in the political process.

References - Chapter VIII

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5. Ibid.
6. Lenski, The Religious Factor, op.cit., pp. 136-7.
7. Presthus, op.cit., pp. 164-204.
8. Schwartz, op.cit., p. 95.
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10. Lenski, The Religious Factor, op.cit., p. 136.
11. Schwartz, op.cit., pp. 103-4.
12. Ibid., p. 103.
13. Ibid., p. 105.
14. Ibid.

CHAPTER IX

POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Introduction

It was not the intention of this study to investigate the party preferences of white collar workers in Western Canada. There are many studies already on the direction of voting in Canadian elections and the relationships between demographic variables and party preference (such as the influence of the religious variable on party choice) are well noted. However, this was an interesting bi-product of the study and since such material on a specifically Albertan study has not been published, the findings are gathered together in summary form in this chapter. Information on actual political party affiliations of this sample is reported first. Then the relationships between various demographic and organizational variables which may influence political affiliation will be examined.

Review of Past Research

This review is intentionally brief since this chapter is intended only as a summary of an interesting bi-product of this investigation. Only Canadian empirical findings will be reported.

In a survey conducted on the 1962 election, Alford concluded that there was very little evidence of a class voting pattern.¹ Age and sex differences were not sharp, nor were urban-rural differences. The Liberals drew almost identical support from all class differences and the liberal proportion of the vote remained steady throughout Canada, except among Western Canadian Protestants.² Alford found a slight

clusion.¹³

Authors of other studies have concluded that though religion rather than socio-economic status may determine the support of the Liberal and Conservative Parties, the emergence of the New Democratic Party, both federally¹⁴ and provincially,¹⁵ is evidence of growing class voting in Canadian politics. Wilson finds this the natural outcome of increasing industrialization and urbanization.¹⁶

Results

Total Sample

Although the sample as a whole displays a Conservative trend, 32% are Liberal supporters, three per cent affiliate with the New Democratic Party and nine per cent claim to be Independents (see Table 9-1). The females predictably are more likely to be Conservatives and less likely to be Liberals than their male colleagues.

TABLE 9-1

PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF SAMPLE

Party Identification	N	% of sample	males	females
Social Credit	61	9.8	10.0	7.7
Conservative	228	36.7	36.0	44.2
Liberal	201	32.4	33.2	23.1
New Democratic Party	17	2.7	2.8	1.9
Independent	58	9.3	9.3	9.6
Don't Know	56	9.0	8.6	13.5
Total	621	100.0	100.0	100.0
N			569	52

Although over 80% of the sample gave a party preference when self rating the strength of their affiliation with a party, only 31% claimed

tendency for manual workers, those with less than high school education and those in lower socio-economic positions to prefer the Social Credit and New Democratic Parties rather than the Conservative, but there were inconsistencies. For example, he found the unskilled more likely to support Social Credit, the skilled the New Democratic Party, professionals the Liberals and owners, managers, salesmen and farmers the Progressive Conservative Party.³

Mildred Schwartz also found age and sex to be less important than social class in determining party support, yet still found social class not as important as origin or region.⁴ Alford also reached the decision that religion and province were most important in determining political affiliation. He found 47% of Protestants supported the Conservative Party and 29% the Liberals.⁵ Conversely, 24% of Catholics supported the Progressive Conservatives, while 49% supported the Liberals. Similar findings linking religion and party voting were made by Grace Anderson in Hamilton, Ontario,⁶ John Meisel in Kingston, Ontario,⁷ and John Wilson in Waterloo South.⁸

Alford noted, however, that sometimes this relationship is changed by the provincial context. In Alberta, for example, there was little difference in party choice between Catholics and Protestants.⁹ Also in Alberta, Alford found that the well educated were less likely to vote for the Conservative Party.¹⁰

Some writers have suggested that ethnic origin is also related to party support. While Alport shows this to be true between British and French ethnics,¹¹ Grace Anderson found ethnicity less important than religion in determining party support. Wilson reached the same con-

(ii) The Variables

There was no significant statistical difference between male and female political affiliation ($\chi^2 = 4.034$ with 5.d.f.), although the females were proportionately over-represented among those who supported the Conservative Party and those who were undecided. Proportionately less women than men supported the Liberal and New Democratic Parties.

There were differences in party support with age. However, these differences appeared to be random, with no clear or consistent pattern emerging. For example, there was no evidence that the older individuals were more likely than the young to affiliate with the Conservative Party.

Marital status, though not overall significant in relation to party affiliation, showed that a large proportion of those who were unmarried were politically undecided (23% of the unmarried compared with eight per cent of the married). This finding is in keeping with past evidence that the unmarried are not highly interested in politics.¹⁸

Both education and income were significantly related to party affiliation. Support for the Liberal and New Democratic Parties is dispersed over all education levels, support for the conservative parties, particularly Social Credit, declined with increasing education, while the number of Independents increases (see Table 9-3).

Fluctuations in support of the Conservative Party and amount of income appear to be random. Those earning between \$10,000 and \$15,000 are highest in support of the Liberals. New Democratic support is concentrated among those earning less than \$5,000. The lower income groups

to have a strong affiliation with the party of their choice.

The 'independents' and 'don't knows' when examined separately have a more liberal leaning than the general distribution of party affiliations (see Table 9-2). This may be because, in an upwardly

TABLE 9-2

PARTY LEANINGS OF INDEPENDENTS AND DON'T KNOWS

Party Leaning	N	%
Conservative	24	20.5
Liberal	30	25.6
New Democratic Party	8	6.8
Social Credit	6	5.1
Don't Know	49	41.9
Total	117	100.0

mobile group, those with political leanings which are incongruent with traditional middle class affiliations keep these leanings latent (the respondents being subject to cross pressures from their present socio-economic standing and their childhood socialization). There are also a core of people who genuinely don't know and who may not care.

Demographic Variables and Political Party Affiliation

(i) Introduction

Hyman found that one of the earliest political attitudes formed in children is party identification, it is also a relatively enduring attitude.¹⁷ Since party identification is formed early it is likely that party choice is related to the demographic variables of childhood and only modified by later socialization processes such as the work experience. In this section, therefore, the relationship between political party affiliation and these demographic variables will be examined.

TABLE 9-3

POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND EDUCATION*

	N	Junior High	High School	Tech.	Some College	College Grad	Post Grad
Conservative	227	39.7%	38.7%	38.6%	36.7%	32.3%	33.3%
Liberal	197	19.2	32.8	31.8	35.9	36.5	30.3
New Democrat	17	2.7	3.4	2.3	1.6	3.1	3.0
Social Credit	58	21.9	10.1	9.1	9.4	2.1	0.0
Independent	57	2.7	6.7	9.1	10.2	16.7	18.2
Don't Know	56	13.7	8.5	9.1	6.2	9.4	15.2
Total	612	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$\chi^2 = 72.2$ with 30 d.f. significant at .001 level.

* Three respondents with no schooling, all of whom voted Social Credit, are excluded from this table.

are also more likely to answer "don't know" to political affiliation, whereas those in the higher income brackets are more likely to be politically independent. These differences are significant at .05 on a chi square test.

A straightforward dichotomy between rural support for the conservative parties and city support for the Liberals is found when comparing geographic socialization and party affiliation (see Table 9-4). Those from small cities show a high propensity to be politically independent and those from the farm show an unexpectedly disproportionate support for the New Democratic Party.

When comparing party support with the respondents' fathers' jobs when the respondent was growing up, those whose fathers were farmers and farm labourers, salesmen, operatives, service workers, or unemployed are above average in support of the Conservative Party. Those whose fathers were professional, managerial, clerks or non-farm labourers are more

TABLE 9-4

GEOGRAPHIC SOCIALIZATION AND PARTY AFFILIATION

Political Affiliation	N	Farm	Small Town	Small City	Big City
Conservative	227	43.9%	36.8%	26.4%	35.6%
Liberal	199	26.2	31.6	34.5	36.1
New Democrat	17	5.5	1.5	2.3	1.7
Social Credit	60	14.0	9.8	4.6	8.6
Independent	58	3.7	12.8	20.7	7.3
Don't Know	56	6.7	7.5	11.5	10.7
Total	617	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$\chi^2 = 42.776$ with 15. d.f. significant at .001 level

likely than others to support the Liberal Party. High support for the New Democratic Party comes from those whose fathers were household workers or farm labourers. Social Credit support is proportionately greater among those whose fathers were farmers, farm labourers, other labourers, clerks, operatives and house workers. Independents are drawn from all groups.

Religious affiliation is probably the best predictor of party affiliation in this sample (see Table 9-5). Forty three per cent of

TABLE 9-5

RELIGION AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Political Affiliation	N	Protestant	Religion Catholic	Gk.Orth.	None
Conservative	223	42.9%	25.4%	45.8%	13.2%
Liberal	197	26.3	52.6	33.3	39.6
New Democrat	15	2.4	1.8	4.2	3.8
Social Credit	61	12.2	7.9	0.0	3.8
Independent	52	7.1	6.1	8.3	26.4
Don't Know	53	9.0	6.1	8.3	13.2
Total	601	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$\chi^2 = 96.33$ with 25 d.f. significant at .001 level

Protestants support the Conservative Party and 26% support the Liberals, whereas 53% of Catholics support the Liberals and 25% support the Conservative Party. This link between religious affiliation and political party support has been noted in other studies with different samples and in various parts of Canada.¹⁹ Those who attend church regularly are more likely than other groups to support the Social Credit Party. Those who attend often are more likely than other groups to support the Conservative or the New Democratic Party, and those who never attend church are more likely to be politically Independent or don't know with which party they affiliate.

There was no clear identification between ethnic origin and choice of political party. Those of British origins were noticeably conservative but most other ethnic groups were too small to draw valid conclusions.

Organization Variables and Political Party Affiliation

(i) Introduction

Since party identification has largely been found to be relatively enduring by Hyman²⁰ and others²¹ it would not be expected that organization variables would have much influence on party identification. However, group pressures and business norms can make impressions on individuals and the upward mobile new middle class bureaucrat is likely to be particularly sensitive to these norms if, by conforming with them, success is both facilitated and justified.²² There may even be aspects of the job which predispose an individual towards a political party without any undue pressure for conformity. This section tests the relationship of job and organization variables (independent variables) and political

affiliation (dependent variable).

(ii) The Variables

There are some significant differences in the support given to the political parties and the type of organization. Those working for the Federal Government are more likely than other groups to identify with the Liberal Party, while provincial civil servants are more likely than other groups to be Social Credit supporters. This may, in part, reflect identification with the organization with which they work. Municipal employees have a propensity to identify with the Conservative Party and to be more uncertain of their affiliation than other groups. Those who work in branch plants of large corporations also have a propensity to identify with the Conservative Party.

There are no significant relationships between function in the organization and party preference. Interestingly, however, support is disproportionately great for the Conservatives among accountants, for the New Democratic Party among production and research and development staff and for Social Credit among those in purchasing and personnel.

Support for the parties is also noticeably different at the different levels of the hierarchy (see Table 9-6). Department heads are most likely to support the Conservative Party, Foremen and Clerical Supervisors give proportionately greater support to the New Democratic Party and Social Credit, a high proportion also are uncertain or Independent. Executives also show a tendency to be over-represented among the Independents.

As job satisfaction increases so does the tendency to identify with the Conservative Party (see Table 9-7). Of those low in job satis-

TABLE 9-6

LEVEL IN HIERARCHY AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Political Affiliation	N	Foreman- Cler.Sup.	Staff	Dept. Head	Executive
Conservative	228	29.0%	38.7%	41.2%	23.6%
Liberal	201	33.3	30.7	33.6	34.5
New Democrat	17	3.2	3.1	2.8	0.0
Social Credit	60	12.9	7.3	11.4	9.1
Independent	58	13.8	10.0	6.2	20.0
Don't Know	56	12.9	10.3	4.7	12.7
Total	620	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

$\chi^2 = 27.143$ with 15 d.f. significant at .05 level.

TABLE 9-7

JOB SATISFACTION AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Political Affiliation	N	Job Satisfaction		
		Low	Medium	High
Conservative	228	12.0%	36.1%	39.8%
Liberal	201	32.0	34.3	29.9
New Democrat	17	12.0	2.7	1.9
Social Credit	61	4.0	9.0	11.4
Independent	58	24.0	9.0	8.3
Don't Know	56	16.0	8.7	8.7
Total	621	100.0	100.0	100.0

$\chi^2 = 23.459$ with 10 d.f. significant at .01 level.

faction only 12% identify with the Conservatives compared with 40% of those high in job satisfaction. Those low in job satisfaction are more likely than other groups to affiliate with the New Democratic Party or be Independent or uncertain. Thus then there is a definite relationship of job influence on political attitudes.

Those who work in cohesive groups seem more likely to conform to

conservative party affiliations when compared with those whose work groups are low in cohesion (see Table 9-8). They are also much less

TABLE 9-8

GROUP COHESION AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Political Affiliation	N	Group Cohesion		
		Low	Medium	High
Conservative	228	27.7%	37.7%	37.9%
Liberal	201	30.8	32.7	32.4
New Democrat	17	3.1	3.3	1.8
Social Credit	61	3.1	8.3	14.2
Independent	58	16.9	8.9	7.8
Don't Know	56	18.5	9.2	5.9
Total	621	100.0	100.0	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 24.087 \text{ with 10 d.f. significant at .01 level.}$$

likely to be committed to a party, 17% of those low in group cohesion are Independents and 19% are uncertain as to their party preference. This may be a case where there is no group pressure to motivate the individuals to conform to the middle class norms which may be enforced in more cohesive groups.

No consistent relationship was found between party affiliation and other job variables, Routine, Job Change, Uncertainty, or Role Definition.

Political Attitude Variables and Political Affiliation

(i) Introduction

Relationships between political party affiliation and political attitudes have been noted through the previous chapters. They have often been found, not unexpectedly, to be significantly related. This section will give a summary of the previous findings using party affiliation as

the independent variable and the political attitudes as dependent variables. Since this is a summary chapter, the tables showing the relationships between the variables which appear in each chapter will not be repeated here.

(ii) The Variables

The differences in intolerance between the supporters of different parties and independents is significant. Liberals, New Democratic Party supporters and Independents appear noticeably more tolerant than supporters of the Conservative and Social Credit Parties, and those who are undecided. Social Credit supporters in particular are intolerant of non-conformity relative to the rest of the sample (see Table 5-12).

Anti-French attitudes and political party affiliation are also significantly related ($\chi^2 = 47.666$ with 10 d.f., significant at .001 level). Here Conservative Party supporters are more anti-French compared with the rest of the sample, Liberals are the least anti-French of any party group (see Table 6-16).

Where Conservatives, Social Credit and New Democratic Party supporters are almost evenly balanced in alienation (equal numbers high and low in alienation), Liberals are noticeably low in alienation and those who Don't Know are comparatively high in alienation. This may indicate that those who cannot decide which party represents their interests become alienated because their interests are not represented (see Table 4-20).

Support for social welfare, though slightly less among supporters of the Conservative Party, is fairly evenly spread among members of all groups, including Independents and Don't Knows.

Laissez-faire attitudes are significantly related to party choice ($\chi^2 = 28.16$ with 10 d.f., significant at .01 level). The greatest support for 'laissez-faire' attitudes is found among supporters of the Conservative Party, followed by those who 'Don't Know,' Social Crediters Liberals and Independents. New Democrats, not surprisingly, give very little support to laissez-faire ideology (see Table 8-18).

In voting participation there is little difference between supporters of the four main parties, but participation is less among Independents and comparatively low among those who 'Don't Know' which party they support (see Table 9-9: Note this table adds to 100% across the rows). Voting is also lower among supporters of the Conservatives

TABLE 9-9

VOTING PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Political Affiliation	N	Voting Frequency			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Conservative	228	1.3%	3.5%	95.2%	100%
Liberal	201	2.0	7.5	90.5	100
New Democrat	17	0.0	11.8	88.2	100
Social Credit	61	0.0	8.2	91.8	100
Independent	58	3.4	12.1	84.5	100
Don't Know	56	16.1	8.9	75.0	100
Total N	621				

$\chi^2 = 48.0$ with 10. d.f., significant at .001 level.

and Liberals where the individual is only weakly affiliated with the party, however this is not true of Social Credit supporters (see Table 9-10. Note this table adds up to 100% across each section).

Supporters of the smaller parties, Social Credit and the New Democratic Party, are more active politically than the supporters of the

TABLE 9-10

VOTING PARTICIPATION AND STRENGTH OF PARTY AFFILIATION

	Strong Affiliation				Weak Affiliation			
	Voting Participation				Voting Participation			
	N	Low	Medium	High	N	Low	Medium	High
Conservative	95	0.0%	3.2%	96.8%	118	1.7%	3.4%	94.9%
Liberal	61	1.6	3.3	95.1	135	2.2	8.9	88.9
Social Credit	30	0.0	10.0	90.0	26	0.0	7.7	92.3

more established parties (see Table 9-11). Independents and Don't Know are low in political activity. However, if strength of affiliation is

TABLE 9-11

ACTIVE PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Affiliation	N	Active Participation			Total
		Low	Medium	High	
Conservative	228	19.7%	71.9%	8.3%	100%
Liberal	201	19.9	72.1	8.0	100
New Democrat	17	5.9	76.5	17.6	100
Social Credit	61	14.8	73.8	11.5	100
Independent	58	25.9	70.7	3.4	100
Don't Know	56	48.2	46.4	5.4	100
Total	621				

$\chi^2 = 31.04$ with 10 d.f., significant at .001 level.

controlled, Social Crediters are no more active than strong supporters of the Conservative and Liberal Parties (there were insufficient New Democratic Party members to make such a breakdown, see Table 9-12). Weak supporters of the two established parties are no more politically active than those claiming to be Independent or undecided.

Summary

In this chapter the relationships between party choice and some

TABLE 9-12

ACTIVE PARTICIPATION AND STRENGTH OF PARTY AFFILIATION

	Strong Affiliation				Weak Affiliation			
	Active Participation				Active Participation			
Affiliation	N	Low	Medium	High	N	Low	Medium	High
Conservative	95	14.7%	69.5%	15.8%	118	22.0%	75.4%	2.4%
Liberal	61	8.2	73.8	18.0	135	25.2	71.1	3.7
Social Credit	30	13.3	70.0	16.7	26	15.4	76.9	7.7

demographic and organizational variables have been summarized and a summary given also of the political attitudes of the supporters of various parties.

The sample is mainly divided into almost numerically equal groups of Liberal and Conservative supporters, less than 10% supported Social Credit and less than three per cent the New Democratic Party. Only 31%, however, claimed to have a strong affiliation with the party of their choice. By and large the less well educated tended to be uncommitted or support the Conservatives and the better educated to support the Liberals or be independent. Support for each party differs with income level (even with class held constant). Those from rural backgrounds tend to support the more conservative parties, those from urban areas the Liberals. The most important variable distinguishing Conservative and Liberal supporters was religion but no pattern could be found with ethnic origin.

Party affiliation, despite its relative stability, is related to level in the hierarchy and job satisfaction and to the cohesion of the working group.

Support of a political party influences other political attitudes. Conservative supporters are likely to be relatively more intolerant, more anti-French, more alienated, more likely to hold laissez-faire

attitudes, give less support to government social welfare programs and vote more often than Liberal supporters. The Social Credit supporter tends to be even more intolerant, more likely to hold nineteenth century liberal views and is more likely to be high in active participation.

References - Chapter IX

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19. Alford, op.cit.; Anderson, op.cit.; Meisel, op.cit.; and Wilson, op.cit.
20. Hyman, op.cit.
21. Maccoby, et.al., op.cit.; and Havemann and West, op.cit.
22. Presthus, op.cit., pp. 164-204.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The objective of this study was to ascertain the political attitudes and behaviour of the upward mobile, white collar and managerial "new middle class." Eighty per cent of this sample worked in bureaucratic organizations, that is to say organizations which were operated with hired management rather than by the owners themselves. Secondly, and more important, was the task of analyzing the data to find relationships with demographic variables which would account for the attitudes held and to examine if organizational and job factors influenced political attitudes and participation. In this final chapter the findings are summarized and conclusions drawn.

Political Participation

Overall active participation and voting frequency is very high in this sample. Differences in participation with income and education do occur but differences are slight. Those who are older and attend church regularly are the most likely to be highly active. Little or no differences are found with sex, ethnic origin, religion, geographic or economic socialization or social mobility. There is little or no evidence that cross pressures reduce political participation. It would seem reasonable to conclude that among the upward mobile, new middle class, conformity to the norm of political participation is a more important determinant of political activity than any divisions in demographic background, and that this impetus to participate decreases with age.

An exception to this general conclusion is found in group participation. The number of voluntary groups to which respondents belonged were positively related to both active and passive (voting) participation. The highly active were seven times more likely than those low in active participation to belong to four or more voluntary groups. This confirms Van Loon's finding that participation in voluntary organizations was a powerful stimulus to political activity.¹

Other evidence also points to the conclusion that original socialization is modified by the work experience. Job satisfaction increases voting participation but not active participation, which evidently needs more stimulus or motivation than general job satisfaction. The evidence confirms Almond and Verba's finding that job participation in decision making influences participation.² In this sample those with highly defined job roles are only half as likely to participate actively as those in loosely defined roles. Similarly, those in non-routine jobs are more likely to vote and to participate actively than those engaged in routine tasks. On the other hand, uncertainty about the job or its tasks resulted in reduced participation.

Active participation increased noticeably with level in hierarchy. This may reflect self interest but is strong evidence that the role of employment in the continuing political socialization of the individual is not negligible. The type of organization worked for also had noticeable effects on participation; government employees claimed to vote more, but employees and managers of locally owned companies were more likely to be politically active.

Though organizational variables may increase the amount of participation among certain groups, the attitudes of those who are high in



participation are not homogeneous. There is, however, a slight tendency for the politically active to be more critical of the French Canadian and to be more likely to favour uncontrolled free enterprise. The conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that among the upward mobile white collar workers, political participation is not entirely fixed in youth but that organizational variables play a significant part in modifying original socialization.

Political Alienation

The results of this study show some support for the theories of Weber and Mills (referred to in Chapter IV) that as the middle class lost control over their work and became bureaucratized and routinized, they, like the worker before them, would become alienated. Mills predicted this would lead to political apathy, though Kornhauser, Lipset and Trow (see also Chapter IV) have shown evidence that such alienation can lead to political extremism. In this sample, one in five respondents were relatively high in alienation and a further three moderately alienated. This alienation was general over the whole sample regardless of sex, religion, ethnic origin or membership in voluntary social groups. This later is an important finding since authors previous studies have predicted that group membership diminished the probability of an individual feeling alienated.³

Feelings of alienation were less among university graduates, those with incomes over \$12,500 and those who attended church. The findings of this study coincided with those of Thompson and Horton who found the 30-40 age group least alienated.⁴ The socialization of childhood was distinctly related to feelings of alienation, those from rural backgrounds and those



whose fathers were farmers were high in alienation, those from small towns and cities least alienated. The results also showed that neither upward nor downward mobility influenced feelings of alienation.

Alienation was equally widespread between all the levels of the hierarchy and all types of organizations. However, alienation was related to job tasks since those performing certain functions were more alienated than others. Those subject to high job change tended to be more alienated and those with high job satisfaction much less alienated than others. Job satisfaction is the variable which is the single most discriminatory variable in its relationship to alienation, more important than any of the demographic variables.

This indicates that job variables again distinctly modify political attitudes. Those who are low in satisfaction and/or subject to changes in job task over which they have no control, probably feel the frustration of lack of control over their work which is translated as Weber and Mills predicted, into political alienation. Some work roles may allow more control and more satisfaction to the employee, but working in highly cohesive groups does not greatly modify feelings of alienation.

No significant relationship was found between political participation and alienation, showing that the use of voting or other measures of activity as indications of the viability of the political system is erroneous. The alienated are likely to be more intolerant and significantly more anti-French and nineteenth century liberal than other groups. The latter finding is similar to the relationship found by Trow (see Chapter IV) between alienation, nineteenth century liberalism, and right wing extremism. Supporters of the Liberal Party are not as likely as other groups to be alienated.

Intolerance of Non-Conformity

In general, the sample was highly tolerant of non-conformity in a way that indicated that the social values of Canada (as put forward by Lipset and Clark, see Chapter I) are operationally more important than the supposed populist intolerant values of the West. Some deviant opinions are more acceptable than others, socialism, atheism and communism met with decreasing acceptance from this sample. Relative intolerance of non-conformity increased with age, downward mobility, rural social background and church attendance. Lower intolerance was associated with higher education, British ethnic origin, the Catholic religion and the male sex. There was no relationship between income and tolerance. Most of these relationships are those expected as the result of previous studies and non conflict with past findings.

Supporters of the Social Credit Party are the most intolerant, followed by Conservatives, Liberals and Independents who are most tolerant. One quarter of those relatively high in intolerance are high in nineteenth century liberalism, and almost one-third of the same group are alienated.

Intolerance was also related to organizational variables; as job satisfaction, level in hierarchy and number of promotions increased so also did intolerance. However, the type of organization in which the respondents worked, public or private enterprise did not relate to intolerance.

The analysis of the relationships between intolerance and demographic and organizational variables again suggests that among middle class, white collar, bureaucrats, background differences influencing

attitudes while not obliterated are modified by job and organizational variables in an ongoing process of political socialization.

Anti-French Attitudes

Although this sample was highly tolerant of non-conformist opinions, it was less than tolerant of the French ethnic minority in Canada. Anti-French attitudes were the most widely held of all political opinions in this sample, more general by far than support for unfettered free enterprise! These anti-French feelings cut across divisions of income, age, education, sex, ethnic origin and socialization. Only Catholics are less likely than average to hold anti-French sentiments, whereas there was a tendency for the downward mobiles to be more likely to be anti-French. The high level of anti-French attitudes is all the more surprising in view of Boyd's findings that tolerance for the French increases with socio-economic status, because this sample ranks high in income, education and occupation.⁶

On the whole feelings about the French were not related to job variables. Executives, employees of the Federal Government and those employed in functions in which success does not require extensive human relations, are all the more likely to express the feeling that the French are being unreasonable and that the Federal Government does too much for Quebec. This is not unnatural among federal civil servants who now have to learn French if they want to progress.

It must be concluded that anti-French feelings are so widespread as not to be related to any particular demographic or organizational variables. Attitudes of intolerance or impatience to French Canadian position and demands is, however, related to other political variables.

The most important, from the point of view of policy, is that those holding anti-French attitudes most strongly are more likely to vote frequently and slightly more likely to participate actively in the political process, than those with more moderate attitudes. This is the reverse of Stouffer's findings that the leadership tended to be more tolerant than the rank and file. That the most active are the most anti-French may serve to perpetuate or aggravate this problem in Canada. Those who support the Liberal Party are noticeably more sympathetic towards the French than the Conservative supporters.

Those intolerant of non-conformity tend to be slightly more likely to hold attitudes intolerant of the French, but the relationship is not significant. Tolerance of the French is not generally related to tolerance of non-conforming opinions.

Social Welfare

Examination of the Canadian values propounded by Clark and Lipset (cited in Chapter I) gave rise to the hypothesis that Canadians would be more receptive to government welfare schemes than their counterparts in the United States. The results of the survey show a high and uniform acceptance of social welfare measures, which is not typical of middle class Americans.⁷

Although support is general, some groups give more support than others; females, Catholics and Ukrainians all gave social welfare high support. American studies have shown that support for education, subsidized housing, etc. is likely to be greatest among the young and among the lower socio-economic strata (see Chapter VII). In the present sample however, it was found that support for social welfare increased with both

age and increasing education.

Support for social welfare measures was also reasonably uniform among different organizations and at different levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy and only small differences were found between those who performed different organizational roles. Job satisfaction was, however, significantly related to the individual's views on welfare. Seventy two per cent of those low in job satisfaction were high in support of government welfare schemes, compared with 46% of those who were high in job satisfaction. It would seem that here again ongoing socialization is significantly modifying political attitudes. Those who are happy with their jobs are more likely to support individual effort than those individuals who are forced to earn their living from employment they consider less than satisfactory.

Support for social welfare is general over all political parties and among those who are independents, but Conservative Party supporters are less likely to be high in support of government welfare. Support for social welfare is also linked to other aspects of liberalism. Those low in support of welfare are likely to be high in laissez-faire, nineteenth century liberalism and intolerance, and vice-versa.

Laissez-faire Attitudes

A large number of this sample, 80%, support some limitations on free enterprise by unions and government. This again indicates that Canadian community values are operating rather than the individualism and free enterprise values of the United States. This does not imply that all middle class Canadians reject the free enterprise ideology, but it would appear that there is less overwhelming support for it than in

the United States, particularly among American middle class.

However, there are differences within the sample of support for laissez-faire ideology. Support increased with income, upward mobility, socio-economic status of childhood and by and large with education. However support decreased with age (the young giving the most support) and with church attendance. No difference was observed among the sexes; and among the ethnic groups Ukrainians were less likely to give high support to laissez-faire doctrine. However, religious differences were quite apparent, Protestants were almost twice as likely as Catholics to be high in support of this doctrine. There was little difference in support between those from rural or city areas.

Since laissez-faire attitudes are so closely tied to work, it was expected that the work environment would significantly modify these attitudes. Those who worked in private enterprise (no matter how owned or operated) were more than twice as likely as those who worked in government to be high in support of free enterprise. Within the hierarchy, executives in particular were very likely to be high in support of business freedom. Even within the organization, those functions in which free enterprise norms provided a justification for the work being done (such as in marketing), support for the freedom of businessmen in the economy was high.

Once again job satisfaction appears as an important modifying variable. Those who are satisfied are more likely to subscribe to the norms of free enterprise than those who are not. There is also some evidence that free enterprise norms are enforced by cohesive work groups.

Those who claimed to be politically independent were least likely

to support laissez-faire ideology and those affiliated with the Conservative Party the most likely supporters. The relationship between this variable and welfare has already been described; those high in support of free enterprise tend also to hold nineteenth century liberal attitudes, to be more intolerant of non-conformity and to be significantly more anti-French than those who are low in support of unconstrained capitalism. Not surprisingly, those who have strong feelings about the capitalist system of free enterprise, either pro or con., were more likely to participate actively in the political process. In Canada it seems that opinions on the economic system are significant enough to be influential in party choice.

Political Affiliation

That party affiliation was related to education, income level, rural or urban socialization and religion was not new, nor were any of the relationships in an unexpected direction, they merely confirmed previous findings. Nor, on the whole, were the attitudes held by party supporters surprising or unusual. The most interesting finding in this area is that despite the early formation and relative stability of party affiliation, party affiliation is related to organizational variables. As level in the hierarchy, group cohesion and job satisfaction increase, there is a tendency towards more conservative political affiliations. These findings show some evidence for continuing political socialization through work.

Conclusions

This research has addressed itself to the empirical examination of two problems:

1. The description of certain political attitudes of the emerging new middle class in Western Canada;
2. The relationship of demographic and organizational variables to political attitudes and behaviour.

In examining the first problem, the results show that middle class political attitudes in Western Canada are probably different from those attitudes found in American studies, as reported in the literature and cited in each chapter. Although there are no studies of Eastern Canada with which this study may be compared, it has been hypothesized that this difference is the result of differences between Canadian and American values.

In Chapter I it was stated that Canada was less achievement oriented and equalitarian but more community oriented than the United States, and that these values were middle class values since the middle class in Canada formed the bureaucratic establishment. As a result, capitalism has not been held sacred but modified by government ownership and social welfare measures which have been acceptable even to the business community. A wider spectrum of political ideology, including socialism is not merely tolerated but considered normal in Canada.

Empirically this study has shown that the Western new middle class is, on the whole, highly tolerant of non-conformity, receptive to government welfare programs and not committed to unregulated capitalism. There is no way of knowing how much these Canadian national values are modified by Western traditions of populism, prairie radicalism, sectarianism, and the frontier individualism. In Chapter I it was speculated that these influences would tend to make Westerners more intolerant and less likely to support government intervention than those in the East. If this is

so, only a comparative study with the East will show how true it is. It is possible to conclude here that these influences are insufficient to make the attitudes held by a Western Canadian the same as those held by a middle class sample in the United States of America. Thus it is also concluded that in this instance national values dominate over class interest.

In examining the second question, the same relationships in general were found between demographic variables and political attitudes as were found in studies conducted in the United States and elsewhere. The most significant findings of this study relate to the importance of job variables in continuing political socialization. Job satisfaction is related to voting frequency, alienation, intolerance, support for social welfare, laissez-faire attitudes and party affiliation. Low job satisfaction is a better predictor of political alienation than any of the demographic variables. High job definition and uncertainty regarding work tasks are associated with low political participation. Uncertainty is also associated with alienation. Level in hierarchy is related to active participation, increased intolerance and anti-French feelings, laissez-faire attitudes and affiliation with the Conservative Party. The organization type influences participation, anti-French attitudes and laissez-faire liberalism.

In commenting on the political attitudes of the new middle class earlier, it was noted that this group does not own the means of production. Thus the job is all important in providing income, status and personal satisfaction. It is not surprising to find then, that the job can have a continuing relationship with political attitudes and participation.

Political socialization is completed in youth, but particularly for the white collar worker for whom success and upward mobility are imperative, socialization is a continuous process in which the job and work organization play a large part.

References - Chapter X

1. Van Loon, op.cit., p. 389,; and Lane, op.cit., p. 165.
2. Almond and Verba, op.cit., pp. 294-299.
3. Kornhauser, op.cit., p. 237; Dean, "Alienation. Its Meaning and Measurement," op.cit., p. 758.
4. Thompson and Horton, op.cit.
5. Van Loon, op.cit.
6. Boyd, op.cit.
7. Wolfinger, et.al., op.cit.

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
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APPENDIX A

Respondent No. _____ Date _____
 Location _____ Company _____

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR RESEARCH UNIT
 UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

CANADIAN ATTITUDE STUDY

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

This questionnaire is part of a national study of Canadian workers, their attitudes, and their work organizations. The study is completely confidential, and no names are taken. Do not write your name on the questionnaire.

Please circle or check off the appropriate number for each question.

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

1. SEX: M _____ F _____

2. AGE at last birthday

--	--

3. Are you married, widowed, divorced, separated, or never married?

Married 1	Separated 4
Widowed 2	Never married 5
Divorced 3	

4. What is the last year of school completed?

Grades 1 - 6 1	College Graduate 5
Junior High or Some High School . 2	Post Graduate 6
Completed High School 3	Technical School 7
Some College 4	No Schooling 8
	Don't know 9

5. What is your approximate present annual income from all sources?

Under \$5,000 1	\$12,500 - \$15,000 ... 5
\$5,001 - \$7,500 2	\$15,000 - \$20,000 ... 6
\$7,501 - \$10,000 ... 3	Over \$20,000 7
\$10,001 - \$12,500 .. 4	

6. During the first 15 years of your life, did you live mostly on a farm, mostly in a small town, mostly in a small city, or mostly in a big city or its suburbs?

Mostly on a farm 1	
Mostly in a small town 2	
Mostly in a small city 3	
Mostly in a big city or suburbs .. 4	

7. A. What is your religion or church preference?

Protestant (Answer B) 1	Other 5
Catholic 2	None 6
Jewish 3	Don't know 9
Greek Orthodox 4	

B. If protestant, please specify:

Presbyterian 1	Anglican 5
Lutheran 2	Methodist 6
Baptist 3	Other 7
United Church 4	Don't know 9

C. Would you say you go to church regularly, often, seldom, never?

Regularly 1	Seldom 3
Often 2	Never 4

8. A. Where were you born (if in Canada, which province)? In Canada:

British Columbia	1	New Brunswick	7
Alberta	2	Nova Scotia	8
Saskatchewan	3	Newfoundland	9
Manitoba	4	P.E.I.	10
Ontario	5	Yukon	11
Quebec	6	North West Territories	12

If not in Canada, in which country were you born (write in name of country)?
 _____ (Answer B).

- B. If you were not born in Canada, how long have you lived in Canada? _____

9. During the first 15 years of your life, which province of Canada did you grow up in?

British Columbia	1	New Brunswick	7
Alberta	2	Nova Scotia	8
Saskatchewan	3	Newfoundland	9
Manitoba	4	P.E.I.	10
Ontario	5	Yukon	11
Quebec	6	North West Territories	12

If not in Canada, in which country? _____

10. What kind of work did your father do for a living while you were growing up?
 Please specify - _____

11. What was the last year of school your father completed?

Grades 1--6	1	College Graduate	5
Junior High or Some High School .	2	Post Graduate	6
Completed High School	3	Technical School	7
Some College	4	No Schooling	8
		Don't know	9

12. Where did your family (father) originally come from? (If other, please specify)

Great Britain	1	Germany	5
Ireland	2	Italy	6
United States	3	Hungary	7
France	4	Other	8
		Ukraine	9

13. What is your father's ethnic origin? (If other, please specify)

English	1	Italian	5
Hungarian	2	German	6
American	3	Ukrainian	7
French	4	Other	8
		Irish	9

14. Generally speaking do you usually think of yourself as a Conservative, Liberal, New Democrat, Social Credit or Independent, or what?

Conservative (Ask A)	1	Social Credit (Ask A)	4
Liberal (Ask A)	2	Independent (Ask B)	8
New Democrat (Ask A)	3	Don't know (Ask B)	9

- A. If Conservative, Liberal, New Democrat or Social Credit, would you call yourself a strong Conservative, Liberal, New Democrat, or Social Credit?

Strong (C, L, ND, SC)	1	Weak (C, L, ND, SC)	2
-----------------------	---	---------------------	---

- B. If "Independent" or don't know do you think of yourself as closer to the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party, or the Social Credit Party?

Conservative	1	Social Credit	4
Liberal	2	Don't know	9
New Democratic	3		

15. Do you belong to a union?

Yes 1
No 2

16. How long have you been working with your company or organization?

--	--

17. How long have you been working on your present job?

--	--

18. A. Do you do shift work?

Yes 1 (Ask B)
No 2

B. If yes, what shift do you usually work?

8 - 5	1	12 - 8	3
5 - 2	2	Other	3

19. At what level is your position in the organization?

Chief Executive	1
Department Head	2
Foreman	3
Clerical Supervisor	4
Worker	5
Staff position (please specify for example, accounting or purchas- ing)	6

To what level in the organization do you report?

20. In what specialized functional area do you do most of your work?

Production	1
Marketing	2
Accounting and Finance	3
Research and Development	4
Purchasing	5
Other (please specify)	6

Could you give me some description of your job, that is, what do you do in your organization?

21. What is the technology of your company or organization?

Unit or small batch production	1
Large batch or mass production	2
Continuous flow or process production	3
Service technology (be specific)	4
Multitechnology organization (be specific) .	5

22. How many promotions - in the sense of more authority and moving up the ladder - have you had with this company?

--	--

23. A. Was your first job with this company a management position? Yes 1
No 2

B. What was the level of this job?

Please circle the number which you feel is the most appropriate.

	<u>Most</u>	<u>Quite A Lot</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>A Little</u>	<u>Almost None</u>
24. How much of your work do you think of as routine?	1	2	3	4	5
25. When you begin a working week, how much of what you will actually do during the week can you foresee?	1	2	3	4	5
26. If someone completely new to your job had to take it on at short notice, how much of it would he be able to find out from a job-description and/or a record of previous work?	1	2	3	4	5
27. How many of your working days follow a similar pattern to one another?	1	2	3	4	5
28. How much of the content of the job you are now in has changed in the past year?	5	4	3	2	1
29. How much of the content of the job you are in now do you anticipate will have changed in a year's time?	5	4	3	2	1
30. How often does your work involve following regular set procedures?	1	2	3	4	5
31. How often do major problems occur in your job which have never occurred before?	5	4	3	2	1
32. How often does something come up in your work which necessitates acquiring fresh knowledge or new skills?	5	4	3	2	1
33. How often do completely unforeseen things happen in your job?	5	4	3	2	1
34. Considering the various problems that arise in your work, how often is the solution clear?	1	2	3	4	5
35. How often do you have to switch from one thing to another?	5	4	3	2	1
	<u>Very Precisely</u>	<u>Fairly Precisely</u>	<u>Not Very Precisely</u>	<u>Very Imprecisely</u>	<u>Not Laid Down At All</u>
36. How precisely are your responsibilities laid down?	1	2	3	4	5
37. How precisely is it laid down which decisions you take yourself?	1	2	3	4	5

	Completely Satisfied	Well Satisfied	Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied	A Little Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	
38. On the whole, how satisfied are you with the company where you work?	1	2	3	4	5	9
39. How satisfied are you with your present salary?	1	2	3	4	5	9
40. How satisfied are you with the kind of work (or task) you do?	1	2	3	4	5	9
41. How satisfied are you with the progress you have made in this company?	1	2	3	4	5	9
42. How satisfied are you with your present supervisors?	1	2	3	4	5	9
43. How satisfied are you with your fellow workers?	1	2	3	4	5	9
	<u>No Chance At all</u>	<u>Very Little Chance</u>	<u>Some Chance</u>	<u>Fairly Good Chance</u>	<u>Very Good Chance</u>	
44. How much does your job give you a chance to do the things you are best at?	5	4	3	2	1	
45. Do you feel that you are really a part of your work group?						
Included in all aspects of my work group			1			
Included in most ways			2			
Included in some ways, but not in others			3			
Don't feel I really belong			4			
Don't work with any one group of people			5			
Don't know			9			
46. If you had a chance to do the same kind of work for the same pay, in another work group in this company, how would you feel about moving?						
Would want very much to move			5			
Would rather move than stay where I am			4			
Would make no difference to me			3			
Would rather stay where I am than move			2			
Would want very much to stay where I am			1			
D.N.A. (No similar work group)			8			
Don't know			9			
How does your work group compare with other work groups in the company on each of the following points?						
47. The way the men get along together:						
Better than most			1			
About the same as most			2			
Not as good as most			3			
Don't know			9			
48. The way the men stick together:						
Better than most			1			
About the same as most			2			
Not as good as most			3			
Don't know			9			

-6-

49. The way the men help each other on the job:

Better than most 1
About the same as most 2
Not as good as most 3
Don't know 9

	<u>Agree Strongly</u>	<u>Agree Slightly</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Disagree Slightly</u>	<u>Disagree Strongly</u>
50. Do you agree or disagree that the way they are run now, labor unions do this country more harm than good?	1	2	3	4	5
51. The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle.	1	2	3	4	5
52. We need more government controls over business practices and profits.	5	4	3	2	1
53. Canada would be better off without any labor unions at all.	1	2	3	4	5
54. Big companies control too much of Canadian business.	1	2	3	4	5
55. The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost.	5	4	3	2	1
56. The government in Ottawa ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job.	5	4	3	2	1
57. The government ought to have special programs so that children from poor families receive help to get as much education as possible.	5	4	3	2	1
58. The government ought to see that the poor get good housing at low cost.	5	4	3	2	1
59. If a person wanted to make a speech in your community against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak?	5	4	3	2	1
60. Should such a person be allowed to teach in a Canadian university?	5	4	3	2	1
61. If a person wanted to make a speech in your community favoring government ownership of all the railroads and big industries, should he be allowed to speak?	5	4	3	2	1
62. Should such a person be allowed to teach in a Canadian university?	5	4	3	2	1
63. If a Communist wanted to make a speech in your community, should he be allowed to speak?	5	4	3	2	1
64. Should such a person be allowed to teach in a Canadian university?	5	4	3	2	1
65. Do you feel that the federal government is doing too much for Quebec in relation to other provinces?	1	2	3	4	5

	<u>Agree Strongly</u>	<u>Agree Slightly</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Disagree Slightly</u>	<u>Disagree Strongly</u>
66. Do you think French Canadians are making unreasonable demands?	1	2	3	4	5
67. It doesn't matter which party wins the elections, the interests of the little man don't count.	1	2	3	4	5
68. Do you agree with the policy of the federal government to make both French and English the official languages of Canada?	5	4	3	2	1
69. Elected officials become tools of special interests, no matter what.	1	2	3	4	5
70. Local officials lose touch with the people who elected them.	1	2	3	4	5
71. If people knew what was really going on in high places, it would blow the lid off things.	1	2	3	4	5
72. People who go into public office are usually out for all they can get.	1	2	3	4	5
	<u>Always</u>	<u>Usually</u>	<u>Sometimes</u>	<u>Rarely</u>	<u>Never</u>
73. How frequently do you vote in local municipal elections?	1	2	3	4	5
74. How frequently do you vote in federal elections?	1	2	3	4	5
	<u>Frequently</u>	<u>Occasionally</u>	<u>Never</u>		
75. When you get together with your friends would you say that you discuss public issues like government regulation of business, labor unions, taxes, and farm programs?	1	2	3		
76. Have you ever written, phoned or talked to your member on city council, in the provincial legislature, or the House of Commons, or any other public official about some issue or problem?	1	2	3		
77. Have you ever gone to any political meetings, speeches, rallies, dinners, or things like that in connection with an election?	1	2	3		
78. Would you say that you are:					
a person who contributes to community decisions					1
a person who is active, but not one of the decision-makers					2
just an ordinary person in the community					3
not really a part of the community at all					4

79. Have you ever worked for another department or functional area in this company?

Yes 1 (Ask A)
No 2

A. If yes, how many other departments?
(Please specify)

--	--

B. How long in each department?
(Please specify)

--	--

80. How would you classify your company or organization?

A branch plant of a major company 1

An owner-managed firm	2
-----------------------------	---

A locally owned company with hired management ...	3
---	---

Government organization municipal 4

provincial	5
------------	---

provincial	5
federal	6

Other (Please specify) _____ 8

81. We are interested in the number of employees in the organization where you work, and if it is part of a larger organization, how many employees in the entire company. For example, if you work in a bank, how many employees in your branch, and how many employees in the entire company?

A. Number of employees in your operating unit.

--	--	--	--

B. Number of employees in the entire organization.

--	--	--	--	--

82. What percentage of your organization is unionized?

A. Percent of union employees. (Please estimate)

--	--

B. How long has the company been unionized?

--	--

83. What percentage of your company's output is sold to government?

--	--

Don't know 8

Now we would like to know something about the groups and organizations to which individuals belong. Do you belong to any of the following organizations?

	Yes	No		Yes	No
Fraternal or social groups?	1	2	Any veterans groups?	1	2
Any political groups?	1	2	Any labor unions?	1	2
Any sports groups?	1	2	Any youth groups?	1	2
Any school service groups?	1	2	Any hobby or garden clubs?	1	2
Any school fraternities or sororities?	1	2	Any literary, art, dis- cussion or study groups?	1	2
Any nationality groups?	1	2	Any farm organizations?	1	2
Any professional or academic societies?	1	2			
Any other organization not listed? (PLEASE WRITE IN)					
	1	2			
	1	2			
	1	2			

APPENDIX B

FIGURE 2.1

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDPOL (CREATION) DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

11/19/71 PAGE 40

FACTOR SCORE COEFFICIENTS

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7
VAR027	-0.00362	-0.02433	-0.00153	0.15970	-0.00659	-0.15352	0.23747
VAR028	0.00028	0.04362	-0.00125	-0.00000	0.07467	-0.01194	0.45777
VAR029	-0.02748	-0.04315	0.04412	-0.03316	-0.02735	-0.00345	0.07753
VAR030	0.02481	0.10378	-0.00293	0.00703	-0.02567	-0.00144	0.25749
VAR031	0.02706	0.07451	-0.00002	0.07443	0.11179	-0.10006	-0.22283 ← out
VAR032	-0.02165	0.03669	0.26001	-0.01479	0.02408	-0.00377	0.13087
VAR033	-0.01081	0.00003	0.36000	-0.01036	-0.00186	0.00639	-0.06359
VAR034	-0.00259	0.03115	0.01005	0.05714	0.01507	-0.00097	-0.02125
VAR035	-0.01200	0.02547	0.04576	0.01049	-0.00029	-0.02329	0.01071
VAR036	0.00000	0.00370	-0.00003	-0.00004	-0.01379	0.01700	-0.01154
VAR037	0.22953	-0.00015	-0.00001	0.04528	0.01004	-0.01217	-0.01226
VAR038	0.02491	0.04693	0.07469	-0.00047	0.01003	0.01038	-0.01129
VAR039	0.01003	-0.02471	0.00003	0.01948	0.03151	-0.00098	0.00992
VAR040	0.00000	0.03308	0.02101	-0.00071	0.00002	0.02200	-0.00003
VAR041	0.00000	-0.07009	-0.01011	0.04329	-0.00049	-0.01952	0.00003
VAR042	-0.00000	-0.00016	-0.00003	0.04000	0.00001	-0.00012	-0.00000
VAR043	-0.01000	-0.00000	-0.01000	0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000
VAR044	-0.00014	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000
VAR045	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR046	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR047	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR048	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR049	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR050	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR051	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR052	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR053	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR054	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR055	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000

2-2

FIGURE 2.2

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLGY PROJECT

1/19/71

PAGE 39

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

VARIMAX ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

2 - 2

1.5 1.4

FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR 5 FACTOR 6 FACTOR 7

VAR027	0.05612	0.06023	-0.04038	0.0001	-0.0455	-0.1948	0.05321
VAR028	0.03976	0.04451	0.00205	-0.03608	0.17722	0.07193	0.08562
VAR029	-0.03865	0.17204	0.25458	-0.01132	-0.06407	0.06516	0.08004
VAR030	0.16029	0.07730	0.07730	0.13967	-0.05569	0.01412	0.05569
VAR031	0.05018	0.23111	-0.21662	0.13255	0.12721	-0.19250	0.05569
VAR032	0.01038	0.02637	0.07022	0.01991	0.06797	0.06230	0.05569
VAR033	0.03364	-0.12637	0.07813	-0.03662	0.01567	0.06610	0.05313
VAR034	0.06678	0.00010	0.07859	0.06741	-0.01425	-0.01750	-0.17550
VAR035	0.04668	-0.04688	0.07374	0.01474	-0.01726	-0.06230	0.15613
VAR036	0.03179	0.05732	0.05732	-0.04211	-0.05070	0.01002	0.05569
VAR037	-0.02473	-0.05175	-0.05175	0.17237	-0.01555	-0.06427	0.05569
VAR038	0.08363	0.18509	0.18509	-0.00037	-0.00727	0.02025	0.02473
VAR039	0.01387	0.06211	0.06211	0.06732	0.00720	-0.04347	0.05123
VAR040	0.07014	0.05334	0.05334	-0.03530	-0.02523	0.02702	-0.03611
VAR041	0.07543	-0.06655	-0.06655	0.15500	-0.04321	-0.01644	0.057266
VAR042	0.02249	0.15235	0.02018	0.07900	0.00951	0.03927	0.06647
VAR043	0.01542	0.12310	-0.03719	0.07702	-0.00452	-0.02536	0.01172
VAR044	-0.05413	0.05591	-0.05591	0.07724	0.01200	-0.05514	-0.13045
VAR045	0.01373	0.11427	0.11427	0.05502	-0.03219	0.16321	-0.05613
VAR046	0.04469	-0.02241	-0.02241	0.15327	-0.05254	0.08159	0.03002
VAR047	-0.02702	0.06973	0.06973	0.2406	-0.00702	0.03172	0.09492
VAR048	0.04309	0.07116	-0.03714	0.07607	-0.07108	-0.01862	-0.03102
VAR049	0.03042	0.05651	0.05651	0.13194	-0.03505	-0.03013	-0.03214
VAR050	0.02428	0.02315	0.05585	0.06829	0.16219	0.04683	0.03086
VAR051	-0.00967	0.07017	0.01921	0.09616	-0.12784	0.08492	0.06920
VAR052	-0.17721	-0.06733	-0.02132	0.05777	0.03381	-0.02517	0.03576
VAR053	0.01567	-0.05507	0.1425	-0.01129	0.17315	0.01010	0.05122
VAR054	-0.05029	-0.01755	-0.0756	-0.02218	0.05334	0.12515	0.05569
VAR055	0.00120	-0.02384	0.05570	-0.05653	0.06003	0.04473	0.03179

Political Tolerance. Political alienation. Social Welfare (Government aid). French Canadian. Active Participation (Discussion). Voting Participation (Passive) + Labor Control. Government Intervention.

Varies by degree of commitment and visibility (Way in which enterprise is viewed - traditional laissez faire).

FIGURE 2.3

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEPLUGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

01/16/71

PAGE 41

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 1 VERTICAL FACTOR 2

2-3

1 = VAR027 2 = VAR028
3 = VAR029 4 = VAR030
5 = VAR031 6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033 8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035 10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037 12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039 14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041 16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043 18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045 20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047 22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049 24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051 26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053 28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055

Intolerance

Alienation

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1

293

FIGURE 2.4

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEHUBBY PROJECT

1/19/71 PAGE 42

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SURFILE EDMONTON

24

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 3 VERTICAL FACTOR 3

1 = VAR027 2 = VAR028
3 = VAR029 4 = VAR029
5 = VAR031 6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033 8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035 10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037 12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039 14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041 16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043 18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045 20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047 22 = VAR049
23 = VAR049 24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051 26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053 28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055

12
1413
11
15

10

27

252420 4

26 1620 1

282122

5



FIGURE 2.5

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SURFILE EDMONTON

01/10/71 PAGE 43

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 1 VERTICAL FACTOR 4

1 = VAR027 2 = VAR028
3 = VAR029 4 = VAR030
5 = VAR031 6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033 8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035 10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037 12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039 14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041 16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043 18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045 20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047 22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049 24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051 26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053 28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055

1511
13

26 25 24

1514
12

295

FIGURE 2.6

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

01/19/71

PAGE 44

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/73)
SURFILE EDMONTON

2-b

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 1 VERTICAL FACTOR 5

1 = VAR027 2 = VAR028
3 = VAR029 4 = VAR030
5 = VAR031 6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033 8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035 10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037 12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039 14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041 16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043 18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045 20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047 22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049 24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051 26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053 28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055

26 27 28 29

24 25 5

13 15 10

18 19 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/79)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

FIGURE 2.7

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 1	VERTICAL FACTOR 6
1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
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10	10
11	11
12	12
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84	84
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87	87
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90	90
91	91
92	92
93	93
94	94
95	95
96	96
97	97
98	98
99	99
100	100

2.7

1	=	VAPC27	2	=	VAPC29
3	=	VAPC29	4	=	VAPC30
5	=	VAPC31	6	=	VAPC32
7	=	VAPC33	8	=	VAPC34
9	=	VAPC35	10	=	VAPC36
11	=	VAPC37	12	=	VAPC38
13	=	VAPC39	14	=	VAPC41
15	=	VAPC41	16	=	VAPC42
17	=	VAPC43	18	=	VAPC44
19	=	VAPC45	20	=	VAPC46
21	=	VAPC47	22	=	VAPC48
23	=	VAPC49	24	=	VAPC50
25	=	VAPC51	26	=	VAPC52
27	=	VAPC53	28	=	VAPC54
29	=	VAPC55			

[illegible]

19	*	23	α. 5
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297

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDECLOGY PROJECT

61/10/71

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 1	VERTICAL FACTOR 7
1 = VAR027	2 = VAR028
3 = VAR029	4 = VAR030
5 = VAR031	6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033	8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035	10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037	12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039	14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041	16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043	18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045	20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047	22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049	24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051	26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053	28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055	

FIGURE 2.9

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

01/19/71 PAGE 47

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 2 VERTICAL FACTOR 3

1 = VARG27 2 = VARG28
3 = VARG29 4 = VARG30
5 = VARG31 6 = VARG32
7 = VARG33 8 = VARG34
9 = VARG35 10 = VARG36
11 = VARG37 12 = VARG38
13 = VARG39 14 = VARG40
15 = VARG41 16 = VARG42
17 = VARG43 18 = VARG44
19 = VARG45 20 = VARG46
21 = VARG47 22 = VARG48
23 = VARG49 24 = VARG50
25 = VARG51 26 = VARG52
27 = VARG53 28 = VARG54
29 = VARG55

29

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28
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FIGURE 2.10

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

01/10/74 PAGE 48

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

2-10

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 2 VERTICAL FACTOR 4

1 = VAR27 2 = VAR28
3 = VAR29 4 = VAR30
5 = VAR31 6 = VAR32
7 = VAR33 8 = VAR34
9 = VAR35 10 = VAR36
11 = VAR37 12 = VAR38
13 = VAR39 14 = VAR40
15 = VAR41 16 = VAR42
17 = VAR43 18 = VAR44
19 = VAR45 20 = VAR46
21 = VAR47 22 = VAR48
23 = VAR49 24 = VAR50
25 = VAR51 26 = VAR52
27 = VAR53 28 = VAR54
29 = VAR55

4

5

1511

2525

0

3

29

12

23

2220

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FIGURE 2.11

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

11/10/71 PAGE 40

2-11

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 2 VERTICAL FACTOR 5

1 = VAR027 2 = VAR029
3 = VAR029 4 = VAR030
5 = VAR031 6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033 8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035 10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037 12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039 14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041 16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043 18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045 20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047 22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049 24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051 26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053 28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055

24 2
25 5
7 13 16
3 15 17 19
21 23 24 25
26 27 28 29
30 31 32 33
34 35 36 37
38 39 40 41
42 43 44 45
46 47 48 49
50 51 52 53
54 55 56 57
58 59 60 61
62 63 64 65
66 67 68 69
70 71 72 73
74 75 76 77
78 79 80 81
82 83 84 85
86 87 88 89
90 91 92 93
94 95 96 97
98 99 100 101
102 103 104 105
106 107 108 109
110 111 112 113
114 115 116 117
118 119 120 121
122 123 124 125
126 127 128 129
130 131 132 133
134 135 136 137
138 139 140 141
142 143 144 145
146 147 148 149
150 151 152 153
154 155 156 157
158 159 160 161
162 163 164 165
166 167 168 169
170 171 172 173
174 175 176 177
178 179 180 181
182 183 184 185
186 187 188 189
190 191 192 193
194 195 196 197
198 199 200 201
202 203 204 205
206 207 208 209
210 211 212 213
214 215 216 217
218 219 220 221
222 223 224 225
226 227 228 229
230 231 232 233
234 235 236 237
238 239 240 241
242 243 244 245
246 247 248 249
250 251 252 253
254 255 256 257
258 259 260 261
262 263 264 265
266 267 268 269
270 271 272 273
274 275 276 277
278 279 280 281
282 283 284 285
286 287 288 289
290 291 292 293
294 295 296 297
298 299 300 301
302 303 304 305
306 307 308 309
310 311 312 313
314 315 316 317
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326 327 328 329
330 331 332 333
334 335 336 337
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386 387 388 389
390 391 392 393
394 395 396 397
398 399 400 401
402 403 404 405
406 407 408 409
410 411 412 413
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530 531 532 533
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550 551 552 553
554 555 556 557
558 559 560 561
562 563 564 565
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570 571 572 573
574 575 576 577
578 579 580 581
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586 587 588 589
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654 655 656 657
658 659 660 661
662 663 664 665
666 667 668 669
670 671 672 673
674 675 676 677
678 679 680 681
682 683 684 685
686 687 688 689
690 691 692 693
694 695 696 697
698 699 700 701
702 703 704 705
706 707 708 709
710 711 712 713
714 715 716 717
718 719 720 721
722 723 724 725
726 727 728 729
730 731 732 733
734 735 736 737
738 739 740 741
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750 751 752 753
754 755 756 757
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762 763 764 765
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770 771 772 773
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778 779 780 781
782 783 784 785
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790 791 792 793
794 795 796 797
798 799 800 801
802 803 804 805
806 807 808 809
810 811 812 813
814 815 816 817
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830 831 832 833
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842 843 844 845
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850 851 852 853
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858 859 860 861
862 863 864 865
866 867 868 869
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994 995 996 997
998 999 1000 1001
1002 1003 1004 1005
1006 1007 1008 1009
1010 1011 1012 1013
1014 1015 1016 1017
1018 1019 1020 1021
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1158 1159 1160 1161
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1178 1179 1180 1181
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1862 1863 1864 1865
1866 1867 1868 1869
1870 1871 1872 1873
1874 1875 1876 1877
1878 1879 1880 1881
1882 1883 1884 1885
1886 1887 1888 1889
1890 1891 1892 1893
1894 1895 1896 1897
1898 1899 1900 1901
1902 1903 1904 1905
1906 1907 1908 1909
1910 1911 1912 1913
1914 1915 1916 1917
1918 1919 1920 1921
1922 1923 1924 1925
1926 1927 1928 1929
1930 1931 1932 1933
1934 1935 1936 1937
1938 1939 1940 1941
1942 1943 1944 1945
1946 1947 1948 1949
1950 1951 1952 1953
1954 1955 1956 1957
1958 1959 1960 1961
1962 1963 1964 1965
1966 1967 1968 1969
1970 1971 1972 1973
1974 1975 1976 1977
1978 1979 1980 1981
1982 1983 1984 1985
1986 1987 1988 1989
1990 1991 1992 1993
1994 1995 1996 1997
1998 1999 2000 2001
2002 2003 2004 2005
2006 2007 2008 2009
2010 2011 2012 2013
2014 2015 2016 2017
2018 2019 2020 2021
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2206 2207 2208 2209
2210 2211 2212 2213
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2230 2231 2232 2233
2234 2235 2236 2237
2238 2239 2240 2241
2242 2243 2244 2245
2246 2247 2248 2249
2250 2251 2252 2253
2254 2255 2256 2257
2258 2259 2260 2261
2262 2263 2264 2265
2266 2267 2268 2269
2270 2271 2272 2273
2274 2275 2276 2277
2278 2279 2280 2281
2282 2283 2284 2285
2286 2287 2288 2289
2290 2291 2292 2293
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2338 2339 2340 2341
2342 2343 2344 2345
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2354 2355 2356 2357
2358 2359 2360 2361
2362 2363 2364 2365
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2378 2379 2380 2381
2382 2383 2384 2385
2386 2387 2388 2389
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2454 2455 2456 2457
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2462 2463

FIGURE 2.12

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

12/14/71

55 1500

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/76)
SU8FILE EDMONTON

2-12

[illegible]

2-13

1	=	VAP027	2	=	VAP028
3	=	VAP029	4	=	VAP030
5	=	VAP031	6	=	VAP032
7	=	VAP033	8	=	VAP034
9	=	VAP035	10	=	VAP036
11	=	VAP037	12	=	VAP038
13	=	VAP039	14	=	VAP040
15	=	VAP041	16	=	VAP042
17	=	VAP043	18	=	VAP044
19	=	VAP045	21	=	VAP046
21	=	VAP047	22	=	VAP048
23	=	VAP049	24	=	VAP050
25	=	VAP051	26	=	VAP052
27	=	VAP053	28	=	VAP054
29	=	VAP055			

51

[illegible]

FIGURE 2.14

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

1/19/71

PAGE 52

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

2-14

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 3 VERTICAL FACTOR 4

1 = VAR027	2 = VAR028
3 = VAR029	4 = VAR030
5 = VAR031	6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033	8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035	10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037	12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039	14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041	16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043	18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045	20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047	22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049	24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051	26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053	28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055	

17* 18* 19* 20* 21* 22* 23* 24* 25* 26* 27* 28* 29* 30* 31* 32* 33* 34* 35* 36* 37* 38* 39* 40* 41* 42* 43* 44* 45* 46* 47* 48* 49* 50* 51* 52* 53* 54* 55* 56* 57* 58* 59* 60* 61* 62* 63* 64* 65* 66* 67* 68* 69* 70* 71* 72* 73* 74* 75* 76* 77* 78* 79* 80* 81* 82* 83* 84* 85* 86* 87* 88* 89* 90* 91* 92* 93* 94* 95* 96* 97* 98* 99* 100*

FIGURE 2.15

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDIOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/76)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

01/19/71 PAGE 53

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 3 VERTICAL FACTOR 5

1 = VAR027 2 = VAR028
3 = VAR029 4 = VAR029
5 = VAR031 6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033 8 = VAR024
9 = VAR035 10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037 12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039 14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041 16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043 18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045 20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047 22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049 24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051 26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053 28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055

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305

FIGURE 2.16

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

11/11/71 PAGE 54

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 3 VERTICAL FACTOR 6

2.16

1 = VAR 27 2 = VAR 28
3 = VAR 29 4 = VAR 30
5 = VAR 31 6 = VAR 32
7 = VAR 33 8 = VAR 34
9 = VAR 35 10 = VAR 36
11 = VAR 37 12 = VAR 38
13 = VAR 39 14 = VAR 40
15 = VAR 41 16 = VAR 42
17 = VAR 43 18 = VAR 44
19 = VAR 45 20 = VAR 46
21 = VAR 47 22 = VAR 48
23 = VAR 49 24 = VAR 50
25 = VAR 51 26 = VAR 52
27 = VAR 53 28 = VAR 54
29 = VAR 55

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

212 127 12 152226 12 18 23

5

306

FIGURE 2.17

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

01/19/71 PAGE 55

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

2-17

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 3 VERTICAL FACTOR 7

1 = VAR027 2 = VAR028
3 = VAR029 4 = VAR030
5 = VAR031 6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033 8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035 10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037 12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039 14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041 16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043 18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045 20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047 22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049 24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051 26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053 28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9

17*
152116*2513
2826*2927 12
22 *2314

19

18

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307

FIGURE 2.18

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/79)
SURFILE EDMONTON

11/19/71

PAGE 56

2-18

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 4 VERTICAL FACTOR 5

1 = VAR027 2 = VAR029
3 = VAR029 4 = VAR030
5 = VAR031 6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033 8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035 10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037 12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039 14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041 16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043 18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045 20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047 22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049 24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051 26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053 28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055

27*
28*
29* 26

2* 24
3* 25 5
4* 6

7* 13 18
1221* 9 15
15* 2223.4
16* 17 17

308

FIGURE 2.19

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEALOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

01/19/71

PAGE 57

2-19

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 4 VERTICAL FACTOR 6

- 1 = VAR027 2 = VAR028
3 = VAR029 4 = VAR030
5 = VAR031 6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033 8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035 10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037 12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039 14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041 16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043 18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045 20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047 22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049 24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051 26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053 28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055

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2926*

72 6

1227*

22

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SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION) DATE = 06/11/77)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

01/19/71

354

02-2

	HORIZONTAL FACTOR	4	VERTICAL FACTOR	7
1	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
3	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
4	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
5	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
6	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
7	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
8	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
9	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
10	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
11	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
12	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
13	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
14	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
15	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
16	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
17	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
18	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
19	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
20	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
21	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
22	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
23	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
24	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
25	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
26	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
27	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
28	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
29	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
30	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
31	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
32	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
33	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
34	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
35	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
36	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
37	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
38	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
39	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
40	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
41	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
42	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
43	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
44	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
45	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
46	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
47	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
48	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
49	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
50	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
51	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
52	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
53	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
54	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
55	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
56	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
57	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
58	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
59	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
60	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
61	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
62	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
63	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
64	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
65				

1	=	VARJ27	2	=	VARC28
3	=	VARC29	4	=	VARC30
5	=	VARC31	6	=	VARC32
7	=	VARC33	8	=	VARC34
9	=	VARC35	10	=	VARC36
11	=	VARC37	12	=	VARC38
13	=	VARC39	14	=	VARC41
15	=	VARC41	16	=	VARC42
17	=	VARC43	18	=	VARC44
19	=	VARC45	20	=	VARC46
21	=	VARC47	22	=	VARC48
23	=	VARC49	24	=	VARC50
25	=	VARC51	26	=	VARC52
27	=	VARC53	28	=	VARC54
29	=	VARC55			

9	21	2515	17
9	2928	2611	16
14	2223		15

310

FIGURE 2.21

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 04/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

21/10/71

PAGE 53

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 5 VERTICAL FACTOR 6

2-21

1 = VAR027	2 = VAR028
3 = VAR029	4 = VAR030
5 = VAR031	6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033	8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035	10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037	12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039	14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041	16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043	18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045	20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047	22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049	24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051	26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053	28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055	

2524

20 24 27

26

10#

3* 7 6 2

2021*16

2217*13

23 #18

1* 5

311

1	=	VAP027	2	=	VAP028
3	=	VAP029	4	=	VAP030
5	=	VAP031	6	=	VAP032
7	=	VAP033	9	=	VAP034
9	=	VAP035	10	=	VAP036
11	=	VAP037	12	=	VAP038
13	=	VAP039	14	=	VAP040
15	=	VAP041	16	=	VAP042
17	=	VAP043	18	=	VAP044
19	=	VAP045	20	=	VAP046
21	=	VAP047	22	=	VAP048
23	=	VAP049	24	=	VAP050
25	=	VAP051	26	=	VAP052
27	=	VAP053	28	=	VAP054
29	=	VAP055			

2-23

[illegible]

12827

374

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312

FIGURE 2.24

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/77)
SURFILE EDMONTON

01/10/77 PAGE 41

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 6 VERTICAL FACTOR 7

2-24

1 = VAR027	2 = VAR028
3 = VAR029	4 = VAR030
5 = VAR031	6 = VAR032
7 = VAR033	8 = VAR034
9 = VAR035	10 = VAR036
11 = VAR037	12 = VAR038
13 = VAR039	14 = VAR040
15 = VAR041	16 = VAR042
17 = VAR043	18 = VAR044
19 = VAR045	20 = VAR046
21 = VAR047	22 = VAR048
23 = VAR049	24 = VAR050
25 = VAR051	26 = VAR052
27 = VAR053	28 = VAR054
29 = VAR055	

1 3 4 5

17*
15*21 7
26*27 29
222*14

19

10
9

5

313

FIGURE 3.1

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/73)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

PAGE 9

3-1

FACTOR SCORE COEFFICIENTS

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7
VAR001	-0.05093	0.00480	-0.06540	0.15140	0.16589	0.11123	-0.21477
VAR002	0.02402	0.00856	-0.02552	0.07122	-0.01357	0.41155	0.01213
VAR003	0.01674	0.01872	0.01735	-0.14334	-0.06184	0.41172	0.03358
VAR004	-0.02081	0.01618	0.05276	0.01701	0.01823	0.00000	0.02673
VAR005	-0.02667	0.01374	0.04302	-0.05150	-0.01022	0.00000	0.00562
VAR006	0.01037	0.01695	0.00000	0.00671	-0.00618	-0.07310	-0.00000
VAR007	-0.00433	0.01546	-0.00102	0.01033	0.01929	0.15563	-0.02779
VAR008	0.00208	0.02952	-0.00278	0.01064	-0.02727	0.007516	0.02817
VAR009	0.04565	-0.00543	0.00216	0.01530	0.00281	-0.01571	-0.02171
VAR010	0.05776	-0.02271	-0.04627	0.01481	-0.01373	0.00640	0.01754
VAR011	0.00005	-0.04326	0.00000	-0.04041	-0.01188	0.00702	-0.00477
VAR012	0.02670	0.03724	0.01315	0.04470	0.00959	-0.01583	0.05575
VAR013	0.00388	-0.01352	-0.00651	-0.00634	0.00229	-0.00441	0.00000
VAR014	-0.02473	-0.02666	-0.02205	-0.07931	0.00000	-0.00290	0.05573
VAR015	0.02471	-0.04674	-0.00717	0.02715	0.01179	0.02362	0.00001
VAR016	0.00000	-0.05609	-0.01351	0.01672	0.01232	-0.01027	0.01273
VAR017	0.01318	-0.00521	0.00986	-0.00218	-0.00000	-0.00317	0.01001
VAR018	0.02671	-0.01536	-0.01233	0.03550	-0.00627	0.05058	-0.00774
VAR019	0.00000	0.00177	-0.00000	-0.00000	0.00671	0.00600	0.00441
VAR020	0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR021	0.00000	-0.04281	0.01169	-0.01214	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR022	0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR023	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR024	-0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR025	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR026	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000

GROUP
COHERENCE

↓

↓

↓

Job Satisfaction
15,16,17,18,19,21 24
25 26

Job CHANGE
5,6

Job UNCERTAINTY
8,9,10

Job ROLE DEFINITION
13,14

Job ROUTINE
1,2,3,4,7,11

12) Delete

↑(20,22,23) ↓

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FIGURE 3.2

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

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FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

3-2

VARIMAX POTATED FACTOR MATRIX

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7
VAR001	-0.29442	-0.00134	0.00347	0.41071	0.37972	0.32228	-0.21006
VAR002	-0.07792	-0.02179	-0.20191	0.21521	-0.01607	0.64157	0.03481
VAR003	-0.01100	0.02302	-0.03000	-0.06895	0.03452	0.00000	0.02220
VAR004	-0.02141	-0.00542	0.15005	0.29114	0.02173	0.00000	0.00521
VAR005	-0.16752	-0.00271	0.00000	0.10531	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000
VAR006	-0.00438	-0.00207	0.00000	0.29713	0.00000	-0.00000	-0.01224
VAR007	-0.12088	-0.00295	0.02773	0.00564	0.00000	0.00000	-0.01154
VAR008	-0.13034	-0.00214	0.16243	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR009	-0.07618	-0.00517	0.17004	0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00000
VAR010	-0.00557	-0.10000	0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR011	0.10000	-0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR012	0.10000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR013	0.11000	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR014	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR015	0.00000	0.11000	-0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000
VAR016	0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.11000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000
VAR017	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR018	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR019	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR020	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR021	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR022	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR023	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR024	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR025	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
VAR026	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000

TRANSFORMATION MATRIX

FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4	FACTOR 5	FACTOR 6	FACTOR 7
FACTOR 1	0.73353	0.00000	-0.42284	-0.11004	-0.27531	-0.00000
FACTOR 2	0.44970	0.26279	0.48584	0.43847	0.41430	0.00000
FACTOR 3	-0.34215	0.78676	0.21035	-0.33490	-0.16784	0.00000
FACTOR 4	-0.39450	0.38423	-0.21906	0.31412	0.42380	-0.17431
FACTOR 5	-0.17313	0.00000	-0.56043	0.49256	-0.00000	-0.24204
FACTOR 6	-0.14036	0.17060	-0.20000	0.30000	-0.32544	0.00000
FACTOR 7	-0.00000	0.00000	0.40131	0.40728	-0.00000	-0.42837

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FIGURE 3.3

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLGY PROJECT

01/10/71

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FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

3-3

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 1 VERTICAL FACTOR 2

1 = VAR001 2 = VAR002
3 = VAR003 4 = VAR004
5 = VAR005 6 = VAR006
7 = VAR007 8 = VAR008
9 = VAR009 10 = VAR010
11 = VAR011 12 = VAR012
13 = VAR013 14 = VAR014
15 = VAR015 16 = VAR016
17 = VAR017 18 = VAR018
19 = VAR019 20 = VAR020
21 = VAR021 22 = VAR022
23 = VAR023 24 = VAR024
25 = VAR025 26 = VAR026

24 25
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14 15
21 16 17
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8 9 10

1 4

FIGURE 3.5

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

01/19/71

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FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/71)
SURFILE EDMONTON

3-5

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 1	VERTICAL FACTOR 4
1	1 = VAR001 2 = VAR002 3 = VAR003 4 = VAR004 5 = VAR005 6 = VAR006 7 = VAR007 8 = VAR008 9 = VAR009 10 = VAR010 11 = VAR011 12 = VAR012 13 = VAR013 14 = VAR014 15 = VAR015 16 = VAR016 17 = VAR017 18 = VAR018 19 = VAR019 20 = VAR020 21 = VAR021 22 = VAR022 23 = VAR023 24 = VAR024 25 = VAR025 26 = VAR026
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FIGURE 3.6

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT			11/19/71	PAGE 13
FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)				
SUDFILE EDMONTON				
HORIZONTAL FACTOR 1		VERTICAL FACTOR 5		
1 = VARG01	2 = VARG02			
3 = VARG03	4 = VARG04			
5 = VARG05	6 = VARG06			
7 = VARG07	8 = VARG08			
9 = VARG09	10 = VARG10			
11 = VARG11	12 = VARG12			
13 = VARG13	14 = VARG14			
15 = VARG15	16 = VARG16			
17 = VARG17	18 = VARG18			
19 = VARG19	20 = VARG20			
21 = VARG21	22 = VARG22			
23 = VARG23	24 = VARG24			
25 = VARG25	26 = VARG26			
27 = VARG27	28 = VARG28			
29 = VARG29	30 = VARG30			
31 = VARG31	32 = VARG32			
33 = VARG33	34 = VARG34			
35 = VARG35	36 = VARG36			
37 = VARG37	38 = VARG38			
39 = VARG39	40 = VARG40			
41 = VARG41	42 = VARG42			
43 = VARG43	44 = VARG44			
45 = VARG45	46 = VARG46			
47 = VARG47	48 = VARG48			
49 = VARG49	50 = VARG50			
51 = VARG51	52 = VARG52			
53 = VARG53	54 = VARG54			
55 = VARG55	56 = VARG56			
57 = VARG57	58 = VARG58			
59 = VARG59	60 = VARG60			
61 = VARG61	62 = VARG62			
63 = VARG63	64 = VARG64			
65 = VARG65	66 = VARG66			
67 = VARG67	68 = VARG68			
69 = VARG69	70 = VARG70			
71 = VARG71	72 = VARG72			
73 = VARG73	74 = VARG74			
75 = VARG75	76 = VARG76			
77 = VARG77	78 = VARG78			
79 = VARG79	80 = VARG80			
81 = VARG81	82 = VARG82			
83 = VARG83	84 = VARG84			
85 = VARG85	86 = VARG86			
87 = VARG87	88 = VARG88			
89 = VARG89	90 = VARG90			
91 = VARG91	92 = VARG92			
93 = VARG93	94 = VARG94			
95 = VARG95	96 = VARG96			
97 = VARG97	98 = VARG98			
99 = VARG99	100 = VARG100			
101 = VARG101	102 = VARG102			
103 = VARG103	104 = VARG104			
105 = VARG105	106 = VARG106			
107 = VARG107	108 = VARG108			
109 = VARG109	110 = VARG110			
111 = VARG111	112 = VARG112			
113 = VARG113	114 = VARG114			
115 = VARG115	116 = VARG116			
117 = VARG117	118 = VARG118			
119 = VARG119	120 = VARG120			
121 = VARG121	122 = VARG122			
123 = VARG123	124 = VARG124			
125 = VARG125	126 = VARG126			
127 = VARG127	128 = VARG128			
129 = VARG129	130 = VARG130			
131 = VARG131	132 = VARG132			
133 = VARG133	134 = VARG134			
135 = VARG135	136 = VARG136			
137 = VARG137	138 = VARG138			
139 = VARG139	140 = VARG140			
141 = VARG141	142 = VARG142			
143 = VARG143	144 = VARG144			
145 = VARG145	146 = VARG146			
147 = VARG147	148 = VARG148			
149 = VARG149	150 = VARG150			
151 = VARG151	152 = VARG152			
153 = VARG153	154 = VARG154			
155 = VARG155	156 = VARG156			
157 = VARG157	158 = VARG158			
159 = VARG159	160 = VARG160			
161 = VARG161	162 = VARG162			
163 = VARG163	164 = VARG164			
165 = VARG165	166 = VARG166			
167 = VARG167	168 = VARG168			
169 = VARG169	170 = VARG170			
171 = VARG171	172 = VARG172			
173 = VARG173	174 = VARG174			
175 = VARG175	176 = VARG176			
177 = VARG177	178 = VARG178			
179 = VARG179	180 = VARG180			
181 = VARG181	182 = VARG182			
183 = VARG183	184 = VARG184			
185 = VARG185	186 = VARG186			
187 = VARG187	188 = VARG188			
189 = VARG189	190 = VARG190			
191 = VARG191	192 = VARG192			
193 = VARG193	194 = VARG194			
195 = VARG195	196 = VARG196			
197 = VARG197	198 = VARG198			
199 = VARG199	200 = VARG200			
201 = VARG201	202 = VARG202			
203 = VARG203	204 = VARG204			
205 = VARG205	206 = VARG206			
207 = VARG207	208 = VARG208			
209 = VARG209	210 = VARG210			
211 = VARG211	212 = VARG212			
213 = VARG213	214 = VARG214			
215 = VARG215	216 = VARG216			
217 = VARG217	218 = VARG218			
219 = VARG219	220 = VARG220			
221 = VARG221	222 = VARG222			
223 = VARG223	224 = VARG224			
225 = VARG225	226 = VARG226			
227 = VARG227	228 = VARG228			
229 = VARG229	230 = VARG230			
231 = VARG231	232 = VARG232			
233 = VARG233	234 = VARG234			
235 = VARG235	236 = VARG236			
237 = VARG237	238 = VARG238			
239 = VARG239	240 = VARG240			
241 = VARG241	242 = VARG242			
243 = VARG243	244 = VARG244			
245 = VARG245	246 = VARG246			
247 = VARG247	248 = VARG248			
249 = VARG249	250 = VARG250			
251 = VARG251	252 = VARG252			
253 = VARG253	254 = VARG254			
255 = VARG255	256 = VARG256			
257 = VARG257	258 = VARG258			
259 = VARG259	260 = VARG260			
261 = VARG261	262 = VARG262			
263 = VARG263	264 = VARG264			
265 = VARG265	266 = VARG266			
267 = VARG267	268 = VARG268			
269 = VARG269	270 = VARG270			
271 = VARG271	272 = VARG272			
273 = VARG273	274 = VARG274			
275 = VARG275	276 = VARG276			
277 = VARG277	278 = VARG278			
279 = VARG279	280 = VARG280			
281 = VARG281	282 = VARG282			
283 = VARG283	284 = VARG284			
285 = VARG285	286 = VARG286			
287 = VARG287	288 = VARG288			
289 = VARG289	290 = VARG290			
291 = VARG291	292 = VARG292			
293 = VARG293	294 = VARG294			
295 = VARG295	296 = VARG296			
297 = VARG297	298 = VARG298			
299 = VARG299	300 = VARG300			
301 = VARG301	302 = VARG302			
303 = VARG303	304 = VARG304			
305 = VARG305	306 = VARG306			
307 = VARG307	308 = VARG308			
309 = VARG309	310 = VARG310			
311 = VARG311	312 = VARG312			
313 = VARG313	314 = VARG314			
315 = VARG315	316 = VARG316			
317 = VARG317	318 = VARG318			
319 = VARG319	320 = VARG320			
321 = VARG321	322 = VARG322			
323 = VARG323	324 = VARG324			
325 = VARG325	326 = VARG326			
327 = VARG327	328 = VARG328			
329 = VARG329	330 = VARG330			
331 = VARG331	332 = VARG332			
333 = VARG333	334 = VARG334			
335 = VARG335	336 = VARG336			
337 = VARG337	338 = VARG338			
339 = VARG339	340 = VARG340			
341 = VARG341	342 = VARG342			
343 = VARG343	344 = VARG344			
345 = VARG345	346 = VARG346			
347 = VARG347	348 = VARG348			
349 = VARG349	350 = VARG350			
351 = VARG351	352 = VARG352			
353 = VARG353	354 = VARG354			
355 = VARG355	356 = VARG356			
357 = VARG357	358 = VARG358			
359 = VARG359	360 = VARG360			
361 = VARG361	362 = VARG362			
363 = VARG363	364 = VARG364			
365 = VARG365	366 = VARG366			
367 = VARG367	368 = VARG368			
369 = VARG369	370 = VARG370			
371 = VARG371	372 = VARG372			
373 = VARG373	374 = VARG374			
375 = VARG375	376 = VARG376			
377 = VARG377	378 = VARG378			
379 = VARG379	380 = VARG380			
381 = VARG381	382 = VARG382			
383 = VARG383	384 = VARG384			
385 = VARG385	386 = VARG386			
387 = VARG387	388 = VARG388			
389 = VARG389	390 = VARG390			
391 = VARG391	392 = VARG392			
393 = VARG393	394 = VARG394			
395 = VARG395	396 = VARG396			
397 = VARG397	398 = VARG398			
399 = VARG399	400 = VARG400			
401 = VARG401	402 = VARG402			
403 = VARG403	404 = VARG404			
405 = VARG405	406 = VARG406			
407 = VARG407	408 = VARG408			
409 = VARG409	410 = VARG410			
411 = VARG411	412 = VARG412			
413 = VARG413	414 = VARG414			
415 = VARG415	416 = VARG416			
417 = VARG417	418 = VARG418			
419 = VARG419	420 = VARG420			
421 = VARG421	422 = VARG422			
423 = VARG423	424 = VARG424			
425 = VARG425	426 = VARG426			
427 = VARG427	428 = VARG428			
429 = VARG429	430 = VARG430			
431 = VARG431	432 = VARG432			
433 = VARG433	434 = VARG434			
435 = VARG435	436 = VARG436			
437 = VARG437	438 = VARG438			
439 = VARG439	440 = VARG440			
441 = VARG441	442 = VARG442			
443 = VARG443	444 = VARG444			
445 = VARG445	446 = VARG446			
447 = VARG447	448 = VARG448			
449 = VARG449	450 = VARG450			
451 = VARG451	452 = VARG452			
453 = VARG453	454 = VARG454			
455 = VARG455	456 = VARG456			
457 = VARG457	458 = VARG458			
459 = VARG459	460 = VARG460			
461 = VARG461	462 = VARG462			
463 = VARG463	464 = VARG464			
465 = VARG465	466 = VARG466			
467 = VARG467	468 = VARG468			
469 = VARG469	470 = VARG470			
471 = VARG471	472 = VARG472			
473 = VARG473	474 = VARG474			
475 = VARG475	476 = VARG476			
477 = VARG477	478 = VARG478			
479 = VARG479	480 = VARG480			
481 = VARG481	482 = VARG482			
483 = VARG483	484 = VARG484			
485 = VARG485	486 = VARG486			
487 = VARG487	488 = VARG488			
489 = VARG489	490 = VARG490			
491 = VARG491	492 = VARG492			
493 = VARG493	494 = VARG494			
495 = VARG495	496 = VARG496			
497 = VARG497	498 = VARG498			
499 = VARG499	500 = VARG500			

FIGURE 3.7

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

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FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SURFILE EDMONTON

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 1 VERTICAL FACTOR 6

1 = VAR001 2 = VAR002
3 = VAR003 4 = VAR004
5 = VAR005 6 = VAR006
7 = VAR007 8 = VAR008
9 = VAR009 10 = VAR010
11 = VAR011 12 = VAR012
13 = VAR013 14 = VAR014
15 = VAR015 16 = VAR016
17 = VAR017 18 = VAR018
19 = VAR019 20 = VAR020
21 = VAR021 22 = VAR022
23 = VAR023 24 = VAR024
25 = VAR025 26 = VAR026

3-7

2 3 4 7 11

1 10 13 14 15 20 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

320

28.

	HORIZONTAL FACTOR 2	VERTICAL FACTOR 3
1	0.000000	0.000000
2	0.000000	0.000000
3	0.000000	0.000000
4	0.000000	0.000000
5	0.000000	0.000000
6	0.000000	0.000000
7	0.000000	0.000000
8	0.000000	0.000000
9	0.000000	0.000000
10	0.000000	0.000000
11	0.000000	0.000000
12	0.000000	0.000000
13	0.000000	0.000000
14	0.000000	0.000000
15	0.000000	0.000000
16	0.000000	0.000000
17	0.000000	0.000000
18	0.000000	0.000000
19	0.000000	0.000000
20	0.000000	0.000000
21	0.000000	0.000000
22	0.000000	0.000000
23	0.000000	0.000000
24	0.000000	0.000000
25	0.000000	0.000000
26	0.000000	0.000000
27	0.000000	0.000000
28	0.000000	0.000000
29	0.000000	0.000000
30	0.000000	0.000000
31	0.000000	0.000000
32	0.000000	0.000000
33	0.000000	0.000000
34	0.000000	0.000000
35	0.000000	0.000000
36	0.000000	0.000000
37	0.000000	0.000000
38	0.000000	0.000000
39	0.000000	0.000000
40	0.000000	0.000000
41	0.000000	0.000000
42	0.000000	0.000000
43	0.000000	0.000000
44	0.000000	0.000000
45	0.000000	0.000000
46	0.000000	0.000000
47	0.000000	0.000000
48	0.000000	0.000000
49	0.000000	0.000000
50	0.000000	0.000000
51	0.000000	0.000000
52	0.000000	0.000000
53	0.000000	0.000000
54	0.000000	0.000000
55	0.000000	0.000000
56	0.000000	0.000000
57	0.000000	0.000000
58	0.000000	0.000000
59	0.000000	0.000000
60	0.000000	0.000000
61	0.000000	0.000000
62	0.000000	0.000000
63	0.000000	0.000000
64	0.000000	0.000000
65	0.000000	0.000000
66	0.000000	0.000000
67	0.000000	0.000000
68	0.000000	0.000000
69	0.000000	0.000000
70	0.000000	0.000000
71	0.000000	0.000000
72	0.000000	0.000000
73	0.000000	0.000000
74	0.000000	0.000000
75	0.000000	0.000000
76	0.000000	0.000000
77	0.000000	0.000000
78	0.000000	0.000000
79	0.000000	0.000000
80	0.000000	0.000000
81	0.000000	0.000000
82	0.000000	0.000000
83	0.000000	0.000000
84	0.000000	0.000000
85	0.000000	0.000000
86	0.000000	0.000000
87	0.000000	0.000000
88	0.000000	0.000000
89	0.000000	0.000000
90	0.000000	0.000000
91	0.000000	0.000000
92	0.000000	0.000000
93	0.000000	0.000000
94	0.000000	0.000000
95		

1	=	VAP001	2	=	VAP022
3	=	VAP003	4	=	VAP004
5	=	VAP005	6	=	VAP006
7	=	VAP007	8	=	VAP008
9	=	VAP009	10	=	VAP010
11	=	VAP011	12	=	VAP012
13	=	VAP013	14	=	VAP014
15	=	VAP015	16	=	VAP016
17	=	VAP017	18	=	VAP018
19	=	VAP019	20	=	VAP020
21	=	VAP021	22	=	VAP022
23	=	VAP023	24	=	VAP024
25	=	VAP025	26	=	VAP026

98	131721	23	13114
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FIGURE 3.9

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR INFOLOGY PROJECT

01/19/71 PAGE 17

FILE INFOLOG (CREATION DATE = 06/11/73)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

3-9

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 2 VERTICAL FACTOR 4

1 = VAR001 2 = VAR002
3 = VAR003 4 = VAR004
5 = VAR005 6 = VAR006
7 = VAR007 8 = VAR008
9 = VAR009 10 = VAR010
11 = VAR011 12 = VAR012
13 = VAR013 14 = VAR014
15 = VAR015 16 = VAR016
17 = VAR017 18 = VAR018
19 = VAR019 20 = VAR020
21 = VAR021 22 = VAR022
23 = VAR023 24 = VAR024
25 = VAR025 26 = VAR026

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FIGURE 3.10

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

01/10/71

PAGE 10

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 2 VERTICAL FACTOR 5

1 = VARG01 2 = VARG02
3 = VARG03 4 = VARG04
5 = VARG05 6 = VARG06
7 = VARG07 8 = VARG08
9 = VARG09 10 = VARG10
11 = VARG11 12 = VARG12
13 = VARG13 14 = VARG14
15 = VARG15 16 = VARG16
17 = VARG17 18 = VARG18
19 = VARG19 20 = VARG20
21 = VARG21 22 = VARG22
23 = VARG23 24 = VARG24
25 = VARG25 26 = VARG26

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FIGURE 3.11

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SURFILE EDMONTON

01/19/71 PAGE 10

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 2 VERTICAL FACTOR 6

3-11

1 = VAP001	2 = VAP002
3 = VAP003	4 = VAP004
5 = VAP005	6 = VAP006
7 = VAP007	8 = VAP008
9 = VAP009	10 = VAP010
11 = VAP011	12 = VAP012
13 = VAP013	14 = VAP014
15 = VAP015	16 = VAP016
17 = VAP017	18 = VAP018
19 = VAP019	20 = VAP020
21 = VAP021	22 = VAP022
23 = VAP023	24 = VAP024
25 = VAP025	26 = VAP026

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84*	91
85*	92
86*	93
87*	94
88*	95
89*	96
90*	97
91*	98
92*	99
93*	100

FIGURE 3.12

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/76)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

01/15/71 PAGE 21

3-12

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 3 VERTICAL FACTOR 4

1 = VAR001 2 = VAR002
3 = VAR003 4 = VAR004
5 = VAR005 6 = VAR006
7 = VAR007 8 = VAR008
9 = VAR009 10 = VAR010
11 = VAR011 12 = VAR012
13 = VAR013 14 = VAR014
15 = VAR015 16 = VAR016
17 = VAR017 18 = VAR018
19 = VAR019 20 = VAR020
21 = VAR021 22 = VAR022
23 = VAR023 24 = VAR024
25 = VAR025 26 = VAR026

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FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/73)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

3.13

HORIZONTAL FACTOR	3	VERTICAL FACTOR	5
1 =	VARC01	2 =	VARC02
3 =	VARC03	4 =	VARC04
5 =	VARC05	6 =	VARC06
7 =	VARC07	8 =	VARC08
9 =	VARC09	10 =	VARC10
11 =	VARC11	12 =	VARC12
13 =	VARC13	14 =	VARC14
15 =	VARC15	16 =	VARC16
17 =	VARC17	18 =	VARC18
19 =	VARC19	20 =	VARC20
21 =	VARC21	22 =	VARC22
23 =	VARC23	24 =	VARC24
25 =	VARC25	26 =	VARC26

FIGURE 3.16

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/79)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

03/10/71

PAGE 23

3-16

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 3 VERTICAL FACTOR 6

1 = VAR001 2 = VAR002
3 = VAR003 4 = VAR004
5 = VAR005 6 = VAR006
7 = VAR007 8 = VAR008
9 = VAR009 10 = VAR010
11 = VAR011 12 = VAR012
13 = VAR013 14 = VAR014
15 = VAR015 16 = VAR016
17 = VAR017 18 = VAR018
19 = VAR019 20 = VAR020
21 = VAR021 22 = VAR022
23 = VAR023 24 = VAR024
25 = VAR025 26 = VAR026



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SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

01/10/71

PAGE 24

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 3 VERTICAL FACTOR 7

1 = VAR001 2 = VAR002
3 = VAR003 4 = VAR004
5 = VAR005 6 = VAR006
7 = VAR007 8 = VAR008
9 = VAR009 10 = VAR010
11 = VAR011 12 = VAR012
13 = VAR013 14 = VAR014
15 = VAR015 16 = VAR016
17 = VAR017 18 = VAR018
19 = VAR019 20 = VAR020
21 = VAR021 22 = VAR022
23 = VAR023 24 = VAR024
25 = VAR025 26 = VAR026

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SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDEOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SURFILE EDMONTON

11/19/71

PAGE 25

3-17

HORIZONTAL FACTOR		VERTICAL FACTOR		5	
14	13	1 = VAR021	2 = VAR062		
		3 = VAR063	4 = VAR064		
		5 = VAR065	6 = VAR066		
		7 = VAR067	8 = VAR068		
		9 = VAR069	10 = VAR069		
		11 = VAR011	12 = VAR012		
		13 = VAR013	14 = VAR014		
		15 = VAR015	16 = VAR016		
		17 = VAR017	18 = VAR018		
		19 = VAR019	20 = VAR020		
		21 = VAR021	22 = VAR022		
		23 = VAR023	24 = VAR024		
		25 = VAR025	26 = VAR026		

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/70)
SURFILE EDMONTON

318

HORIZONTAL FACTOR	4	VERTICAL FACTOR	6
1 = VAR01	2 = VAR02		
3 = VAR03	4 = VAR04		
5 = VAR05	6 = VAR06		
7 = VAR07	8 = VAR08		
9 = VAR09	10 = VAR10		
11 = VAR11	12 = VAR12		
13 = VAR13	14 = VAR14		
15 = VAR15	16 = VAR16		
17 = VAR17	18 = VAR18		
19 = VAR19	20 = VAR20		
21 = VAR21	22 = VAR22		
23 = VAR23	24 = VAR24		
25 = VAR25	26 = VAR26		

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FIGURE 3.19

[illegible]

FIGURE 3.20

SUMMARY OF SELECTED VARIABLES FOR IDEOLOGY PROJECT

FILE IDPOL (CREATION DATE = 06/11/73)
SUBFILE EDMONTON

PAGE 28

3.20

HORIZONTAL FACTOR 5 VERTICAL FACTOR 6

1 = VAR001 2 = VAR002
3 = VAR003 4 = VAR004
5 = VAR005 6 = VAR006
7 = VAR007 8 = VAR008
9 = VAR009 10 = VAR010
11 = VAR011 12 = VAR012
13 = VAR013 14 = VAR014
15 = VAR015 16 = VAR016
17 = VAR017 18 = VAR018
19 = VAR019 20 = VAR020
21 = VAR021 22 = VAR022
23 = VAR023 24 = VAR024
25 = VAR025 26 = VAR026



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APPENDIX C

Job Satisfaction

TABLE 4.1

JOB SATISFACTION AND LEVEL IN HIERARCHY

Level	Job Satisfaction				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Executive	55	0.0%	38.2%	61.8%	100%	2.618
Department Head	211	3.8	50.7	45.5	100	2.417
Staff	261	4.2	54.8	41.0	100	2.368
Foreman/Cler.Sup.	93	6.5	65.0	28.0	100	2.215
Total	620					

TABLE 4.2

JOB SATISFACTION AND NUMBER OF PROMOTIONS

No.of Promotions	Job Satisfaction				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Under 2	286	4.5%	52.8%	42.7%	100%	2.381
2 - 4	220	3.6	52.3	44.1	100	2.405
5 or over	115	3.5	57.4	39.1	100	2.357
Total	621					

TABLE 4.3

ORGANIZATION FUNCTION AND JOB SATISFACTION

Organization Function	Job Satisfaction				Total	Mean
	N	Low	Medium	High		
Production	74	10.8%	55.4%	33.8%	100%	2.230
Marketing	161	1.9	49.7	48.4	100	2.466
Acc. and Finance	196	4.1	56.1	39.8	100	2.357
Research & Dev.	69	4.3	56.5	39.1	100	2.348
Purchasing	27	7.4	44.4	48.1	100	2.407
Personnel	54	1.9	40.7	57.4	100	2.556
Total	581					

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